WHERE THE WAR WILL BE DECIDED

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 37, 7 November 1917, Page 7

WHERE THE WAR WILL BE DECIDED

[HE WEST THE MAIN BATTLEFRONT

Washington, November 5. Mr. N. D. Baker (Secretary for War) emphasises that the principal battlefront remains in Flanders and France. "It is there our forces are lighting." He interpreted the evacuation of the Worder Peninsula to mean that tho Germans did not contemplate a further advance towards Potrograd at present.—Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn. Colonel Shumsky, the well-known war critic of the "Bourse Gazette," Petrograd, thus reviews the enemy's move in tho Baltic: The German rush on Riga cannot be carried to the point at whioh it seriously threatens Potrograd, and this for tho following strategical reasons:— 1. An offensive movemont of more than 400 versts requires not less than two months. The Germans have started it too lato (September 1), and in two or three weeks they will meet the_ Tainy period and the bad Toads, whioh will Tender. impossible any movemont on Petrograd this year. We must not forget that in 1915, during their victorious march through Poland and Lithuania, tho speed of their advancing troops engaged with the Rusians did not on an average exceed three to four kilometres a day. 2. The routes leading to Potrograd are protected not only by the lino of the JDwina, but also by a strong position formed by tho lalra system of the Pskoff region. It is sufficient to look at the map to realiso the seriousness of the obstacles these lakes present. Moreover, they itre strengthened by a_ series of well-fortified positions. It is incredible that tho Germans can overcome all these obstacles in the short time that they havo at their disposal before tho rainy period, even if they do not meet on their way with a sorious resistance from the Russians.

3. There are not sufficient Gorman forces on the Eastern front for a great expedition of this kind. Tho permanent and periodical attacks of the AngloFrench armies have drawn IGO Gorman divisions to the West. Consequently the forces of our enemy on the Russian front aro absolutely not /efficient

(a) To undertake an offensive covering 400 kilometres. (b) To break through a series of strong and practically impenetrable positions. (c) To defeat tho Russian army which, though disorganised, is numerous in men and supported by excellent artillery well supplied with ■in enormous quantity of ammunition. For the above reasons I feel justified in asserting that in any case during this year there cannot bo any .danger of Petrograd being attacked by the enemy. His attack on Petrograd directed from tho sea is out of the question. After the Dardanelles tho idea of landing laTge armies must be abandoned. Since Napoleon to his great, chagrin realised the impossibility of landing his army in England, the dilliculty of such an operation has not diminished, but on tho contrary increased, for a modern army, followml by nn enormous supply service, would require many months to effect a landing. Its base being too far away, in its native land, must he connected with the operating forces by means of sea communications. But where could the Germans find troops to land a big army? The idea of landing big nrmies on enemy territory is a dream of theorists: which may be ruled out bv practical men. Thero is no oxnmplein modern history of such a landing with successful consequences. . Tho facta in our possession suggest that Germans have much more modern ideas than they are credited with by sensational writers. The aim of the' German blow was Riga, and perhaps I?oval (which is scarcely possible), but no further.