The Dominion. MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1918. A SPLENDID RECOVERY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 88, 7 January 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1918. A SPLENDID RECOVERY

Seriously as the disastrous de-j feat inflicted upon the Italian armies two and a half months ago told against the Allies, it is well j within the facts to say that the outlook as another year opens is very greatly brightened by the fashion in which thS Italian nation has. rallied its forces and hardened its, resolve in tho stress of a supreme emergency. Writing only a week or two after the Italian line on the lsonzo had given way, an English correspondent at Home observec that tho facts which then emerged were: "First* the success of the enemy's 'political offensive' so far as a portion of tho Army is concerned, and as the result of this a military success which has probably exceeded his expectations; and second, the relative failure of this political offensive as far as tho country is concerned." Time and events have demonstrated that this correspondent's estimate of the situation and of the prospects it held was sound. It is not denied that a plague-spot of disloyalty appeared in Italy prior to tho military disaster /of October, and had a part in making it possible. Nor is it claimed that disloyalty has been wholly extinguished, as many honest patriots hoped it would be, by the emergency which has done so.much to arouse and stimulate the nation at large and the mass of its military forces. Tho corrupting propaganda which the enemy conducted by means of leaflets showered upon the troops and upon tho country from aeroplanes, and in other ways, was supplemented and assisted by the disloyal agitation of a section of the Socialist party. And, at/a time when all other parties—including even the followers of Signor GioLlTTl—were uniting in face of tho national peril, this Socialist minority held aloof and even boasted through its official organ, the . Avant-i, that its aims and < hopes were not those of the Nationalist Press. As it. was used by tho Avanli, the term nationalist did not refer to the political party of that name, but to all newspapers representing and expressing national rather than so-called international interests. The nature of the propaganda carried on by tho disloyal minority in Italy is sufficiently indicated in the fact that it has been described by Italian newspapers as Leninism. There is general testimony, however, that this disloyal agitation has failed to influence any large section of the Italian nation. \'lt should be clearly understood," tho Kome correspondent of the London Time* wrotein November, "that the overwhelming mass of opinion in tho country, so far as it is articulate, rejects the point of view expressed by the Avanli. Tho attitude oE organised labour is sufficient proof that Leninism has not spread widely among the people." It was disappointing, ho ] added, that this disloyal agitation j had not disappeared altogether un- ' der tho shock of the Austro-German ' attack, but Italy's constitution was j sound, and her general resisting ' power seemed actually to bo invig- i orated by the shock that was to lay ] her low. Subsequent events have • justified this hopeful view. Splen- ] did resolution on the part of the <

Italian nation and its armies, as well as timely assistance from the Allies, were needed to stem tho enemy's offensive and establish the firm defensive front against which all his recent attacks have broken in vain. Considering what is implied in this recovery, it is necessary to take account of tho all but overwhelming character of the Italian defeat for which internal treason and enemy propaganda partly paved the way. It is to be recognised that the collapse of the Italian line was not caused by any single factor, but was made possible by a combination of circumstances. The first unfavourable impression of the disaster was heightened by tho knowledge that the Italians jusf previously had boon attacking in superior, numerical strength and enjoying also, in the areas where their offensive had reached its height, a pronounced superiority in artillery and other items of material equipment. This being so : obvious reasons appeared for assuming that tho disaster which followed was due much more to political than to military causes. In actual fact the magnitude of the disaster is largely explainable oil purely military grounds. Political factors apart, the development of tho Italian offensive beyond the Isonzo involved certain risks which perhaps no _ generalship could havo wholly eliminated or escaped in such operations. At all events, it is now known that in the hope of breaking through.the Austrian front beyond Goriria and the Bainsizza Plateau, General Cadokna took the risk of advancing his centre too far alid temporarily weakening, his northern flank—the flank which in the event gave way before tho enemy's onset. The brilliant success of tho Italian armies had in fact obscured the peril to which they were still exposed, "clinging to waterless and rocky heights, with a river gorge in rear athwart tho lines of communication." It is a very material point that tho tremendous concentration they effected in tho hope of opening tho road to Trieste, and possibly the road to Laibach, and tho consequent weakening of their northern flank, made tho Italians extremely vulnerablo to such a

counter-blow as tho enemy struck. Treason may have contributed to the collapse of the weakened northern flank—though even here there were examples of noble heroism, as in the defence of Monte Nero days after it had been isolated—but once th"o enemy had broken through in this area a general retreat became inevitable. Another fact which should not be overlooked is that tho Italian retreat, though it entailed terrible losses and heavy sacrifices, was carried out with sound.judgment and masterly skill. It is now obvious that the prompt decision in favour of a general retreat averted irretrievable catastrophe..' Had an attempt been made, after the northern flank had given way, to stand fast further south, the Italian armies would have found themselves fighting on a front parallel to their main line of communications, and tho probable sequel would have been a wholesale envelopment. Instead, they were withdrawn intact, though not without heavy loss,- and aro today facing the enemy on a stationary line, unbroken in spirit, and in rising strength. At the same time suggestive indications are not wanting that tho Italian people arc capable of that national discipline which General Diaz, like General Cadoiina before him, has named as essential to victory. Such indications are to be found in the solid support accorded tho Government, except by a small minority of Socialists, in tho Chamber of Deputies, and in the radical measures taken to increase the food supply I and to mobilise the civil popula- ' tion for war industries. Tho malcontent section has not disappeared, but there is every reason to believe that it is and will bo held firmly in check. The Premier, Signor Orlando, has made his attitucle plain in _ public declarations. He made it if possible still plainer when, in October last, he associated himself with the declaration of Sia.Nto Bissolati to the members of the Extreme Loft: "To defend the Army from stabs in tho back I myself would fire upon you." The position of the Government is all the stronger since it is understood to have discarded war aims, more or less definitely entertained by its predecessors in office, which wont well beyond the liberation of unredeemed Italy. The removal of this ground of contention strengthens tho hope which lato military and political events have done so much to fortify, that the Italian nation and armies will meet with unfaltering resolve whatever demands the war may still impose.