PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 76, 22 December 1917, Page 8

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Moke light is thrown upon the ■ failure of- the- enemy submarine campaign by a cablegram received yesterday which stated that the Press Bureau had published an official diagram showing that the amount of British, Allied, and neutral tonnage sunk by submarines had steadily : declined- since June, until the sinkings from Scpte.'nter to December 12- were lower than those for the llarch quarter. In Juno tonnage losses had already heavily declined as compared wiwj those suffered in April. The total decline indicated is thus very considerable. Another diagram, the cablegram stated, showed a steady rise in the number of German submarines sunk, the total since September being nearly double the total for the March quarter. It will he remembered that oii November 1 the First Lord 'of the Admiralty stated that since the beginning of the war between 40 and 50 per cent, of the German" submarines commissioncd and operating in the Ixorth Sea, Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans had been sunk. He added that during the last quarter tho< enemy had lost as many submarines as during the whole of 1016. This, Sir Eric (JrEDDES. observed,. showed that real progress was being made. It shows in fact very substantial progress, and. the- information, now . supplied through the Press Bureau indicates that the rate at which'- submarines are being destroyed is still rapidly increasing. Not many days ago the First Lord stated- that the Germans were still building submarines faster than they were being destroyed, but it seems qui to clear that, if present conditions continue t-he_ margin in the -enemy's favour will soon ne overtaken, and matters, of course. will not stop at that point. * * * *

The established facts relating to tho destruction of enemy submarines arc made more interesting by rumours which circulated some time ago that tho German -authorities' were determined to _ make a special submarine effort in O.ctobcr-No vpmber., • using up. their reserves of. men and boats to do.so, the purpose being to give as good a stagc : setting as possible to a winter ''peace campaign.": ..There is. some, evidence in. ; the Aclifiifalty:Aveekly: returns'that.the Gor-j mans have in fact concentrated upon such an effort, though rather later than was- anticipated. If the rumours mentioned had a. foundation in truth it would appear that th-3 enemy, without gaining any very big immediate results, has materially impaired any prospects he might have had of .effectively attacking American transports' and sun ply ships in the spring of 1918. This, however, is speculation. The vital fact clearly established is that German submarines arc being destroyed ■at a rapidly increasing rate > and that unless the present trend is reversed the destruction of submarines, will, before long outpace She 'enemy's utmost efforts in construction. . ..

At. timo of writing .there .is little news from the land theatres, though bombardments reported on the .French front may portend events. In Italy the enemy is preparing a further offensive, but snow is falling in the mountains, and if it continiics will s?,t a, period to his oper : ations. It is mentioned that' ( the snowfall is .already hampering his •communications. - The descent of winter will teP much- more against the . Austro-Gcrmans than against the Italians in the matter of communications,., for while the enemy armies.on the.northern-part of the front are dependent on long transport lines through mountain country, the corresponding Italian forces are supplied by routes running over-the plain aid traversing only a limited belt of Alpine country.

It is difficult to arrive at any; very definite idea of the economic advantage the Central Powers are likely to gain as a result of the Russian collapse. In the most unfavourable development, from the Allied standpoint, these advantages may equal or overshadow in importance the accompanying military relief gained by the Central Empires, but there; arc a number of limiting factors. Apart fronft the instability of the Bolshevik regime, the northern areas in which its power centres are ill provided with the foodstuffs the enemy is supremely anxious to obtain. ' lir Southern Russia, where foodstuffs are much more plentiful, loyalist are apparently stjll in the ascendant. It is to be' cuhsidered also that conditions wF anarchy in the Russian provinces will oppose serious impediments to commercial operations, and that any attempt by the eilcmy to intervene would be as likely as not to aggravate the trouble. The position as a whole is obscure, but a certain amount of light has been thrown upon some of its leading features For instance, the Vienna ArbeUc.r Zeitung, the chief German Socialist newspaper in Austria, recently published an account of conditions in Russia which seems to deserve attention. The writer, a Socialist who had visited Russia, describes the economic chaos in that country as unspeakably great. "There is a scarcity in Austria of food and raw material," he goes on to observe; "in Russia everything is at hand in plenty, only it cannot be transported. In South Russia there is grain enough. Yet in Pctrograd, although the bread card, entitles one to more than it docs here (Vienna), there are often whole districts without, bread, because the Russian railways cannot transport any grain. Waggons, locomotives, and all railway material arc wearing out, and cannot be replaced bccause there is po manufacture of them going on. The. old regime turned everything into,

the production of munitions,_ and the state of the railways is simply indescribable The amount of rolling stock diminishes from month to month, and added to this fact are the state of the money market, the chaos in industry, especially in mining, the decreasing confidence of the people in the credit banks—all in tho midst of war! It is a state of things which must lead to the worst economic crises, and thcncc to anarchy and counti-T-rcvohition.'' To, what extent the'enemy will bi* enabled to profit by tradeMviih lhissia in these conditions, assuming that a continued paralysis of Russia's military effort gives him comparatively frco hand in working upon them, is obviously a somewhat open question.