The Dominion. FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 1918. ENEMY DIVISIONS

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 157, 22 March 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 1918. ENEMY DIVISIONS

Tuouoii it created a stir in the Reichstag, tho speech in which a German Socialist deputy, Dr. David, criticised Germany's policy towards Russia contains at an immediate view nothing that can bo called sensational. It is known to all the world, except where German censorship or German propaganda has contrived to hido or obscure the facts, that in Russia Germany is carrying a policy of cold-blooded and unscrupulous annexation and plunder to its practicable limits. Tho fact is in plain sight also that Germany's actions in Russia have done much to consolidate and weld , her remaining enemies and to con- [ firm their determination to bring her to account. In so far as it traverses this ground, - Dr. David's speech is merely a somewhat inadequate statement of obvious truths. As an exposure and indictment of the PanGermana' it is feeble, but it has inf terest as a protest against their domination of the nation and its policy, and the protest all tho more, deserves attention since it is made much more on material than on moral grounds. He condemns the Pan-German policy to which the ! Imperial Chancellor is now visibly committed less on the score of its criminality than because it is ineffective— because it imposes an everincreasing task and burdens on the fnation and excludes all present hope of peace. If, as Dr. David asserts, the treaty with Russia has < caused widespread indignation throughout Germany, the 'explanation no doubt lies in a growing mistrust of tho ability of the Pan-Ger-mans to achieve the victorious peace they have predicted and promised and in developing fear of tho consequences entailed in following the Pan-German lead. It is probably not unduly credulous to believe that Dr. David's strictures have real value and significance as indicating tho state of public mind in Germany, though it must be added that this is far from involving a belief that political developments _in that country are likely to materially influence the trend of tho war in tho immediate future. Well-in-formed opinion is summed up in the statement that a spontaneous revolution in Germany is exceedingly improbable. That no effectivo protest has been made by any section of the German people against the dismemberment of Russia certainly gives strong support to this opinion and tends to justify the view expressed by Mr. Balfour when he said not long ago, "So far I cannot make out that the Germans have even begun to understand the moral horror which their procedure has instilled even into the most obstinately recalcitrant student of methods and German aims." But though the day of, moral awakening and political emancipation in Germany has yet to dawn, thore are substantial reasona for believing that the power of the Pan-Germans is by no means as firmly established as some lato events would suggest. On the contrary, there is fairly convincing evidence that the development of Pan-German schemes has awakened in Germany a widespread feeling, if not of indignation, at least of alarm and of profound uneasiness, and that though tho popular imagination has been .to some extent dazzled by tho success won in Russia, the underlying feeling is one of depression' and of extreme disinclination to face tho prospect of an indefinite prolongation of the war. These are conditions which visibly make for internal crisis, though the crisis has not yet come to a head. A Mannheim Socialist journal observed recently with considerable point: "In Berlin they are pursuing a zig-zag policy whioh precludes success." _ The German Government, that is "to say, alternately holds out hopes of early and triumphal peace and demands heavy and increasing sacrifices to which there is no prospect of finality. Such a policy does not make for tho stability of the Pan-German regime, and it is not unreasonable to assume that tho Government as it is now constituted will not indefinitely maintain its hold on the German people except by a decree of military success which in all likelihood is far beyond its power to compass. As to the state of public opinion in Germany and the divisions that exist some interesting evidence has been afforded during the progress of the so-called negotiations with Russia, which amounted in fact to a brutal dictation by Germany of piratical terms. At an early stage of the negotiations strenuous efforts made by the Government publicity agencies to discredit the idea that critical dissensions had arisen between the military party and the political groups which repudiatp a policy of annexations gave ground for a belief that such dissensions existed and were viewed with alarm.

More direct evidence was also supplied on this point, however, and not only in Socialist utterances. The Frankfurter Zeilwiy declared, for j instance, that the great majority of tho German people are behind "the parties constituting tho majority in the Reichstag (the parties which have declared against annexations), and added that only because this was the case had the country stood firm against the Pan-German agitation. The Frankfurter Zeitung .pointed out further how dangerous tho policy advocated by tho PanGermans might be to tho future of Germany, and remarked that the risky enterprise in which, such a policy would certainly involve Germany might suit Pan-German fanatics, hut "every German who retains the faculty of seeing things as they really are will think with horror that just at the moment when a successful end is in sight the ship may be flung back into a most furious; surf and exposed to dangers that mean more than a few mines or a few square kilometres of foroign territory." That the country has not "stood firm against the Pan-German agitation" does not wholly rob these observations of their force and significance. It is at least evident that a revulsion j against Pap-Germanism has gained some head in Germany, and there is tho more reason for regarding it as a factor of tangible importance since the fears upon which it is based are by no means illusory. Already thero are fairly plain indications (♦that Germany has won a Pyrrhic victory in Russia. As Dit. David has said; the East is smouldering. Apart from its broader effects, Germany's disclosed fiolioy. of

enslaving the Slav races of Western Russia manifestly invites direct dangers, considering that there are in the- Dual Monarchy more than twenty-four million Slavs and four million people of Latin race, as against twelve million Germans and ten million Magyars. The extending Polish revolt, and tho conflicts between German and Slav troops on .the Italian front, which are mentioned in tho news to-day, are lato indications added to many others that in her policy towards tho Slavs Germany has stimulated destructive forces within the alliance which she commands. This is one conspicuous result of the Pan-German policy which must be expected as timo goes on to raise new and formidable obstacles in Germany's path as a belligerent, and to correspondingly dishearten her own population and tho ruling races in the Dual 'Monarchy. Conceivably sho is not everywhere at an end of her military success, but sho is nowhere in sight of a secure goal, and her political and racial troubles must be expected to develop. No doubt the practical importance of these factors as they bear upon tho war and upon the problems of neace must depend very largely, almost exclusively, upon tho measure of military success compassed by the Allies. But granted that, the Allies persevere unflinchingly in their- task there is little doubt that his internal divisions will ultimately contribute materially to the enemy's defeat.