The Dominion. TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1918. AN INTERNATIONAL NAVY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 101, 22 January 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1918. AN INTERNATIONAL NAVY

Much that has been said in recent days, by.'President Wilson and others,. on the subject of afterwar naval policy has been expressed in terms so broad and general as to carry little point or mean-, ing. A more practical turn is given to the discussion of this allimportant question by an announcement made by the American Secretary for the Navy last month in issuing his annual report. The United States, Mr. Daniels declared on that occasion, would be willing to contribute its share to an international navy of sufficient force "to give validity to the international decrees" of the Peace Conference. From his further remarks it is plain that what he has in mind is the creation of a permanent "police of the sea." According to a well-informed Washington correspondent, tho report, in so far as it deals with the establishment of an international navy, undoubtedly received the careful consideration of President Wilson before its publication, so that the proposals it advances under this head are presumably to be regarded as an authoritative outline of the policy favoured by the American Government. It cannot be said that the proposals provide or suggest an easy solution of the knotty problems of naval policy which will arise at the Peace Conference and afterwards, _ but they raise much more definite issues than were raised by President Wilson in his broad generalisations relating to disarmament on land and sea and to freedom of the seas, and they certainly merit thoughtful consideration in Great Britain and elsewhere. It is true, as Mr. Lloyd Geoiige reminded the trades unionists with whom he conferred at the end of last wcek,_ that where freedom of the seas is concerned Britain is in a different position from Amoriea or any Continental country, and he stated what must always be the essential features of British naval policy when he added: "We must guard most_ carefully against any attempt to interfere with our capacity to protect our shores, our shipping, and ouw overseas communications." For the time being the onV naval policy which Britain can for a moment consider is to raise its national Navy to maximum strength. It may be added that no other policy will be feasible after the war unless Germany utterly renounces the policy and aims of her present Government. All talk of a naval holiday or of an international navy will be empty until it is no longer possible for any German to advocate the policy of'the Pan-Gormans, expounded by Count Reventlow last year in tho following terms: —

What do ivo Germans understand by Clio freedom of tho seas? Of course, wo do nnt mean by it that free use of the sea which is the common privilege of all nations in times of peace. . . . That sort of freedom of tho seas we had before the war. What we understand to-day by this doctrino is that Germany should possess sucli maritime territories and such naval bases that at the outbreak of a war wo should bo able, with our navy ready, reasonably to guarantee ourselves tho command of tho sea-s. We want such a jumping-olf place for our navy as would give us a fair chance of dominating the seas and of being free of the seas during a war. The inalienable possession of tho Belgian seaboard is therefore a matter of .life and death to us, and the man is a traitor who would faint-heartedly relinquish this coast to England. Our aim must be not only to keep what our arms have already won on this coast, but sooner or Inter to extend our seaboard to the soutli of the Strait of Calais.

Obviously while any considerable party in Germany holds these views and cherishes these ambitious, the question of reducing naval armaments and setting up an international navy will possess only academic interest. • But the Allies arc fighting in this war in the hope of inflicting such a defeat on Germany as will not only quench her ambitions in regard to the Channel coast, but finally overthrow and discredit the German military party. T.'c is evidently as one who shares this hope that Secretary Daniels has spoken in advocacy of an international navy. For the time being he is administering a policy under which the United States is making every effort to build up and increase its naval strength as rapidly as possible, but ho holds that at the Peace Conferenoe an opportunity will arise of providing an alternative to the fearful drain of competitive armament building which was in vogue before the war._ That alternative, as has been said, ho finds in an international navy to enforce international decrees. To such a police of the sea, lie declares, the United States will _ bo ready to make full contribution, "and to that end the expansion that now crowds all the old and now shipbuilding resources will soon place this country in a position to furnish as many and as powerful ships as will come from any other country." Thp international navy, as Mr. Daniels outlines Ijis plan, would be composed of separate naval establishments of all nations, each Nation contributing according to its wealth and population, "or upon some plan to insure that no nation can safely challengo the decrees of the high international court." This is perhaps somewhat vague, but there is nothing indefinite about tho proposal made by Secretary Daniels, presumably with the full knowledge and approval of the Government to which he belongs, that _ the United States should contribute in full measure to whatever combination of naval force is necessary to uphold international law upon tho seas. One matter which Secretary Daniels does not touch is, the right of search and blockade in time" of war. This right is vital to all maritime nations, and above all to Great Britain. The problem; of reaching an international agreement on the subject of search and blockade may in the end prove.insoluble, and as a result the project of an international navy may bo wrecked. Yet such an informal overture as Secretary Daniels has made on behalf of the United States is not to be lightly slighted or ignored. Complete naval disarmament is unthinkable while the bare possibility remains of any _ Power sending out swarms of hastily constructed submarines on a mission ol destruction. On the other hand reversion to the conditions of competitive naval construction which formerly obtained would impose intolerable burdens upon nations already heavily burdened by the war, and certainly not least upon Great Britain. Like all other nations intent on keeping the peace of the world inviolate,_ Britain has every possible incentive to strive for the attainment ol the conditions which Secretary Daniels has sketched, tentatively it is true, but with the very important proviso that the United States is prepared to take a full au.l active part in assisting to establish these conditions.