The Dominion. SATURDAY, MARCH 2, 1918. THE CRISIS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 140, 2 March 1918, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, MARCH 2, 1918. THE CRISIS OF THE WAR

'.■■■' ■■ :: •••-''♦—-—■;•■• . To the extent that they -suggest that the trend of the war this year is likely to hinge- upon. the action taken by the enemy, reports which have dealt in recent days with signs and portents of a German offensive in'.'the Western theatre.are almost certainly utterly misleading.,. It is probably true, as President Wilson declared a few weeks ago, that the culminating crisis of , the war has arrived, and that this year's achievements must : . determine tho issue. This "cannot, however, be taken to mean simply that the .fate of the war will be determined by the success or failure of the Allies; in meeting whatever attack's the enemy may organise ■ during the coming spring and summer in the Western theatre elsewhere. The task' actually laid upon the Allies in the tremendous struggle about to open is to so use their resources that before the 'year is out the enemy's defeat will be unmistakably manifest, and the ultimate issue of'th'e war ho longer in doubt. To accomplish, less might be/dangerous, and. this probably is what . President Wilson had in mind when he said that the achievements of the present year must determine the issue. But while the Allies are Unquestionably called upon to do much more than defeat any attacks the enemy may attempt this year, it is equally true and to the point that what is known of their resources relatively to thoso.of the enemy ..warrants a-belief that: they are : capable of carrying out this larger.- programme. _ It is a little, difficult'to summarise available information bearing _ oh these great issues, but the .weight'pi evidence certainly .is that in .any offensivo action ho may undertake the enemy will .operate .within defined and restricted limits, and that in normal course long before .this. : year has

come to an end "the Allies ,\vill possess under._ all heads • a i)ronounccd superiority in developed resources.. An authority of the highest standing, General Foch, was quoted a day or., two ago as observing:, that: Germany may-begin an offensive in Rumania and Macedonia, working towards Italy. But be added that the Teutonic numbers did not make for superiority. The . Germans failed in the Yscr campaign when'they had a three to one superiority and... the Allies were .almost without artillery,.and munitions.. '.It. is.' bf'.the highest importance also'that General Foch considers that the danger-point has been passed in Italy, and that the Italian armies are now well able to hold their own even without the aid which, France and Britain are ready to. render. .. ■ ■■' . \ • The comments of the.great French •strategist arc. of material-value in clearing the outlook;- Aufc- they do nut cover all the ground. He has been content to record a belief that •the Allies.are well able to cope with any offensive the* enemy may attempt,'whether it takes shape on the main West front or is developed in the Balkans and against Italy, with tho interruption, of the Allied sea communications "in the 'Mediterranean of its principal objects. A concentrated attack in France or Flanders is certainly not the only- possibility, in sight, assuming that_ the' enemy elects to stake his remaining, hopes on, offensive action. Except on tkV hypothesis that_ tho •men and factions now dominant in Germany recognise •that they_ must at all costs strive for decisive success, .in the iinnie,djate -.future;; Turkey,' the .Balkans, and/Italy, may easily be regarded •by. the enemy as-a better field for ■pffensiv.e,.action . than- the area in which-- the- -main -armies- of France and Britain: are concentrated and those; of ■ America-:-are . gathering. 'But, ■■ this ■■■'apart; ■'General -Foch might' : witfr : 'evident* •■justification Save >d'ded;;to his ''recorded observations that/.there is every'.likelihood that'- before ..months .have passed, the' Allies will c ha.v'e. repaired at all points the' balance- of effective strength' which 'for 'the: moment, has ,in one .'important;., detail—that of numbers—turned against them. .■••The chief .advantage 'gained ... by ■■■•• the enemy' as a result' of the late turn of events, in. Russia is-that ho is temporarily : in.a position to oppose ..superior, numbers !to, "the.' Western ..Allies (though not, Without utilising* ..large numbers of inierior. troops) or .alternatively' to., use...'considerable bodies, of reserves in othor theatres. It is not suggested- that .he is likely to approach equality with the Allies in .artillery or other essential ;items of-material equipment, least of. all,' perhaps, in the vital factor of" aerial force. The enemy's prospects aro limited in the first place because he is opposed by splendidly organised and equipped armies which in the 'past have triumphed over : infinitely greater odds than he is able to set against them to-day. But it is equally important that the transportation ofi American troops to France is proceeding at such a rate that whatever temporary superiority in numbers the enemy is able to establish is likely to bo speedily wiped out. Most encouraging information on this point is contained in American files of recent date. A very definite impulse was given to American war preparations when the mission headedby .Colonel House returned home ' iiv'-the , closing-'day's ■'• of" last -year .after attending;;intor-Allie ; d conferences '■'and''conferring , 'with individual Allied Governments. One of the principal recommendations made by the mission was: ■ That the fijhtinj? forces of the United States be cliepatched'to Europe with the least possible delay, incident to taining and equipment. While in Europo the mission did :much to pave the way for this rapid dispatch of-* troops. Secretary Lansing observes in an official statement that ■ the agreements which were reached, when in full operation, will greatly increase the effectiveness of the efforts now being put forth by. the United States and the Allies. The agreements provide for a comprehensive pooling of military, shipping, and other resources, and for. "participation in the 'military deliberations of the Supreme War Council'as a step'towards efficient aiid centralised unity of control of military operations." It may be noted in passing that tho question of has given rise .to no such misgivings and embittered debate in the United States as. in .Great Britain. So far as the-.-,reinioyccment of. the Allied armies is - concerned it -is particularly noteworthy that arrangements were made under which the Allies, by restricting imports and in other ways,'will liberate the'greatest possible amount of tonnage for the

transportation of- American troops. Guarantees were given also that full equipment of every kind would bo . to all American troops sent to Europe during the year 1918. ..What; this 'means, , ; according to a well-informed ■ Washington • correspondent. who is _in touch with the political and , military authorities, is that if the Allies supply the tonnage a million ' American troops may be transported to .France by June or , July. That the Allies are their part appears notably in the elaborate measures that are now being taken to enforce food economy in Great Britain. Submarine losses are steadily, though slowly, declining and reserve stocks of some essential foodstuffs, as Mr. Bonar, Law stated recently, are much heavier than -at this time last year. But the. people of Britain are being asked tp .tighten their belts in order that ships may be released to transport as many American troops as possible across the Atlantic during the critical months-that lie immediately ahead. According' to the correspondent who has been quoted, some members of the House mission declare privately that the war will be won or lost in I*9lß. It might be unwise to accept this too literally, but undoubtedly the Allies aim at far •greater• results this year than that of-merely. recoiling the enemy's attacks:. " And what is known of their present and prospective strength warrants a belief that any offensive undertaken by the enemy will be dictated, hot by the reasonable hope of gaining decisive advantage, but by the desperate straits of the. German military party and the fact that its members .darc.nqt face the prospect of an indefinitely'lengthened war.. . The fact that the Allies Have prospects of redressing within a few months the balance- of- numerical strength whereit now turns against .thorn in itself impels the'enemy, to an effort of maximum violence. The opportunity by' wliich he is faced, such as it is, is> vanishing opportunity. But it. docs. not by 'any means fo'lloV' that.an. effort which is likely to-bo- cxtremelyi.violent will on-that account-open- with good prospects. It is nrobably within the facts to

say that this is a supremely critical year, not because it will witness the enemy's last bid for victory, but because the. Allies, cannot afford to let it pass without demonstrating such a'complete mastery .of .the military situation as would put the issue of the war clearly beyond doubt. '.'",■