THE FAILING SUBMARINE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 139, 1 March 1918, Page 6

THE FAILING SUBMARINE

The weekly return of British shipping losses published to-day completes the record of submarine piracy for a period of twelve months—a period which coincides approximately with that of the enemy's "unrestricted attack" on British, Allied, and neutral merchant shipping. There is no doubt that if the hopes with which the Germans embarked upon their augmented submarine efiort at the beginning of last year had been realised the organisation of the Allies would have been thrown- fatally out of gear and they would have been placed in imminent peril of losing the war. It is in the light of these facts that wo must assess the magnitude of the British_ and Allied achievement in bringing the underwater craft to manifest defeat. The submarine is an elusive foe, and if the enemy persists in renewing his flotillas it is unlikely that they will be utterly defeated and put completely out of action while the war lasts. But that the underwater craft have failed in the mission to which they were devoted is established beyond any possibility of doubt. Evidence on the point groups under two main heads. One is the steady decline in shipping losses, and the other is a steady increase in tho destruction of submarines. /

■ Tho failure of tho enemy underwater campaign is emphasised by an enormous expansion in the construction of now merchant tonnage in Britain, America, and elsewhere, and by the comprehensive measures of co-ordination and economy the Allies have devised to tho end of turning the tonnage available in a giv.en period to the best possible account. The evidence in sight relating to the decline in shipping losses and the increased destruction of submarines in itself may fairly be called conclusive. Comprehensive, though not detailed, information in these categories is supplied'in two diagrams issued by the Admiralty in 'December last, one indicating the trend of shipping losses and the other* the progress made in tho dostruction of enemy submarines. The first of these diagrams is particularly valuable in that it relates to Allied and neutral as well as British losses. It shows that in the June quarter of 1917, when the unrestricted campaign reached its height of effectiveness, ships of all nations were .being sunk by the enemy submarines at a rate four times as great as in the September quarteil ot 1917, and twice 'as great as in the December quarter of that year, but that in tho last quarter of 1917 losses fell to the same' figure as in the corresponding quarter of the provious year, before the unrestricted campaign began. Another way of illustrating the prevailing trend is to compare the average losses of British ships per week during eight-weekly periods from' the time when the campaign was at its height. Average losses per week in periods of eight weeks to the dates named are set out in the following table:— Average British losses Ships over per week to All ships. 1000 tons. . May 23 35 24 « July 18 23 17 September 12 20.7 17.3 November 7 18.2 12.1 January 2' 10.5 12.2 February 27 13.1 11

These figures show clearly that in spite of occasional fluctuations the rate of destruction is constantly declining and that it has declined enormously from the maximum point reached in the Juno quarter. On the other hand, the Admiralty diagram which has been mentioned shows that eince the end of the September quarter in 191G submarines havo been' destroyed at an ever-in-creasing rate, and it was stated not long ago by Sir Eric Geddes that submarines are now being destroyed as fast as they are being built. The least satisfactory feature at the moment is that some delays have occurred in the development of the vast programmes of shipping construction framed in Britain and the United States. It is certain, however, that here, as in their direct attack up_on the underwater pirates, the- Allies are capable of very greatly expanding their past and present efforts. The activities of the National Service ' Department should before long give a great impetus to shipping construction in Britain, and the very magnitude of the American programme makes some initial delays inevitable. A hint of what Amorica will accomplish in shipping construction in the not distant future is given in one of to-day's cablegrams. It mentions a single yard, on the Delaware, which is expected to turn out 400,000-tons of shipping in 1918, and it is stated that after next September this one yard will turn out a merchantman every two days. As a whole there is ample warrant for confidence that the submarino will be a factor of declining importance as time goes on. The position will never be completely satisfactory while any ships aro being desfcroyjed, but, as Sir Eric Geddes has said, it is impossible to foresee any changes except for' tho better. Tho Allies arc entitled to read in the events and trend of the submarino campaign , an assurance of ultimate victory. To Germany the same facts mean that the one weapon which might have given her a decisive advantage in the final phase of the war is breaking in her hands.