The Dominion WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1918. GERMANY'S REASONS

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 161, 27 March 1918, Page 6

The Dominion WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1918. GERMANY'S REASONS

It may ho some time before the course of events in France in the conditions created by the German offensive is clearly defined, but no real room for doubt exists in regard to the reasons that have impelled Germany to make her desperate bid for victory or the consequences that will attend its failure. A due appreciation of these reasons is essential to an understanding of the position now and as it develops. ! We are justified in setting down as the determining factor in the calculations which preceded the offensive a belief on the part of her leading soldiers that nothing they can accomplish elsewhere will compensate them for the continued development of the Allied concentration in France and Flanders which, with the aid of America, must ultimately become overwhelming. Thanks to tho measure of freedom she has gained for the time being, Germany undoubtedly was in a position to mass overwhelming forces in Macedonia and possibly to do the same in Italy. The colossal attack directed against the British front in Franco-'points clearly to recognition by her. military leaders that even sweeping success in these theatres would not give them the victory to which they aspire. The dominant motive impelling Germany to her present furious effort was unquestionably fear of ' thS ever-growing Allied concentration on the decisive front. Tho men who sway Germany's destinies are perhaps not yet prepared to admit the Allied contention that Germany must achieve complete and overwhelming victory in her present adventure or lose not a battle only but the war. As will be noted presently they may see possible alternatives. But the most determined German optimist would be bound to admit that so far as military factors aro concerned Germany's only possible road to victory lies through and over tho Allied armies on tho main Western front. Considering for the moment only military factors, it is manifest that the Allied view that Germany muse win a speedy decision or loso tho war rests upon a substantial foundation. It rests mainly, though not solely, upon the fact that Germany will never be stronger than she is to-day, whereas tho_ Allies, even.though they only continue the struggle moantime on evon terms, will be vastly stronger, absolutely and relatively, a year hence than they are now. To suggest that the. Allies would win the war merely by spinning it out would, of course, be-absurd. But it is the most vital fact bearing on tho situation that, while Germany has nothing to nope and everything to fear from delay, the Allies have much to hope froni judicious delay. Failure in her present effort will moan to Germany that her last hope of forcing a, military decision has vanished. On the other hand, a successful dclensive stand against the German onslaught will give the Allies not a merely negative victory, but time to augment _ their shipping resources, to bring as big an American army as may be necessary into the field, to assembloand organise an overwhelming aerial force, and generally to throw into tho scale a vast body of resources as yet untapped or only partly exploited. All that iB being done by tho Allies to the end of expanding their military resources has the closest possible bearing upon the mighty contest which is being waged in France, and emphasises tho salient truth that nothing but a speedy victory will serve Germany's purpose. In the matter _ of _ shipping, for instance—and shipping is a factor of supreme importance- to the Allies in all respects and particularly as it bears upon the deployment of tho American armies— the Allies are to-day grappling with an acute shortage, but in such circumstances as warrant the belief that every month henceforth will witness relief and improvement on an expanding scale. AVe havo it on the excellent authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty that the submarine is held and constitutes now a declining torce._ He has said also that before 1918 is over Britain will be building shipping of all kinds at more than double the rate attained in the record prewar year—a year in which British yards constructed close upon two million tons of merchant shipping and some 300,000 tons of naval ships. Taking account of what America and other countries are doing in this field of activity it is manifest that the shipping situation in itself- provides Germany with most imperative reasons for accepting the most desperate risks in an effort for victory to-day rather than face delay and its' consequences. Tho same reasoning applies to the expansion of the American armies and of tho Allied aerial forces, which alike depend in a very material degree upon an adequate increase in available shipping tonnage. Nothing is, in fact, more clearly established than that_ Germany must overwhelm the Allies in the near futuro or abandon her last hope of forcing a military decision. The further claim that if she fails now to achieve victory she will be manifestly doomed to defeat calls in only one respect for reservation. Granted that the Allies stand solidly together, and make the most_ of their resources and opportunities, Germany's failure to. crush the Allied armies in her present offensive will undoubtedly connote her defeat in the war. But it is conceivable that Germany may bo

stopped far short of her goal in this ulfensive and yet may seek to dismay and dishearten her enemies liy an appearance of spectacular success. It is now evident that Italy and the Balkans take a subordinate place in the plans she has formed, but it does not 'by any means follow that these theatres are overlooked. On the contrary nothing is more likely than that she may turn from failure in the AVestern theatre—failure which will doom her to unrelieved defeat provided the Allied fortitude remains unsfmkon—to make the most of such opportunities 'as present themselves in Italy and Macedonia. It is a possibility' to be faced that she may before long add some success in these theatres to the as yet inconclusive success sho is winning on the Western front and thereupon, having reached the high-water mark of military success, may offer to conclude a peace which may have some attractive features for the pacifists, but which will leave Germany unbeaten and with many of her ambitions for the time being satisfied. Against such an attack upon their moral fortitude and solidarity the Allies are fortified first and foremost by the knowledge that if the offensive upon which the enemy is now engaged in fche AVcstcrn theatre is repelled, an unflinching prosecution of the war will undoubtedly give them final victory. But they are strong also in a political organisation vastly superior to that of the enemy because it is based on freedom, and justice. If it is truo that the enemy ha 3 some prospects of playing upon what is weak in the Allied nations, it is equally true that he is politically much worse placed than the Allies to withstand the strain which will attend the prolongation of the war. Thero is much force in the observation recently made by an English writer: "It is not true of the Entente Powers that the political strength of the alliance as a whole is the strength of its weakest member; otherwise we should have broken up long ago. But it is true of the Central Powers. Germany has lost the war if_ and when either Turkey or Bulgaria or Austria secedes. The defection of Russia has shaken but not ruined us. But the defection of one of the German allies would ruin Germany." Even as regards Turkey and Bulgaria this is probably not ■ exaggerated, and undoubtedly the political weakness of Austria, due to incurable internal disorders, takes a prominent place amongst the factors which darken Germany's pro : spects and limit her outlook. It is not merely the soldiers of the belligerent nations who are being tested in.this terrible struggle, but the spirit of the people as a whole. AVe must keep this fact constantly before us, for on the courage and endurance of the mass of the people will the final issue largely depend.