The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1917. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 61, 5 December 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1917. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

The cardinal fact of tho great battle which oponed on tho Oambrai front last Friday is that tho ibermans have failed in a mighty effort to restore a badly damaged section of their lino. This result was only reached, however' after a grim struggle, which admittedly tested the British organisation and the martial qualities of the British troops. In the battle at large, the troops, and the organisation in which they have a place, emerged triumphant from tho test, but it has still to be explained how tho enemy was enabled to break into one short section of the British line—the southern flank of the salient facing Cambrai—by a surprise attaok. It is perfectly clear from the reports that no blame rests on the troops who met tho German thrust. On tho contrary, it is duo first and f oremost_ to their magnificent efforts in a soldier's battle that tho enemy's threatening advance was stemmed and broken. The Germans con-

trived to effect a concentration which for the moment gave them an overwhelming superiority. Obviously the move should have been met by a counter-concentration. That

it was not so met in good time implies a failure in leadership, presumably on the part of a subordinate commander. The immediate results of this failuro in' any caso were serious. The enemy gained temporary possession of positions on and adjacent to the southern flank of the British salient and effected considerable captures of men and material. He now claims that he captured six thousand prisoners and a hundred guns. Tho return is probably exaggerated. It is an old trick with the Germans to include dead and _ desperately wounded men in their lists of prisoners, and it seems likely that on tho present occasion they have included trench mortars in making up their total of captured guns. It is certain, however, that tho British losses were serious; it seems to bo equally certain that they might have been averted, and tho enemy is obviously to be credited with a definite though limited and local success. But only by arbitrarily isolating these facts and tearing them from their setting could they bo construed as having any vital bearing on tho trend of tho West-'

»n campaign. If it ito 3 bo emphasised that the enemy found a law in the British armour, infinitely greater emphasis must be laid on ;ne fact that his partial and temporary success, bought at a terrible cost, was an incident in a >attlo which has once again demonstrated the very definite superiority )i the British armies to the forces ■>y whom they are opposed on tho Western front. Tho leading features of the battle aavo been clearly outlined in official and supplementary reports, lhe attack which opened on Friday is described as one of tho greatest, ■i not actually tho greatest, tho Germans have evor launched on the West front. Two hundred thousand infantry, it is estimated, have been imployed in the effort to wipe out ihe British salient which threatens jambrai and a vital section of the Hindenburg_ line to.the north. It, is in the highest degree significant ] n his own declining fortunes and tho splendid success of the British offensive that the enemy was compelled to undertake such an enterprise, not in the hope of winning decisive but simply and solely'with intent to restore a dangerously weakened Section of his ine. When he hurled his divisions against the Allied line on the Yser, ind against tho French at Verdun, 30 aimed not at merely local results, jut at forcing a decision. It is believed that he was animated by the samo hope in l his abortive at;acks this year on the heights of the Aisne. His own reports and thoso if Allied origin show that his latest jffort, though it was prepared and leveloped on the maximum scale, ffould have been regarded as fully successful if it had re-established ;ho line west of Cambrai over which jENEeaI Byng's troops swept in ieir victorious offensive on Novemier 20. It has never been better demonstrated than in this battle ;hat the price the enemy is conlemned to pay for the continued lefenco of his Western lino is heavily and rapidly increasing. The progressive invasion of his line at rital points compels him to draw aore and more heavily upon his resources in defensive counterneasurcs. Tho process culminates tor the timo being in the battle west md south of Cambrai. The enemy's )bject and the nature of His effort leing established, it only remains :o add that he has completely failid to attain his object, though he ms paid tho price in lives which ic no doubt hoped would bring him success. All reports, official and inofficial, bear witness to bis appalling losses in a long series of aboriive_ attacks, but in spite of these sacrifices'tEe tactical position on the 3ambrai front is substantially unchanged. In the proportions of tho battle, tho loss of Masnieros tillage and a crossing of the Escaut 3anal are minor incidents. Cambrai, and tho enemy line to the north, are not less seriously moniced than they were when tho terrific German counter-stroke was launched. It is by theso facts and with due regard to tho enemy's snormous and unrecomponsed losses, > md not by a momentary failure of ' n'ganieation on ono short section of she British line, that the battle mist bo measured.