The Dominion. THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1918. CAN THE ALLIES HELP RUSSIA?

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 209, 23 May 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1918. CAN THE ALLIES HELP RUSSIA?

It is now many weeks since Mr. Bawouk declared that tho Allies roust ask if they could give the help that' Russia needed in her extremity—the help sho must have if she is to escape becoming in all respects subservient to the Central Powers. As information stands the Allies have not yot found means of returning an answer to this pressing question, but reports appearing to-day at once emphasise tho necessity of setting a period to delay and hold out some hope that effective action may be taken. A plain warning is sounded by tho Daily Chronicle correspondent who points out that if the Allies do not assist tho Russian democracy the Germans will supply a nucleus for the reactionary forces. There is undoubtedly a very real danger that if the Allies leave Russia to her fate millions of Russians who despise and condemn the Bolshoviki and their doctrines may come to regard any alternative—even complete German domination—as preferable to the frightful anarchy that now obtains. With matters in this state,_ it is welcome news that Amorica is likely to consent to an Allied expedition to Siberia. Of the Powor3 warring against the Teutonic Alliance, America unquestionably is best placed to take the lead—at a.ll events the moral lead—in the great enterprise of enabling Russia to suppress the internal forces of disintegration, which, in combination with Gorman penetration, threaten her not merely with ruin, but with extinction as a nation. Hitherto the American Government has been unwilling to sanction Allied intervention in tho absenco of an explicit invitation from Russia, but it seems hardly possible that this condition should be satisfied. Large sections of the Russian population would undoubtedly welcome Allied intervention—it is reported to-day that cyen in the Bolshevik Council at Moscow some members ventured to raise their voices in favour of intervention and were forthwith arrested—but in the chaotic condition to which she is, reduced Russia is manifestly incapable of addressing a national invitation to the Allies to come to her assistance. According to 'the Washington correspondent of the London Times, President Wilson now accepts this view of the matter, and will consent to an Allied expedition. It is !the more likely that the correspondent is correct in his forecast since President Wilson in his latest speech laid special emphasiß upon his determination to stand by Russia as well as by Franco. It seems obvious that ho can give effect to this assurance in no other way than by agreeing to American participation in prompt and adequate measures on behalf of Russia, and in opposition to German penetration. An ample justification of Allied intervention appears in tho necessity of saving Russia from the last penalties of being exploited as a Teutonic sphere of influence, but regard for their own interests equally impels the Allies to the same course of action. There is in fact no dividing lino between Russian and Allied interests in the matter of defeating Germany's schemes of plunder and exploitaIf Germany succeeded in degrading and enslaving Russia she would at the same timo become a standing menace to the whole world —a menace which no Allied victory in Western Europe -would abate. The nature of the German menace which is taking shape in Russia is

very clearly described in a recent article by a Japanese correspondent in the London Observer. Pointing out that some Englishmen minimfso the dangers raised on tjie ground that Germany is unable to send a large army either towards India or to Northern Manchuria, he remarks:

AVell, tho menace may not necessarily consist in a largo military expedition, thousands of utiles away from lis bnso. It: may just as well bo political and bo just as dangerous to the peace of tho Indian Empire or of Japan. Tho five hundred thousand tons of war material stored at Vladivostok, precious as thoy are, could in all probability bo soon replaced if they were destroyed. People who think that the menace lies solely in tho possiblo destruction of those goods show that their minds aro not capable of rising: above questions of pound* and dollars. Supposo the Siberian railway to fall under tho control of the Bolshevists and German influence to gain predominance ia Eussia, who can guarantee that Germany will not launch submarines at Vladivostok in ordor to work havoc in the Pacific and Indian Oceans? Or suppose the Caucasus and Turkestan to be dominated by German agents, will not Persia and Afghanistan bo soon found in a similar plight, and will not tho British-Indian j Army in Mesopotamia ho threatened from the rear and the north-western frontiers of India seriously disturbed? As a matter of fact German agents have been working in India from tho very beginning of the war, as is well known, trying to create sedition. All this menace, all these dangers, will bo warded off if .there were to arise a reconstituted Eussia, able to give resistance to German aggression, before its rushing tides overflow the boundaries of European Eussia.

To consider the possible, scope of Allied action in .Russia "'naturally opens a somewhat wide field of conjecture, but it can hardly be doubted that it is by an expedition to Siberia that the Allies will bestserve Russia and protect their own interests. It follows that while American participation is essential an important share of the enterprise when it is launched will of necessity be allotted to Japan. This can hardly bo regarded as an objection in view of her steadfast good faith as an ally and the part she has played in tho war. The proposal to send an expedition into Siberia raises no question of any invasion of Russian sovereignty other than that involved in temporary intervention. Tho objects aimed at are to enable Russia to cast off German bonds and regain hcr_ standing as an independent nation, and tho British Government has declared, on grounds that can hardly be questioned, that Japan is in yvery way qualified to take part in an enterprise to that end. There is, of course, no question of marching a big Allied army through Siberia into European Russia. The initial object must rather be to provide a rallying point for those sections of the Siberian population which stand for sanity and order and are as determinedly opposed to Germany as when the Tsar still occupied his throne. It has been said that Russia is in no condition to issue a national invitation, .but the success of any expedition undertaken by tho Allies as a means of rendering moral and material help must depend upon what is accomplished in rousing and organising the Russian population, at first in Eastern Siberia, and afterwards in other areas to which operations may extend. For instance, a wellinformed English writer (Mil. Leslie Urqtjhart) observed recently that 'in Siberia the sane elements of the population undoubtedly predominate, because tho Siberian is much more highly developed than the Russian, and there can bo no question that with the assistance of the Siberian Cossacks tho healthy Siberians will suppress Bolshevism and restore law and order. The. actual conditions obtaining in Siberia, as in other parts of Russia, aro to some extent in doubt, but apparently credible reports declare that Siberia has been very much less seriously penetrated by Bolshevik and German influences than the i western areas of Russia, in which these fell forces have li£"d free play. This somewhat optimistic pronouncement is. at least not yet falsified. News has como through during the last few days of a Cossack movement under General SemENOFF which aims at redeeming Eastern Siberia from Bolshevik control. Mn. Urqtthart, the writer just quoted, is confident that a small Allied force would have tho enthusiastic support of the ' Cossacks along tho Siberian railway and_ of other sound elements in the native population, and Btafcs that ho is supported in this opinion by competent Russian soldiers who know the country. If these possibilities were realised Siberia might become.au avenue through which to transmit invaluable help to European Russia, and in a corresponding degree defeat Germany's designs and magnify her problems. The matter is not one on which it is possible to be dogmatic, but the Allies have manifestly, every incentive to put theso possibilities to a practical test.