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THE AEROPLANE

ItS PART IN WAR LECTURE BY COLONEL SLEEMAN WAR WILL BE WON BY SCIENCE Tho work of the aeroplane in war was discussed by Colonel J. L. Sleeman, ■1.G.5., Director of Infantry Training, in a lecture before Ihe linkers' Institute at tho Garrison Rail last night. Colonel Sleeman treated his subject in a very interesting way, and emphasised the importance of aircraft in the present war and in the dciencc organisation of tho i.iiitiv. in- ii:-n;u ollic. ir. lij give attention to the enormous possibilities of the new arm. Every ofiicer who wished to be efficient, said Colonel Sleeman, must g.ve close attention co aircralt and air strategy. The aeroplane had revolutionised war, and it was not at the end of its development. Prior to the war, in 1913 he had been attached to the lioyal Flying Corps as observer and photographer, and had then had some experience with machines that were now utterly obsolete. Britain was waiting at that time to see what progress was going to be made in aviation. France and Germany were pre-eminent in the new field, but tho lines of progress were .still uncertain, and the British War Office preferred to delay before building up an a:r service on ii large scale. In August, 1914, Britain had about seventy aeroplanes, and "they went to France with the old army.. The Germans undoubtedly had a. very big start. They had bigger and faster machines than. Britain had produced, and they had worked out theories ol air strategy. They had decided to use their machines uoc merely for reconnaissance, but also for directing artillery fire, and the result was seen in the speed and accuracy with which they brought their guns to bear upon t)ie British trenches. Fortunately, while Germany had the 'better machines, Britain and Franco had tho better airmen. Germany, moreover, had made a grave miscalculation in regard to the Zeppelins, which proved largely ineffective, and which had absorb-

Ed energy and effort that would have had most formidable results if applied to aeroplanes. Since then all the warring countries had given a vast amount Hi' attention to their air services, and tho aeroplane had become recognised as an arm that could not be neglected without inviting defeat. The progress made, in the development of the aeroplane during the 7.is.rTTTir years had been as great as fiftj years of peace would have been likely to produce, added Colonel Sleeman. liven during the last eighteen months the.jjrogress had been extraordinary. It had been the rule throughout the war that a type of aeroplane became obsolete witliin three, months, and this fact accounted. for some of the fluctuations in bhe fortunes of the air war. A new machine, produced by one side or the other, would render all the older machines relatively ineffective. The Germans had achieved great success for a short time with the Ftikker machine, which added simplicity of action ti? great speed. But within a few weeks the British and French had replied with a machine that na? teller than the lAikUvr, and since then there had been continual progress. There were fighting machines to-day that could fly 150 miles i> 11 hour, in almost any weather, and bombing machines that could lift eight tons. It could not be said that the limits of speed or lifting capacity had been reached. The limits were not in sight.

Napoleon had said that lie had spent most of his life "wondering what was on the other .side of the hill." The aeroplane had made it possible for the Generals of to-day (o know promptly and fairly accurately what was on the other side of every hill. The air presented no obstacles. An aeroplane could go out fifty miles and return with its observer's report in the time that a cavalry patrol would tnke going out a few miles. But cavalry and mounted rifles wore still a most important branch of the Army. The aeroplanes had not taken over their duhes._ It had simply relieved them of n portion of the task of reconnaissance. Colonel Slccinnn described the sensations of flying, and the peculiar difficulties that besot the pilot in time of war. Ordinary flying, such as would be undertaken in times of peace, was α-simple matter, and lie was convinced that aeroplanes were going to be used extensively for business and even social purposes in the near future. Wind was not an obstacle \o.t some penile believed j£ to l>e. ,xcopt at the start and the lnaUiig. Referring to aerial ladies, Colonel Sleeman said that the air service was now highly organised and specialised. There were three main branches—for fighting, observation, and for bombing. Ihe fighting machines were extraordinarily fast, and required the highest degree of skill on the part of the pilots. Their wing area was so small that they had to retain a speed of GO or 70 miles an hour when returning to the ground. The crack flyers used the fighting machines, and they usually were young men of the sensitive, highly-strung type. The aeroplaries went out in formations, the fighting machines protecting the others. It was Hie rule of f-qi'.idron commanders lo allot n definite altitude to each machine in a formation. The machines were all at different altitudes, in order to avoid collisions. Bombdropping had become a science. The bomber had to know his own speed and the direction and force , of perhaps severnls winds blowing in different direction's at various levels below him. Tho best cover for infantry from aeroplane observation was shadow. The flying- men could not see into shadows below them. They were quick to detect movement, and they could see shadows, so that men who wished .\n escape observation shonld lie- down. ■•• The Germans had tried a neat trick on one occasion. They had "about turned" marching troops'when aeroplanes appeared overhead, so as to give the impression that the men wore goi.ig away'from, nnd not towards, the trenches. There were many devices of this kind to bo studied by soldiers of to-day.

The importance in modern war had just been recognised by Britain in a very marked inannej , . The Royal Flying Corps and the'-lloyal Naval 'Air Service had been merged in the Royal Air Forco, whiclv'Wiis in have direct access In,the Army Council. In other words, Hie air service had become a distinct arm, like tho Army or the Navy. Tho air service would bo directed nnd developed by -its own experts. What the developments of the future were going to be it was impossible to pay. But it seemed not improbable that the Flying Arm w.is going to render wars practically impossible. The. aeroplane was proving that war was a matter of intimate lierson.il concern, not merely to soldiers but also to civilians in their own homes and ew.n to Ministers-and members of Parliament. A country that had 100,000 aeroplanes ready at the outset, of a war would bo able lo spread devastation over tho territory of its enemy within a few hours. There was no doubt that Germany, the most njgressive country in Riiropp, would have to realise in f'ulure that she was surrounded by other countries capable of sendim> vast air.fleets to her cities and industrial areas.

"We have to face these new nroblems, nnd (be sooner we fneo them die better for thn Empire." said Colonel Slrcman after further discussion of the influence of H\o npraplnnc on war. "There is no doubt timt we have bfen handicapped as a people by tlie inability of snmo of our officers to look into the future and pretiaro for the things flint were roi'iir to happen. We have fot to change that We are Roing to win this war all right, but we «hall have wen it at. very high cost. The war lias sliotrn us tli.it wo must imnrovp the standard of our officers. The Baltic of Waterloo is said lo iinvo been won on the playing fields of Eton. This war is going to be won in tho laboratories, of science. Brain nnd clwrijeter count more in battle today than mere pluck and muscle. Timt is an unpleasant fact we must face. Them lias been a tendency in our schools to produce youths who nre good at prnmes but not so good at their books. That, typo of man was invaluoble to the Empire in the old days, but the soldier* of the future must have knowledge and highly-developed brains ns well as sporbhabits nnd sound bodies. A recognition of that fact was creeping in before tho war, and lately we hnvo read

the statement of the 'High Military Authority' that the successes of the Germane were duo to the high efficiency of their officers and non-commissioned officers. Wo must create in the schools a feeling that it is not enough to be good at games; that the boy must be good aleo at his books. It is to the schools that we (ook for the officers of the future, and it is to the officers that we look fur the successful defence of our country."

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19180622.2.52

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 235, 22 June 1918, Page 8

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,514

THE AEROPLANE Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 235, 22 June 1918, Page 8

THE AEROPLANE Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 235, 22 June 1918, Page 8

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