TINO'S DUPLICITY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 25, 24 October 1917, Page 5

TINO'S DUPLICITY

WHY HE DID NOT PUBLICLY JOIN , THE KAISER AMAZING DISCLOSURES A White Book, containing the GrecoSerbian Treaty, and documents relating thereto and to tho Germano-Bulgarian inoursion into Eastern Macedonia, was recently distributed to tho Greek Deputies. The documents establish that tilers existed an agreement between the Athens Governments and the Central Powers. It first figures in a telegram from General Ba'irar to tho General Staff, stating that a Bulgarian major had a meeting with a Greek officer and declared that, in virtue of an agreement betweon General von Mackensen. and the Athens Government an occupation extending to two kilometres within tho Greek frontier, provided it was a strategical neoessity, was allowed at any point, and that consequently the Tieights surrounding Lechovo had been occupied. Tho following day General Yanakitsas, tho Minister of War, telegraphed to tho commander of tho Cavalla Arni.v Corps that it bad only agreed that the. Germano-Bulgarians could advanco to the frontier line, but under no circumstances must doubt be cast on the Bulgarian officers' good faith, nor should force bo used, as the maintenance of friendly relations was dosired.

Then comes a letter from Count von Mirbaah, the Minister, to M. Skouloudis, tho. Premier, stating that, in view of tho movements of the Allies' troops, the Germano-Bulgars were compelled to enter Greek territory in order to ensure tho free passngo of the TCupel Pass. Count von Mirbach formally deolarod that this was a purely military necessity, that Greek eovereignty would be respected, and that the population would be well treated. Similar assurances were given by M. Passarofl', the Bulgarian Minister. Skouloudis's "Hoodwinking" Tactics. At this juncture M. Skouloudis indulged in protests which he promptly communicated to the Entente Powers, thinking thus to hoodwink them. A few days later M. Skouloudis made a statoment to Parliament representing the occupation of the Rupel Pass in an entirely falsa light. Another significant document is tho following telegram from the Greek Minister in Berlin addressed to M. Skouloudis:—

"Have reason believe we must keep in view probability Gormano-Bulgar advance into R-upel Pass/' ■ Other documenls from a German source certify the existenco of an agreement regarding Fort Rupel, and furnish evidenco of treacherous understandings with tho Bulgars. Reports were received from Greek diplomatists and provincial authorities concerning Bulgarian atrocities against Greeks, with a view to the annihilation of tho Greek element in Eastern Macedonia, but these reports wero systematically shelved.

The documents included a telegram from the Greek Minister at Bucharest to M. Gounaris, stating that lie had been informed by a British colleague that, according to sure information, Germany had categorically assured tho Sofia Government that Greek neutrality had Ijcen definitely ensured, even in the event of a Bulgarian attack against Serbia. On receipt of this telegram, M. Gounaris addressed a telegraphic circular to all Greek Legations communicating tho Bucharest lelejrram, and requesting them l;o state if an opportunity offered "that a Bulgarian attack aeainst. Serbia could not leave Greens, indifferent, nnd

that the only result of a Turco-Bulgarian agreement would be the-further cementing of the ties uniting those countries." M. Gounaris's subsequent attitude showed to what an extent he was acting in bad faith,

Tlno to the Kaiser. Telegrams exchanged between the Kaiser aud King Constantine when Great Britain declared war on Germany are highly enlightening. Replying to the Kaiser's telegram recalling reasons v/liy Greece should stand by Germany's side, King Constantine telegraphed through tho Berlin Legation:— "The Emperor knows that my personal sympathies and political opinions draw me towards him, and I shall never forget

that it is to him wo owe Kavalla. After mature consideration, however, I fail to understand how I could 6erve his purpose by the immediate mobilisation of my Army. Tho Anglo-French fleets nils the Mediterranean, and would destroy our warships nnd merchant navy. They would occupy our islands and would provent the concentration of my Army,

which can only be effected by sea, there being no railways. Without being fcble to render liim any service we would t'isappear from the map. "Consequently I am of opinion (lint circumstances "impose 011 us neutrality which can be profitable to him considering that I engage not to harm his friends and my neighbours, bo long as they do not harm our local Balkan interests."— Eeuter. The Greek Minister in Berlin sent a dispatch to King Constantino, the principal passage in which is: "Yon Jagow has told me that he thinks the Emperor will understand tho necessity expressed by Your Majesty for maintaining neutrality for the present. Von Jagow repeated to we the advico lie had formerly given, to come as speedily as possible to an understanding with Sofia and Constantinople, adding that Serbia to-day constituted' the 'skin of the bear.'"