A DEAL IN WOOL

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 158, 23 March 1918, Page 10

A DEAL IN WOOL

INTERESTING POINT OF LAW. By TeleirraDh—Press Association. Cliristohuroh, March 22. In the Supreme Court to<lay an interesting point of law was involved in the case J. S. Jessop (Mr. Gresson) v. Walter Hill (Mr. Dougall, with him Mr. Upham). Mr. Gresson said that on November 14, 1916, one Carmichael sold to Hill the whole wool clip on his Waireka Station. On December 1, 1916, plaintiff Jessop bought fiom Carmichael the Waireke Station as a going concern, and had, of course, assigned to him the benefit of the wool clip contract with Hill on December 18. The Government by Proclamation, prohibited the export of wool, except by permission of the Minister of Customs, and then, on December 21, tho Government, by Proclamation, requisitioned all the wool in the Dominion for war purposes. The question to bo decided was the effect of the latter Proclamation on a prior sale for forward deliv-

ery. Mr. Gresson admitted that tho original contract was made impossible by the Proclamation, but he contended that subsequently the parties had entered into a contract which was possible of performance, and within tlie Proclamation. Under the original contract plaintiff was bound to deliver the wool f.o.b. ocean-going steamer, but the Proclamation forbade this, and Mr. Gresson contended that the parties thereupon made a new contract for delivery at a Government wool store, the store being suggested by defendant. The express intention was for delivery of the wool at Dalgety's store, Napier, which was by Proclamation a, Government store for delivery, the consideration to Hill being the deduction of f.o.b. charges. Mr. Gresson submitted that such alteration in the place of delivery made the contract enforceable. Mr. Gresson contended that Hill, who had repudiated ■ the contract, had been wrong in doing so, as the contract was quite enforceable. The second contract was one sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Sale of Goods Act.

Mr. Dougall contended that by the Proclamation the ownership of the wool was liable to be taken away by the Government. In this instance the contract was to deliver at a place nominated by tho purchaser. As it happened, that place was a Government wool store. However, by Proclamation, tho delivery was hot to tho purchaser biit to the Government wool broker. Whoever owned the wool at the time of the Proclamation ( had to remain tho owner till the Government exercised its right of purchase or rejection. On tho making of the Proclamation executory contracts for sale were not voided, but suspended until the Government had decided to take the wool or otherwise. It was clearly indicated by the Proclamation that owners of wool were not at liberty to traffic It could not he held, as contended for the plaintiff, that the mere coincidence that the changed place of delivery happened to be a Government wool store made tho contract enforceable. If owners were allowed to traffic in that way the ends of the Proclamation would be defeated and the rights of the people endangered. When the Proclamation came out owners of wool were then prohibited from selling except in the case of the rejection of tho wool by the Government. Had Jessop delivered to Hill the "Government could have seized the wool without paying compensation to either, as each would have been equally in the wrong.. Mr. -Justice Herdman reserved his judgment. •