PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 209, 23 May 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Let every man whoso conscience will nob permit him to fight the Germans, who indulges in the fatuous idea that wo should make peace with and receive these people once more into our friendship and business relationships, 'read the horrifying story, which appears in the war dispatches to-day o£ the treatment of wounded men in Germany. It is stated that the details are too revolting for publication. They must indeed be so, for what does appear is calculated to make the blood of every spirited citizen of the Empiro Boil with indignation. Let thoßo who read this appalling revelation of devilish brutality contrast the desperate fate of_ these wounded British soldiers with tho life of easo and comfort which is tho fortunate lot of, for example, the crew of tho See Adler, and ask themselves how it can ever be possible for a Briton to enter into friendly relations with a German again. There should bo a drastic reckoning for the perpetrators of these outrages—and for those in high authority in Germnay who have shut their eyes to them.

News from the West front still relates to local actions in which the balance of advantage is decidedly with the Allies. Little new light is cast upon the conditions in which the enemy will resume his offensive, but due emphasis is laid in one message upon the fact that he will do so blinded as he has never yet been on the eve of n great battle. This aspect of aerial superiority is not less important than the advantages derived from the use of aerial squadrons as a striking force. In the first phase of his offensive there were plain indications that the enemy had contrived to movo troops laterally more rapidly than the Allies. It is by no means certain that be will

retain this advantage on his new front, hut in any caso his aerial inferiority is in itself a serious handicap, and will modify any advantago lie enjoys in tho matter of communications. An estimate of enemy strength submitted by a Bci.ror correspondent at French Headquarters is chiefly notable as locating only a third of the enemy's total strength on the front on which he has thus far developed his offensive. Assuming that it is sound, this estimate carries an obvious suggestion that tho enemy may extend his offensive into new ground. There are at present no means of testing this possibility, apart from, tho fact that the extent to which tho enemy is committed on his present, front and his approach to highly important objectives give him an obvious incentive to concentrate rather than disperse his efforts. 'The Reutcr correspondent credits the enemy with only 210 divisions in all on the Western front, a smaller number than other authorities have mentioned, but in the absence of reliable information as to the present strength of a German division, no real light is cast upon the enemy's effective strength.

Further accounts of the air raid on London on Sunday night show that though the casualties in_ tho bombarded district were not light, the enterprise was disastrously costly from the enemy's point of view The detailed official report which appears to-day establishes the fact that at least five of the. raiding machines were destroyed; it leaves in doubt the fate of two others which are said to have been observed falling at sea. There is now, however, a circumstantial report from Copenhagen that two Gorman aeroplanes of a large new type were forced by shortage of petrol to descend in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank and were destroyed by their crews, of whom four men, possibly the survivors of a larger number, have b.een taken to Gothenburg. It thus seems. fairly clear that seven, if not nine, of the twenty or thirty enemy machines which took part in the raid on London have been accounted for. Although defending airmen played as usual a gallant part, highly efficient gunnery also had much to do with the loss inflicted on the raiders. The reports show that at least three machines were brought down by gun fire.

One peculiarity of the Copenhagen roporfc is that it speaks of only two Germans being ■ rescued from each of the aeroplanes lost in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank. The ordinary Gotha Carrie's a crew of three men. and machines of a large new type might ho expected if anything to carry a larger number. The explanation, of course, offers that some of the aviators were drowned. The official reports' speak of tho raiding aeroplanes as Gothas, but it is not that some bigger machines of a new typo were employed. Reports gained currency some time ago that the Germans were constructing gianl multiple-engined aeroplanes. In a note on • tho subject the aviation correspondent of the Manchester Guardian stated that from available information it appeared that most of these machines were very big biplanes equipped with four engines Cas against tho Gotha'a two). "The engines," ho added, "are placed between the wings much in the way that the engines of the Gotha biplanes are placed, but tandem fashion, so that one engine on each side drives a pusher airscrew behind the wings' as in tho Gotha, and the other engine on each side is placed immediately in front of it and drives a tractor air-screw, as do the engines of tho HandleyPage, Caudron, and Caproni machines. Less is- known, at any rato outside the Department, concerning the six-engincd Riescnflugzciifl, but it is assumed that it is probably a largo triplano similar to- the Caproni, probably with two fuselages or bodies, with a central body between them, in which case the central body would probably carry an engine at each end—one driving a tractor screw and one a pusher—the other engines being disposed in pairs on the wings outside tho twin fuselages. . . . The chief reason for the existence of these giant machines is that they may carry enormous bombs which, according to German estimates, are to abolish whole sections of a city in one sweep. That is to say, instead of carrying two or three bombs of 200lb. apiece they will probably carry two or three bombs of 10001b. apioco, or possibly one enormous bomb of even greater weight. Without denying the capacity of these machines to carry such enormous bombs, one recalls that the Germans expected at least as much of their Zeppelins early in the war, and certainly no less of their aeropjane raids on London during the past twelve months, so that wo must decline to bo alarmed. It must be remembered that these giant aeroplanes are more vulnerable to attack than smaller aeroplanes. Being _ larger, they are easier to hit either by shell firo from tho ground or by machine-gun firo from other aeroplanes. Being so very large, they cannot bo handled_ easily, and therefore are less easily able to avoid being caught and held in the beam of a searchlight, so that from tho point of view of the anti-aircraft, artilleryman they would appear to bo weicome targets, especially since such knowledge as one does possess about them points to their being very much slower than tho machines with which they arc certain to bo attacked when thov begin raiding." * * * * .

"The Germans appear to imagine," tho correspondent further observes, "that these huge machines can be made virtually invulnerable to attack by hostile aircraft because they can carry so many ma-chine-guns and gunners and offer such a steady gun platform from which to defend the machines against the Allies' chaser machines. This, again, is open to argument! becauso even from a fixed firing point it is exceedingly difficult to hit a small and very fast machine with a machine-gun, especially when that machine is flying in tho dark. On the. oilier hand, the practised fighting pilot on a' small fast machine is likely to regard a big'slow-moving aeroplane as a good target, more especially when the target is held in tho beam of a searchlight. Moreover, a small and fast machine is able,to manoeuvre for the position which suits it best, and so ran with comparative ease get the big machine between itself and the moon or star light, and so have it silhouetted against the sky while it assures for itself a black background against which it can hardly be seen at all, oven at very close range. It_ appears, therefore, that there _ is a very distinct limit to the size of aeroplane which can be used with

advantage for bombing purposes, just as there is a distinct limit to the size of warship that can he used with advantage. This, however, is no argument against the giant aeroplane for uso in time of peaco for passenger transport, for in this caso the analogy of sea-going ships again holds good."