The Dominion. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1917. A SUPREME NECESSITY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 50, 22 November 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1917. A SUPREME NECESSITY

To-day's news from London suggests that there is no longer any clanger of a political crisis in England as an outcome of tho forceful plea lately raado by Mr. Lloyd George for Allied unity. The newspapers, it is stated, unanimously cradit the British Prime _ Minister with having made a brilliantly cf- | fective reply to Mr. Asquith's criticisms in the House of Commons,, and it is added that tho Paris speech has undoubtedly strengthened the position of the Lloyd George War Cabinet. Taking at thetr face, value some <jf the cablegrams transmitted to this country fast week, it seemed hardly likely that this state of affairs would be reached, but a comparison of these messages with tho news transmitted to Australia upon which they were based shows that they were in some eases far from beino; a fair and adequate summary. This applies particularly to newspaper comment on the spcech; In tho cablegrams forwarded to New Zealand vitriolic criticisms by the London Ddtlij News, a paper bitterly hostile to Mr. Lloyd George, were quoted at length, but comments by eight other newspapers, showing gradations of feeling from hostility to warm approval, were ignored. The material fact was passed over, also, that the Paris newspapers enthusiastically applauded the British Prime Minister's - spccch, finding much to commend in his bmital frankness and stern' sincerity. That it provoked a certain amount of criticism seems, to have been the least important result of the Paris spccch. At the outset it evoked praise as well as blame, but it is more important that it has effectively concentrated attention upon what is now the supremo necessity of the Allies—the necessity of achieving siuch a unity of action and eifort as will make their resources tell with maximum cffect. Mn. Lloyd George docs not seem to have exaggerated when he said that as a resultof ms spccch at Paris public opinion m America, Italy, France, and Jintain was agreed that the scheme ot

a Central Council, with a view to united action, was vital. As he is reported, Mk. Asquitu brought forward nothing in the Homso of Commons debate on Monday which is calculated to shake this opinion. Admitting, as he was bound to do, that co-ordination should bo as complete as possible, he nevertheless deprecated the establishment of any Organisation interfering with the responsibility of the General Staff to the Government, or derogating in any way from the authority and responsibility of the respcctivo Allied Governments. This is criticism which contains its own rebuttal. Almost in the samo breath Mk. Asquitii affirmed the principle of co-ordination and stipulated conditions which would male co-ordin-ation impossible. Obviously if there were no invasion of the authority and responsibility of separate Allied Governments and Staffs, there could be no co-ordination. If he made out a poor case in dealing with the main question, Mit. Asquith was equally unimpressive in his protest against the strictures passed by Mr. Lloyd George upon the past conduct of the war. Had the. apportionment of blame been in question, his protest would have been perfectly justified, for Mr_. Lloyd George is only less responsible than Mr. Asquitii himself for whatever mistakes were made by the British Government in past stages of the war. But the object of tho Paris speccli was not to apportion blame, but to pave the way for tho ad9ption of a more effective war policy by showing how badly the policy hitherto pursued had failed. 1 Instead of attempting to shift blamo from his own shoulders to others, Mr. Lloyd George emphasised his own responsibility. It was the only Ministcl 1 of any of the belligerents who had held office since the outbreak of war that he claimed tho right to review past failures and insist upon the need for a better policy of co-ordinated action than 'the Allies have yet evolved. A certain amount of political friction should not be allowed to obscure the fact_ that tho Paris spccch was a straightforward appeal- for unity on the merits of the case. Judging by nowspaper utterances, it was at once j,c,ceptcd m that light in Paris. When the speech appeared Figaro observed that public opinion would not resent Mr. Lloyd George's _ brutal frankness in revealing the risks tho Allies had run in each desiring to win his own victory instead of seeking a common victory on any front. This raises the essential issue, and the only one that deserves to be considered. By the nearest practicable approach to an arrangement which would enable the Allies to move and act as a single forcc, they will attain maximum strength and emciency. So long as this end is achieved, or even approached, interference with the authority and responsibility of individual Governments and Staffs is a minor consideration. In order to justify their attitude, critics of the Paris speech in its essential character as a plea for better co-ordination would havo to show noli only that extended coordination will infringe the authority and responsibility of individual Governments and Staffs, but that co-ordination in itself is bad and undesirable. If it marked the final stop open to tho Allies in the direction of co-ordination and unified command, tho creation of the Central Council would afford no great reason for satisfaction But it seems now much moro likely than it did in comparatively recent tunes that further progress will be mac in the same direction. It is particularly striking that the United Stages has not only agreed to combine with Britain, France, and Italy in constituting a common advisory council, but is willing, according to MR. Lloyd George, to take tho logical further step of investing such a council with executive authority. From the great Western democracy, notoriously jealous of its national independence and isolation, this is a very great concession, but it is also a logical surrender to facts. The extent to which public opinion has been awakened in the various Allied countries on tho question of " ni h ecl control should mean at least that the Central Council now exercise a very definite influence on events in spite of the fact that it Is denied mandatory authority, it is not by any means certain that the development which culminates for the time being in the creation ot the council will stop short at that point.