NIBBLES AND "BITES" IN THE WEST

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 64, 8 December 1917, Page 6

NIBBLES AND "BITES" IN THE WEST

WHAT OFFENSIVES" MEAN i V TO THE ALLIES: ■■:

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS

; '.:<By : . H. R. Wakcficld.)

by tho authority, of the War, Olßce, and forwarded per favour,-6f-. the Royal Colonial Instituto;]';;':'-;*■.

It is frequently observed that this iyea'r.the casual, 'student of tlio war has accepted news of'".British and Allied successes. , with, remarkable sang-froid. Victories ears ago would jhave raised the. temperature of the national spirit many degrees aro now .■quite coolly received. • This is not due ,-to lack of interest, but rather to lack 'of .expert knowledge*, .and the familiar|ity '-which breeds nonchalance regardtog what is less than half understood. ■In spito of all that has been written, the ,','nverago man" canuofc as:jet comiprehend tho conditions which limit and 'control'the aotions of military chiefs in modern warfare, and theref'oro cannot a,vail himself of tho safest, surest restoration for all who feel what is called "war strain." -'

Two Examples. . 'A littlo whilo ago tho British initiated two simultaneous actions, a minor Operation north of Lens and a major joporation east of Ypres. They were ,40th fn the truest sense successful, and Unuch can bo learnt from an examina- . tioni Qf • tho objects of those offensives 'and' the degree of success which thoy •attained. .Firstly, it must bo realised that'the Germans, in most cases, aro resisting attack in positions chosen by themselves. They aro, not, as they ■.protend, willing to surrender moro territory. Any retreat, they may be '■forced to make north of Lens and east :X)f Ypres, will weakon them both strategically and politically. They jhavo their backs to the wall. Sccondjly, it is beyond disputo that the Aljlies in tho West have numerical artil■lery_. and aerial superiority. That suiperiority. can bo over-stated, .but it ■exists; It is not an inevitably deci(filvo superiority, but it is sufficiently . '.pronounced to be a continual menace ;'-oven to an onemy on tho defonsive in 'his own, chosen, positions, elaborately 'fortified. . Balancing the Losses. j. It is tho most obvious platitude that [Ihe'only policy for a numerically inferior, force is to attempt to inflict vhigher losses on its opponent than it fruiters; itself. It is equally obvious [•that it is the policy of the superior tforce to inflict on its opponent Josses ■at least equal, or at any rate very ; 'Blightly inferior to its own. Such a must iu tiino end in the disintegration of the lino of the inferior 'force/ , Bow does tho British Army set ;to work to assist that process? . Being by virtue of its initiative numerical and material superiority the attacking force, ,it has normally the valuable •privilege of selecting the area where Hhe"battle shall bo fought. Now that ,the. element of surprise has been largely eliminated from war, that privilege has lost some of its.value; the enor'inous strength of fixed, defensive posi■tions_ weakens it still moro, but it romains.a privilege. We, therefore, •seleot an area of areas, and attack there.' ; . -, Since wo possess., general and artillery predominance, save ■for short sporadic intervals, that predominance will bo operative all over ( the .front on which it exists. It can ,l)o,'taken, as a /postulate .that wherever Tve.,.attack:,we, almost nlw.ays, possess .that predominance.- '-Therefore, dur-, ting the preliminary bombardment we shall inflict, in ordinary circumstances, more losses than wo suffer. When .this preparation is deemed to have <3one its work, ,wo attack, and invari■ably occupy enemy territory to a certain depth. •-. ,- . "Snags" Inevitable. It is, perhaps, true that the attack Save in abnormally favourable conditions, is more costly, than the defence. One dofendiug machine-gun may annihilate a hundred attacking men. ■ It is only right to emphasise this, because it' is often lost sight of, and it (lends an-olement of hazard to all attacks. In tho slang of the day,, tho (attackers may always "strike a snag." : 'But it is also true that tho losses of ;the defence aro for the most part perjmanent losses, the bulk of the garri- ; son is either killed or captured, and !the wounded aro not recovered. The ■successful attack has a. heavier gross, 'hut lighter net loss. Tho Germans, jwho are acute students of war, have 'always disliked the defensive. We (have, then, reached the stage when jtho offensive/ force lias' expended a ' certain amount of capital, and purchased with it certain 'square miles of ground. , It has also more or.less disorganised the defensive foroe. ■ Therefore, that defensive force is compelled to counter-attack, partly in the hope of recovering the valuable ground lost, partly ■ to prevent the enemy from developing and extending their success and to give time for reserves to be brought up. It is also necessary to sustain its morale; a force which never strikes back tends .rapidly to become demoralised.

It is these counter-attacks which provide. tho attacking force with the interest on its investment. They are usually mado without sufficient artillery support, with insufficient knowledge of the situation, and often with troops unacquainted with the terrain. Their •ouly chance of success lies in the fact that tho assailant will not have had timo to organise the captured positions, his artillery , will stil! be moving up or left behind, units will be depleted of officers, probably rather exhausted, possibly short of food and ammunition. But it is not .entirely a paradox -to stftto itiat many counter-attacks are not meant to succeed. They are meant to delay, Tho quicker they are developed tho .better.-' They aro invariably costly. , The Successful Offensive.

The successful offensive, therefore, will accomplish tlio following, results. It will overwhelm tiro garrison of a given stretch of front, 1 partly by bombardment and partly by an infantry attack. It will occupy a prearranged amount of enemy territory. It will hold this ground against counterattacks, and it will have improved its position for further attacks. In this process it will inflict losses at least equal (to its own. Apply this to the offensives at Lens and Ypres. The attack which carried Hill :7() and much other valuable ground was extremely successful. It was mado with very few troops, and Was in no soriso a great operation. But because Lens is a very sensitivo subject with tho Germans, they wore compelled to make great sacrifice either to get tho lost ground back, or at least stop any further advance. If they had to tell their people now that they had lost Lens, it would lja terribly hard to reconcile witli these peculiar "victories" which appear with such regularity in their communiques. They wcro, therefore, compollcd to counter-attaok no less than fourteen times without recovering a yard of ground, and to suffer losses between twice and threo times as heavy as those of tho Canadians, who attacked them. They are now in inferior. positions, at the mercy of our artillery, and they aro still moro drastically compelled to rosist any further advance. Thus the main object of most recent offonsivos was achieved by us. and losses.unite disßioaoiiionata ta

tho extent of tho operation were inflicted upon tho enemy. At Yprcs fully two-thirds of the attack was equally successful (so much so that it even disorganised tho German communiques!). It gained valuablo ground, took prisoners and droveoff counter-attacks. But on tho right wing, after gaining ground, wo were compelled under extremo pressure to lot some of it go. Such things must sometimes happen; it is tho danger of them, which necessitates tho most elaborato preparations and the most extreme care; it is that which makes a modern offensive elaborate and slow. Nevertheless our success was undeniable, and once moro the Germans were permanently weakened and placed in an fnforior position to rbsist any tether attacks. Above all, 'perhaps, by obliging them to repeat costly oounteratacks, wo inflicted a heavy drain on their man-power. Why, then, this sang-froid? ' Be : causo the casual student cannot visualise tho process. Ho does not understand the role of counter-attacks, and what a tremendous part they play in tho modern' Conception of the offensive. He does not see tho whirlpool of Allied military power for ever sucking German divisions into its vortex, and tuat in so doing it perfectly accomplishos its aims. Thanks to our numerical superiority we can afford to rest our divisions far moro often than can tho Germans. The almost, intolerable, str.ain of mode rnwar demands rest and respite, and the Germans cannot get it. . For if there is comparative peace at Yprcs and Lons there is fury at Craonne and Verdun. If thero is comparative peace, at Craonne and Verdun, the 5.0.1t, signals are up at Lens and Yyros. (German man-power is being steadily ground down between the British and French mill-stones. It is these offensives, that alter largo scale maps so little, which are so deadly and certain in their effect on the enemy. Thoy are whining the war,, and the casual student must learn to understand them.