The Dominion. MONDAY, MAY 13, 1918. ANOTHER NAVAL ACHIEVEMENT

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 200, 13 May 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, MAY 13, 1918. ANOTHER NAVAL ACHIEVEMENT

The story which is told to-day of a second and highly-successful attack on Ostend makes a. splendid addition to the record of the Navy. In some respects the operations which culminated in the'sinking of the old cruiser Vindictive well inside the entrance'to Ostend harbour were an even more remarkable exhibition of naval daring and resource than tho attacks made sixteen days previously on Ostend and Zeebrugge. His experience on that occasion taught the enemy that he could not , afford to rest on the assumption that the sea and land defences of his bases on the Belgian coast were impregnable, but it also gave him a, plain warning, which he is unlikely to have neglected, to strengthen and improve these defences by every moans at his command, and to obsorvo incessant vigilance. In tho circumstances, and taking account of the modern development of minefields and of coast defences generally, the decision to so speedily repeat the attack on Ostend was marked by superb audacity. Whatever element of surprise entered into ttm affair obviously resulted solely from the excellence of the British dispositions. Apart from the factors of skill and daring, the enemy had everything in his favour. Making reasonable use of his opportunities and the pronounced advantages ho enjoyed, he should have been able to guard against surprise and to maintain a much more effective defence than he actually compassed. That ho was so completely outgencrallcd obviously confers upon the attack on Ostend much more than the importance and significance of a magnificently daring exploit. In that character it has seldom been equalled, but it is not moro conspicuously marked by the valour of the officers and men engaged than by the skill with which it waa planned and carried out. Its significance as bearing on tho later development of naval war is not measured by the immediate importance of the results achieved towards closing the port of Ostend, but by tho remarkable success with which strong coast defences were attacked and overcome by a naval force after full warning had been given that 'such attacks were to bo expected. Tho object of closing the cntranco to Ostend harbour was not fully attained, but this was due not to tho exertions of the enemy, but to the presence of a mudbank in the channel. Exposed as she was to a tremendous concentration of fire from the shore batteries, the Vindictive was manoeuvred into position ono hundred and fifty yards or more within tho harbour entrance as calmly a-s if she had been a tramp steamer approaching a berth in some peaceful port. Her bow was placed as her commander desired, and it only remained to swing her aiV'oss the channel. Unfortunately she grounded by tho stern before tho swing was comploted, and so had to bo sunk lying obliquely across the channol instead of straight across. The cool daring with which the Vindictivo was handled seems to have been typical of the fashion in which the operations as a whole were conducted. Destroyers and launches had an important part to play. Apart from their activities as covering and supporting units, it is evidont that they cleared a path for tho Vindictive through the minefields, and it is perhaps one of tho most remarkable tributes yet paid to tho superior fighting powers of the British Navy thai tho enemy did not

venture to send his own light naval craft into action. The fact that the British casualties were so light in itself boars strikingly upon the new prospects that are visibly opening in naval warfare. Of the fiftytwo heroes who ventured into the jaws of death aboard the Vindictive, at least forty were brought away alive, though no doubt some of them were wounded. Other casualties, apparently, were confined to tho small craft which manoeuvred in the immediate neighbourhood of tho harbour entrance. At all events, the British monitor's which engaged the shore batteries escaped scathless and without a single casualty. A statement by tho Germans that they severely damaged a monitor is untrue; indeed, as information stands, their report is false in every detail.

It is by _ this time plainly clear that there is no justification for regarding either the latest attack on Ostend or tho earlier attack on that port and on Zeebrugge as isolated events. These gallant exploits are above all impressive in the conclusive cvidonce they afford that tho war at sea has definitely entered a new phase. The initial achievement of the Navy was to establish general command of the seas and to restrict the enemy, so far as naval operations were concerned, to furtive attack. In itself, tho achievement was magnificent, and it is a truism that without tho sure shield of sea-power Britain and her Allies would have been speedily overwhelmed by Germany's onslaught. Nevertheless, experience soon showed that such a use as the enemy made of tho submarine was not to be countered by any holding policy. The extent to which the new domands thus made on Allied sea-power, and particularly on tho British Navy, were unexpected is a subject of dispute amongst naval' oxperts. Tho essential fact which stands out today is that these demands are being brilliantly met. Deeds like the attack on Ostend aro mado possible in tho first place by tho splendid qualities of individual daring and resourco_ with which tho Navy has at all times been richly endowed. But they demand also tho highest standards of. organisation, and if far-reaching prospects aro now opening in tho domain of sea. warfare it is very largely because the organisation of the Navy has been stimulated and transformed under war conditions. Tho sweeping changes and reforms that first took definite shape in a reconstruction of the Admiralty in May, 1917, have already produced notable results. Some 'broad features of tho changes that have been wrought are in plain sight. A clear distinction has been made between tho business of providing and maintaining the material equipment of the 'Navy and its direction as'a fighting force, and undoubtedly the result has ken a double gain. Tho Naval Staff, now chiefly constituted of officers fresh from sea-experienco, is enabled to devote its whole attention to tho actual problems of sea warfare. Problems of maintenance receive separate .attention, though the closest co-ordination of the organisation as a wholo still, of course, obtains. With matters so ordered, and with the American Navy thrown into the scale as a co-operating force, there is * every prospect that sea-power \yill be turned to increasingly effectivo account a3 time goes on, and it is reasonable to regard events like the attack on Ostend not as extraordinary departures from the normal course of the war at sea, but as indicating the lines on whicn it is destined to develop.