PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 200, 13 May 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

An American commentator is quoted to-day as observing that in dealing with the Maurice charges Mr. Lloyd Geokgb evaded the question as to whether the strength of the British Army had been unduly reduced prior to the German offensive. As a matter of faefcj it is not clear that any reduction in the strength of the British Army, by the transfer of British reserves to a general reserve, took place. It is, of course, obvious, however, that tho British Army has been called upon thus, far to bear the brunt of the enemy offonsive and to endure a far more terrible ordeal than if the Allies had freely utilised tho wlijole of their available strength. This policy is frankly expounded in the official review of military operations which appears to-day, and is defended on grounds which seem conclusive. The Allies, we are told, are opposing to the sledge-hammer use of masses by" tho enemy tho strategy of meeting the blow with the smallest force capably of standing up to the shock, wnile keeping the strongest reserves possible. "In the present offensive," it is added, "the British have played the part of tho wings, and have withstood many times their own weight of the enemy masses, and have retired slowly, exacting the fullest price. Meanwhile Foch holds the bulk of the French in reserve, sending units only to points hard-pressed. This strategy has been justified in that three weeks have seen the enemy brought to a standstill without a single strategic object being fulfilled, and with losses so immense that his reserve is in danger of proving inadequate to his policy."

This exposition is noteworthy, not onthe score of novelty, but because it is invested with official sanction, and particularly because of the emphasis it lays upon the already serious depletion of the enemy reserves.' From first to last tho review is particularly optimistic in tone, and it is perhaps as well to remember that although the enemy _ has not yet gained any strategical objective, be has come dangerously close to doing so, and correspondingly narrowed the margin of security with which the Allies will continue the struggle. However, the official commentator presumably holds reliable information on the all-important question of reserves, and his hopeful verdict on the situation carries weight accordingly. He assumes a furious renewal of the enemy onslaught in the near future, and it is obivous that the British Army may yet have a tremendous task to face. But it is equally clear that tho outlook from the enemy's standpoint is most unpromising. Comparing tho prosent strugglo with the enemy's attempt to urcak through at Terdun, it might bo said that the chief difference is that although tho enemy has now thrown in a greater share of his available resources than in his total offort at Vordun, he has not yet compelled the Allies, as he admittedly did in 1916, to prematuroly bring their whole weight to In the decisive struggle now being waged, tho greater part of the Prenoh Army still stands in ro-

servo, and the same is true of practically the whole strength of the American Army in France. The British Army for the tiino being has a desperately trying part to play, but it is by iho condition of the Allied forces as a whole that tho progress •of the struggle must bo gauged.

The referenco mado by the official commentator to the American Army is somewhat obscuro. Ho says the Allies arc so confident that, given the choice of a Binall American .army for defence, or waiting till they are reinforced by a complete, powerful, self-supporting American Army, they havo chosen tho latter. Read literally, this means that tho Allies havo changed their policy, so far as the Americans are concerned, since it was announced recently that American troops would be brigaded with French and British units, , bo as to become immediately available. Since there arc now half a million American troops in France, this arrangement offers a material reinforcement should it be needed. It is evident that Americans havo not yet been employed on tho main battlcfront except in very small numbers, and it is quite possible the policy of tho Allies is to hold them in reserve as long as possible, but tho suggestion of the official review that they will not bo called upon until they are organised as a selfsupporting army is surprising, and probably calls for some modification or correction.