PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 140, 2 March 1918, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Action in Siberia by Japan;-or by Japan-: in concert with her Allies, now seems' to bo in near prospect,, but it is likely that some of the reports on this . subject from America and elsewhere arc cxag-. geratecl. The object of the Allies is to recover the stocks of war material stored at Vladivostok'and at depots along the Siberian railroad, and so far. as Vladivostok is concerned the problem raised should be comparatively easy of solution.But the feasibility of recovering supplies stored further inland would seem to depend very largely upon the attitude of the Siberian population, and that of such -authorities as have been established in Siberia. The enemy is at present gathering in great supplies of war material in Western Russia, and everything practicable should, of course, be done to prevent supplies stored in Siberia 'being' similarly appropriated. But it would bo possible-to expend greater and more costly.efforts in. recovering, these supplies, than they are worth, particularly if the- Siberian population assumes.a,.hostile•attiiuclc. •• .However, present, indications, are that: action in this direction ' wjll. be taken by the Allies,' 'though the scale arid scopo : of the projected cxpedf'ticm •. have yet -to •be disclosed-. ■■. ■ : ■

'News from Mesopotamia, shows that- the tßritish 'movement ; along the-Euphrates is .extending. Fatrols are now. in touch- with-the'-Turks near Hit, that is to say, about forty miles beyond the locality in'which the advance began not many days ago. 'The outlook in the Turkish theatres is at present decidedly promising. Developments both in Palestine, whc,ro.. General Allenuy now commands a section of the Jordan. Valley, and in Mesopotamia are calculated to encourage a great and widespread extension -of the Arab revolt, and • developments on these lines %yould be apt to far more than outweigh .the. relief the, Turks have gamed as a result of tho'Russian collapse. # * - , ♦ « The opinion's based by Mr. Charles Grasty upon the fact that Germany. is now relieved of ' the necessity. ..of .'copinjr, with., Russian naval forces in the Baltic seem onthe face of things exaggerated. Ho suggests that the freedom now gained by the German fleet in the Baltic will have the effect of confronting , the Allies with a fresh naval problem in dealing with the enemy submarines, but the lines on which 'he attempts to justify theso conclusions are .not disclosed. One obvious fact which must bo taken into account is that the Russian Baltic Fleet has for many weeks been, a factor of inconsiderablo importance. Tho ,new ; conditions... which ...Mil.. Grasty is made "to somewhat vaguely indicate, if they exist at all. must be supposed to have existed for » considerable..time past. In point of fact, however, it seems unlikely that the elimination of the Russian fleet has to any serious extent affected tho submarine situation." Jiad np, oc,casjpn,tp ; uso more : 'than ■ ; ari' ,, jnsignificant' number of submarines in the .Baltic. Her underwater craft have long been, concentrated against Allied shipping'jn'other seas. The only part played by the High Seas Fleet in furtherance of the submarine campaign is that of protecting,.the .minefields which bar the''approaches to German coastal waters. It has throughout the war been an essential task of German surface warships operating in the Baltic to guard and protect the minefields which close the entrances to that sea, and they are certainly not relieved of this-duty by tho Russiancollapse. 'It is as necessary as ever that all possible ' precaution's should be taken v against such raids, as British naval forces have at times pushed. daringly homo ;in the'■ approaches to the Baltic, and against the entrance of British submarines." Considering further that by' common consent Germany's most valuable base for submarine operations is neither tho Baltic nor her own North Sea ports,,but the! Belgian coast, Mr. _ Grasty's rather sensational suggestions seem to lack ■foundation.

■ One :of the most serious aspects of the existing situation is the "evident danger that the Russian warships in the Baltic, including four modern Dreadnoughts, may fall into the hands of the enemy. It is probable, however, that' there is' justification for- , the.view expressed ■in -.a London ■•■message to-day that owing to the shortage of seamen the enemy will , , find it difficult to adequately man the larger vessels. The further statement that" the few British submarines in the Baltic arc unlikely to fall into the enemy's hands is presumably based, on information, and ifso is highly satisfactory. In the ordinary way these submarines- would, have the-option of seeking internment in Sweden, but whether they could rely, upon Swedish protection as matters stand, is perhaps doubtful." .. . ■

If Germany is in fact sounding Spain "with view to getting .KingAlfonso to make a proposal regarding the abandonment of air raids on towns outside the war zone," she has afforded another and'an extraordinary example of that shanielessness and lack, of-.humour which, in German policy,. go hand hi hand ■with - -the most callous and brutal criminality. If the conditions of aerial warfare had been determined by the Allies, some such restrictions as Germany now wishes to ■ talk about would no doubt have been imposed long ago. In that case respect for non-combatant lives would have very seriously hampered/such an aerial offensive as the Allies arc now preparing. Thanks, however, to Germany's brutal misuse of aerial force all such questions have been thrust aside'.. At a time .when she thought herself immune from effective counter-measures she- embarked upon a policy of indiscriminate ! murder—a policy.which developed ■in tho. murder of -babies in jtheir cradles and school children at their desks, ■ These crimes will never.bo. adequately punished, but at least (ho Allies are absolutely free to develop their aerial, offensive withoutregarding the incidental loss of civilian lives or any other considera,--tip.n than that, of .achieving the maximum 'military effect. , It might, .thought, that eycn ; 'a Gei , .-. man would tp:day. h'ivo.beeh ashamed t;cf..'suggest, that'..they'. should adopt any other policy. /