GENERALISSIMO FOCH

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 211, 25 May 1918, Page 9

GENERALISSIMO FOCH

TI|E ALLIES' GREAT WAR . v CHIEF W MAN AND THE SOLDIER A BjIAKEK OF VICTORY HISMjEfHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

[By Reader.]

The object of this paper is to irive ..tho reiwicU-3 of The Dominion a more complete-a; nd extensive view of Generalissimo loch than rho ono conveyed by tho short noMes appearing occasionally in the. public Press , . Before his victories on the Majrno and in Flanders ha waa £ h «i l V° . taIOWU -: Professor at tho Jicolo de mjißrre, he was a man of study and science,, .a deop and original military tninkor, a gmt worker, and so he boflnmo one of. tho masters-perlmps tho master—of pencil-tactical science. His family originated in the village of Valentine, in thift. department of IliuiteG , a ™ nne - but Ferdinand Foch war, bt.rn at Tarbes o*i August i, 1851. His vamily .wasi Christian. In tho patois of Languedoc. "foch" means fire. Latin focus). Fronv. ihis childhood he was most studious and frardworking. His father was eecretary-jq-neral o£ the Prefecture, and he had tfiftee sons-one a lawyer at •larbea, the o<her a Jesuit. As bis father's career ia the Civil Service caused ihirn to dwell successively in many lou-ns, Ferdinand freqUented several collegjsat Tarbes, at Uc*jtez, at St. Etienno, and at Metz—and ojrt-jiywhere he showed the Eame keenness feu study and the sumo exemplary condui!).t, thus earning universal esteem and laJFection. At St. Clement's College, lietz, his school-felloes gave him by thefr', votes the "grand prix de eagesse"—the Snst prize for good conduct. His jnind. s already, distingmshed for precision -and', method. "Ho has a geometrio mind/' suid his master in his Bcnotil days, "ha/'ia made for the Polytechnique"— tho .'grei\t French nursery of strategists and lauflthomaticians. .Nor 3iad he .less rnosess in literary studies. He had a passion fbr'jhistory, and through, it ho lived from hie) youth in imagination among the great; {tattles whose tradition he wae destined! 'to continue in the field.

EARLY DAYS llfjl THE ARMY. On leaving Fontaip.fcjbloau he eiioso the garrison of Tarbes. ,He followed the courses of the Cavalry School of Sanuir, and afterwards, in U|34, tlioso of the •Ecole do Guerre. In ; 1896, as major of artillery, he was made professor of strategy-and/general tactics at the latter school, where lie n miained till 1001. Prom 1901 till 1907 ho advanced by slow stages to the rank of 'i>i; igndier. His Tβligious _ convictions Woej:ed his road to promotion, but no rebuTs could disturb ■lis serenity, and ho always gave freely .of his best. He commaiNV.ed the artillery of the sth Army Corns al Orleans, when lie was appointed. Director of tho Ecoio tie Guerre. In 1911 he w«jj made General of Division, and in 1912 Ide was sent to .Cambridge, England, as ' head of the Trench, military mission So tho British manoeuvres, men the war broke out ihe was in command of the; 20th Corps at Nancy. Most of Ins cnrqsr from sublieutenant to general was sipmt -vntli the troops. Thus lie was abie-t}: apply to his studies and their theoretic: results Ihe test o£ practice. Practical'realism is pwt of his nature as of his teaah.mj,' but it is chiefly as a teacher at t'flo £colo de Guerre that ho lias made Jus influence felt in the Army StafFs, a:fti has given a definite direction to Freiufy tactics. To his work of teaching he bi'tiqsjht- a genuine enthusiasm, n passion ibr clearness and light, the zeal of a misyUmary of tho truth, the fire of intense patriotism. No phrase-maker, his language 'was strong, precise, clear,, trenchant. '"On soino days," said one of his pupils, "his words were sabre-cuts." A streirubVis worker foimself, ho made- others woriq (too. His officers were bombarded wife'questions, and an answer must be sought kad i'ouud; and no makeshift or sloventj- ' uiiswer either, but clear-cut and, correct. •"Don't toll me the problem ■ is difficult," he once exclaimed to-, tho ccinniauder of an army corps; "if il;| were not it could riot be a problem! If, we have heads it is to use them. AVhaii elso arc ,wp there for?" His teaching is, summarised in his two works, which) embody •lais lectures at tho Ecole de jGuorre— "The Principles of War" and "The Con'duct of War." Ho claims to giivc> officers .the intellectual instruction luiaded to think out a reasoned mauoeuvivi'-. "j\ly jpages," ho says, "are bonfires on tho l>eaks to guido the mariner in the.■storm."

A DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON. Ho is a disciple of Napoleon. The uso of masses, economy of forces, e.x;feractUm Of every ounce- of "profit from a pucsess, ■the all-importance of moral—such '.nre his methods. Ho uses Moltko's lessors, but adapts Moltke to tho French as lUoltko adapted Napoleon to the Germans.! War do not exclusively material end '.terrestrial; it has its divine side, as Najioleon said. The fighter is man, the 'whole man—physical, moral, inteilectunl. ■ Victory is to tho armies that ran manoeuvre —that is, to the best instructed. iDffeneivß is the road to victory. His slfaidies Of modern armaments.and tactics led , ,, him

to foresee tho characteristic features of the present war. "In the future," ho says, "soldiers will uso the spade and tho pick as much as ■ the ritl'e. Tho lines of battle will extend beyond all known or oven imaginable limits. Cavalry will have to fight on foot with carbine and rifle." Ho also, at tho outbreak of the war, foretold its course in theso memorable words: "Loug, dur, sur" —long, hard, sure. Ho reduces tho art of war mainly to three basic ideas: Preparation, formation of a mass, the impulsion which .multiplies the power of the moss. Superiority of numbers at tho chosen point of attack is tho aim; it is ensured by order and method, by economy ol forces, by the division of those forces into groups whose relativo positions in space and time are planned in accordance with the end in viow. To uso theso forces freedom of action is necessary. Tho forces must bo in tho commander's hand; that is tho function of discipline. Discipline must bo intelligent and active. "Discipline," he says, "in a commander docs not mean that orders received .'ire executed as far as is judged suitable, reasonable, or even possible. It means entering wholoheartedly into tho mind and will of tho commander who has given tho order, • and taking every possible means to fulfil his wishes. Discipline does not mean 6ilenco, self-suppres-sion, doing just, what you think you vunderstand while taking care not to compromise yourself. It moans entering into the' spirit of the orders received, searching for and finding some means to carry them out, exerting the moral energy needed to enforce their execution. Thus Failly, on August 4 and (i, 1870, was unable or unwilling to execute the orders ho had received to march, to Bitche and thenco to Heichsoffen, and so was shut out from tho .battle, in which the army of Alsace was crushed.' So, too, Garibaldi, on January 20, by not executing tho order to rejoin tho Army of 'the East, brought disaster on liourbaki. Most important of all the factors of victory is tho action of the commander, and that action ie tho resultant of his natural or acquired qualities—of his will, judgment, freedom of spirit in the midst oi , dangers, authority over his troops, gift of leadership. For tho commanders of higher rank the art of war doe 3 not consist in a wild-lxrar rush upon.tho enemy. AH tho human wills engaged must be attuned to harmony, the subordinate must bo completely responsive to the direction from above. To securo such submission the right method of command is essential. A short order admitting of no reply will, not suffice. Tho subordinate must bo made to understand tho order, for a blind obedience will not always ensure its execution in. logical accord with tho will and plan of tho Commander-in-Chief." ' -

THE ESSENTImL FACTOR OF VICTORY. Pursuing this psychological analysis to its conclusion, General Foch arrives at this formula: War is a department of moral force. A battle is tho struggle of two wills. Victory consists in the ascendancy- established by tho victor's will, in the correlative yielding of the will of tho vanquished. He lias never failed and never ceased to insist on this essential factor of victory—moral force. "An objective clearly defined, a single thought in the minds of all, the same holy anger in every heart, a supreme and united'effort, that is the secret of the irrestistible onset we have to organise in order to hurl ttio enemy out of France." Patriotism is tho flame which enkindles .his teaching. "A country calling itself Franco cannot disappear"; and ho adds: "To be beaten is to disappear." These lofty ideals and this profoundly idealistic mentality find a natural ally in tho Christian faith. His faith is tho root of General Foch's idealism as it is of his moral strength. . He lias always been a practising Catholic, ■manifesting his religion with a noble simplicity, even when his military prospects had to suffer for it. He would never aacrifico his faith to his career, to his much-loved work at tho Ecole do Guerre, nor even to the object to which his life was consecrated—tho training of tho leaders who wero to defend his country and to give her victory. Hβ would purchase nothing by a- betrayal of the faith, or by so much as the semblance of one.

In 1907 M. Clemenceau, then as now Prime- Minister ,-f France, was looking for a Director of the Ecole de Guerre. He interviewed general after general. I'pcli's turn came. il. Cleuienceau asked him to remain for dejeuner, at which they talked of everything except the Ecole.de .Guerre. At dessert Cicmenceau said, poii\t-T)lnnk: "T have a piece of news for you. You are appointed Director of th« Ecole do Guerre." "I am not a- candidate." "Possibly; nevertheless you are appointed, and I am sure you will do good work there." , The General expressed his thanks, .l.lien a scrapie occurred to him, "You are aware, sir, that. I have a brother si Jesuit?" "Your brother is a Jesuit!" said Clemenceau. "What do I enre about that, General—or, rather, Monsieur le Directeur? You are appointed, and all tho Jesuits can't ckango it." Goneral i'och lias tho simple piety of the man who kneels down \vtih tho rest, tho faith that sees the hand cf God in all that happens. On September-8, 191-1 entering a villago ivhero tho stretcherbearers of tho 51st Division were billeted, ho saw Pore Zimmerman, the divisional j chaplain. Ho stopped his motor-car. Tho [ order had ju.it como from JoEre: "A corps which us unable to advance must die at its post rather than letroat." joch went over to tho priest, shook his hand warmly, and said to nlin beforo his staff, "Father, as I told you this morning, wp aro to make our supreme effort in arnis to-morrow. Do you also make a

supreme effort in prayer. All my trust is in God. Au rovoir." Tho day after the victory of the Morne, in answer to (ho congratulations of the Bishop of Cahors, Foch wrote: "lUonseigneur, do not thank me, bat Him to Whom alone victory belongs."

A MAKER OF VICTORY, Guneral i'oeh is a man of study and rolleulion, a man of l'mth. Tho hour of need revealed him a man of action. In this war he has been among the greatest of the makers ul victory. Ho brought to tho conduct of the \wr his technical knowledge, his .creative ability, his lorcu 01 , character. He was ouo oi [ho victors ui' the JHnrne, the victor of the I'scr and at Ypres; he is the directing brain of the French armies, and recently of all the Aliies. lu 19U0 ho said in his conferences, "War is tho only school of war. , ' In that terrible school ao who knew all that could bo learned in peace-time showed himself tho apiest of pupils, that is, luu greatest of musters. His v/iil is unconquerable. Ho turns to account not only tho enemy's mistakes, but ihoso of lii-3 own subordinates. With Hra a repulso is a half-way house to victory; lie uses it to defeat the foe by an unexpected manoeuvre. After Morbauge— better known as the Battle of iletz— August lit, ho covered tho retreat with the' 20th Corps, which ho then commanded. In this task lie showed the greatest energy and skill. He then took part in the defence of Nancy under Castelnau. At tho end of August lie was recalled by Jofi're to command the 9th .vnny, which was just being formed. He received the constituent parts of this army on September 5, at MachauH, in Champagne. The 3th Army was to take tho place in the centre between the sth (General Frauchet d'Esporcy), retiring on Coulom-liiiers-JSsternay, and the ith (General do Lungle), retiring, on Vitry. It was on tho oth that Joffre issued his general order for the great battle. On tho 3rd a French aviator saw Von Kluck's troops turn sharply'to the south-east. Gallieni telegraphed to General Headquarters on the 4th: "The enemy is exposing his right flank to an attack." The idea of tho Battle of the Marne was born, and the battle began. Mannoury and Gall'ieni fell upon Von Kluck. Foch's army front marched from Sezanne to Mailly. His left rested on the northern eide of tho plateau of Sezanne, his centre was at Mornins-lc-Petit, his right at tho marshes of Saint Gond. He had three army corps, tho 11th (Eydoux), tho 9th (Dubois), and an' improvised corps consisting of a Moroccan division (Humbert), ami tho division of Verdun, the 42nd (Grossctti). At the extreme right, to keep touch with tho neighbouring nrmy, a single cavalry division, tho 9th, patrolled a stretch of 12 miles. It was on the Fronch centre, that is, on Foch's army, that the Germans sought to avenge their repulse of their right wing by Jlaunonry's flank attack. Their object was to pierce the French front between Sezanne and Mailly. Had they succeeded tho whole French plan was ruined; it meant a catastrophe. Accordingly the Germans .flung a crushing weight against Foeh'a command.

UNBROKEN UNDER ADVERSITY. On September C, after a series, of intenso bombardments, the right of tho 9th Army gave ground. It retired at Morains-le-Petit and Louhare, and dug itself iu opposite Salon and Gouirgaucon. On tho 7th and Bth the enemy assaulted with redoubled energy. The French stood firm. Foch was imperturbable. The 9th was the .critical day. Under a terrible ■bombardment the 21st and '.2nd Divisions xell back. They had hardly any officers left. Tho lltli and Dili Corps weru threatened with envelopment. Foch alono was unshaken. He sent Jofl're the famous dispatch: "Outflanked on the right, outflanked on tho left. Situation on the whole-excellent. Am going to. advance." Ho was a psychologist. Ho knew the enemy's stato of mind, and on it ho based his action. That the fads appeared to contradict him did not disturb him. He ordered a superbly during manoeuvre, worthy of Napoieou- himself. He stripped his ieft of the 42nd Division, a body of picked troops, and sent the division to his right (o fall, on the enemy's flank. Hut would tho division arrive in time? Until 'A, 'lid tho vest of the nriny had to hold fast without its aid. The army must hold and tho division must get across, such were the.two watchwords. ■ Pqch's high spirit was an inspiration.to his troops: his ardent appeals infused his own courage. From his headquarters at Plaucy he promised tho Htli and 9th Corps that tho 42nd Division would arrive at midday, and thai tho 10th Corps would come up in .support. But midday ckuic, ami no Grosselti.. J'och addressed a now and more impassioned appeal to his men. Ho implored them to stand, fast; tho hour of victory was at hand. "Tho German. Army \v;is in tho last stage- of exhaustion; tho ■ tniils and tho orders wore hopelessly entangled; 'the. eommnml had lost its bearings. The vigorous efforts of our troops had takon tho enemy by surprise; he counted on our offering no further resistance. It is- of the last importance to tako advantage of this stato of affairs. At this decisive hour when the honour and existence of Franco are at stake, officer* and men must draw from the energy of our, race the strength to hold out till the ' moment when tho enemy shall retire exhausted. The disorder of tho German ranks is tho sign of our coming victory; our army has only to throw all its energy into the continuance of the struggle to stop the enemy's advance and hurl him out of our country. But every one must bo convinced that success is to thoso who hold out the longest." THE TRIUMPH OF THE MARNE. The Prussian Guard attacked again. The French front seemed broken, or all but broken. At six in the evening tho 42nd Division was sighted south of La Fere Champenoise. It. was seen from Linthn.s tlio giganlio figuro of Grossetli on horseback at its head, aureolcd in tho glow of the sunset, victory impersonate. The '12nd Division had made a flank march of fifteen miles under fire, after three days of continual fighting. It took tho enemy on tlio flank; the Gormaas retreated. During the night tho Chateau of Mondement. "tho key of victory," was taken. Tho enemy broke off the fight between the marshes of Saint-Gond and Sommesons. On tlio morning of the lOlh Foch entered La Fere Champenoise, where lie occupied tho headquarters of tho Prussian Guard and of tho Princo of AVtirteinbiirg. On (ho 11th ho was in Chalons-sur-Marno. If the victory of the M.anie—apart from tho action of Providenco in permitting Von Kluck's mistake—was the fruit of the strategic doctrine of tho French High Command, and of Gnllieni's intuition, it was no loss duo to tho heroic obstinacy of the 9th Army and to Foch's superb tactical stroke- on September !). "Had it not been for tho !)t.h Army"—it lias been well said—"and had that army not had Foch for its commander, the plan inspired by.the genius of Gallioni would have failed, and there would Jnivo been no victory of tho Jlnrnc. Gallioni and Maunoury were the hammer, but Foch was tlirj anvil on which victory was forged." HIS WORK IN FLANDERS. In the long battle of Flanders, which lasted from October 21) to tlio middle of November, 1911, Foch's part was quite different, but no less admirable ami decisive. During tho "race to tho sea," while, the French were striving to turn tho German right, and the Germans to turn the French left, ho commanded the armies of the north in Belgium. Thojwere composed of the most disparate- elements: Belgians from Antwerp Onmpi English, Hindoos, French Territorials and marines. Their lines, spread over the vast loH'-lyine plains, were ot tho thinnest. The Germans, on tho other hand, rested their lines on the Wood of Kcyfiiis and the Forest of llouthiilsV. They had brought their heavy gniia from Antwerp, and they had sixteen corps against ton of the Allies. In spite of (|]c?e odds, Foch war? victorious on tho Yscr and at Ypres. The Germans sought l<i [strike a decisive blow, cither by bronkim; thrcmsh near tlio sea, seizing Dunkirk, Calais, laiid Boulogne, anil threatening England, or by breaking lhrough at Ypres, completing tlio conquest of Belgium, and opening afresh the way 'to Paris. There wero lliveo moving lines in the plains, of Flanders towards the end of October: the advancing German line, (he British lino retiring beforo overwhelming numbers, tho French line coming w> in support. General Foch made up for lack of numbers by superior strategy. His main idea was to break the German offonsivo by continual and increasing counter-attaoks. -

On October 20 the Germans crossed (he Yser between Diiinude and Niouporl, making for Dunkirk. But on the 22ml Grossetti's division, the division of La IVro Chanipcnoise, attacked in tlin direction of Slype, between l.ombaertzyde and Ghistelles; Iho soldiers crossed tho Yser on foot-bridges, shouting to the Belgians: "This way to Oslend." Farther south. Bi.vschoote, north of Ypres, was carried. Admiral Rouaroh and his marines heroically defended the redan of Dixmude -and Nieuport; the Germans crossed lo llio left bank, took Tcrracte, and threatened Pcrvyse. Grossctti flow to the rescue. 6n the 25th and 26th Dixinudo still held out; but the Germans had been reinforced, and their weight threatened to carry all before it. There wns talk of a retreat to the Somnifl. But Foch, with his iron temper, was there. Ho called in the sea as a fresh ally. Tho sluices were opened at Nieuport. and tho Belgian Army retired beyond the railway embankment. "An embankment four feet high saved France," said the General afterwards. On 27th the sea poured in, and tho sea grew and grew. Tho Germans attempted to get before it. Ou tho 30th, at live in the morning, they carried Ramscapollo by a furious on : elaught. The samo evening Grosselti tlrovo them out of the town and oil' the high road into the plain, when; tho rising flood buried their heavy guiis. On the 3tst the inundation reached Perv.vse. On November lan unbroken sheet of water extended from Nieuport to tho neighbourhood of Dismudo. Tho road to Dunkirk was closed.

"I WILL MOT GIVE WAY." But a now battle- had begun round Ypres. The Anglo-French, troops, forestalling an enemy offensive, had attacked—tlio English in ■the direction or. the forest of Iloutluilst— the French towards L'oulen ■ and Ghistelles. On tho 27th, M\\, and 29th, the Hermans assaulted in their turn with fresh troops. The- blow seemed decisive; tha Emperor kid come; he was present at tho battlo and prepared to make his solemn entry into -Ipres. On the 30th ttie English lost Hollebeke; on tho 31st their'line was broken, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers, of the 7th Division, were surrounded. Field-Jlavshal French thought of abandoning Ypres. Hu went to Vlatncrtuigho ti> consult Foch. The German superiority in numbers was overwhelming. Tho British; losses wero enormous. It would be better to fall back west of Ypres. Generals d'Urbal and Dubois wero present ut this momentous council of wal , . General Foch said to the. British Commander: "Tho Germans havo sixteen army corps on our front; we have ten including your command. If you wero to retire I would remain hero with eight, one against two. Remain! As for me, come what may, and if it costs my life, I will not give way. I give you my word for it as a soldier. Give me yours." "Yes," said French gravely. And ho grasped Foch's hand. Immediately. Foch drew up a memorandum, tho plan of a counter-attack. French read it and countersigned it. Haig, d'Urbal, and Dubois executed it. Gheiuvelt and Mossince wero retaken. At Hollebeke, Passehemlaele and Lonnebcke, the French barred tho Germans' road. Tho Kaiser was still waiting. But at last, on November 5, ho went. He had lost 120,000 men; he hud to acknowledge defeat; he was not to inako his entry into Ypres. Td win those two battles," which comprised in themselves bun-1 dreds of battles, General Foch, watching tho whole fray from his post' at; Cas--601, had not only to display consummate tactical ability, to refashion his plans with lightning rapidity so as to counter effectively «ich new danger; ho had also to infuse into those under him his own indomitable vigour; above all lie hud to maintain the necessary unity of purpose among the heterogeneous forces. Going to and fro between King Albert and Field-Marshal French, .he won his Allies before beating tho Germans. His vast military knowledge, his authority, S) necessary to the common victory, were cloaked in his- geniality and good humour. Ho supported on his right and on his left tho Ally who was too hard pressed and who was weakening. Never j disturbed, always on the spot at the worst moments, a smile and a joko on his lips, ho overcame objections, solved doubts, Rave reassurance and encouragement. Ho wus the brain that set all in motion, the heart that sent tho blood throughout tho body. ALWAYS READY. "He is just 'the same ever since the war began," say hie soldiers. AVith his air of combined simplicity and distinction, a penetrating look in his steel-grey eyes, his stubby moustache, as he chewed tho end of a rarely-lit cigar, ho was always ready for whatever might happen. Conh'deuco went out from him; he radiated tranquillity and security. Unflagging energy, imperturbable good humour, .such aro the two leading traits of his character, the two sources o£ his strength; tho two combined make invincibility. At critical moments, besides find alxsve the calculations which aro the fruit of his technical knowledge, he lias sudden and Having inspirations. "God sends me j ideas," says tho man of faith and prayer.

Tho roiiil to Dunkirk onco closed against the enemy, tliu retreat; tu tlio Somuio avoided, Ypres mid tlio last fragment of Belgium saved' (or King Albert us a sure pledge of tlio coming restoration, nml England, perhaps, saved irom invasiou, Ooncrnl Foch continued liis work. It was ho who planned tlio war of assault against tlio trench-fortresses. It was hn, who, in September, 1!)15, as Commander of tlio Armies of the North, drew up the plans of tlio Somme offensive. That this offensive did not give nil the results expected was duo to execulivt; errors for which he had no responsibility. On May 15. 1017, he was appointed Chief of the French General Staff. Ho was the directing brain of all tho operations. "When Venetia was invaded, 'it was he who, by friendly notes, communicated from day to day, saved (lie Italian front. A commander who combines method and daring, technical knowledge find the intuition of genius, knowledge of military history and knowledge of man and of tlio springs of his action, a commander who knows bow to wait ami howto rush forward, whoso clear intellect and vigorous will rest on the bases of duly, patriotism and faith in God—who shall 6uy that such a man—now Generalissimo of tlio Allies—has not in him to plan victory and to carry out his pla:i?