The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1917. GERMANY'S GREAT DESIGN IN THE NEAR EAST

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 1, 26 September 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1917. GERMANY'S GREAT DESIGN IN THE NEAR EAST

The possibility is in plain sight as the war approaches its fourth winter that the calm now obtaining in the Turkish theatre may presently be broken by events of far-rcach-ing importance. It is a conspicuous fact as matters stand that a comparatively small British army in iMesopotamia is placed in an ex.posed and possibly dangerous situation, but it is not by any means solely on this account thab the Ottoman Empire, seems likely in tho near future to make- new demands upon the active- enterpriser of the Allied Powers. There is a good deal in existing circumstances to recall and give point to the contention upheld by tho adherents of tho "Eastern" school of strategy that the Allies should have'made- Constantinople their first great objective when the development of their resources enabled them to assume the offensive. On this subject tho military correspondent of tho Manchester Guardian remarked recentlyj/hafc the occupation of Constantinople would navp. provided a short cut to victory in 1915.' "With that," ho added, "we might without doing l more than hold our own in Franco have- purchased the freedom of Belgium and Serbia, secured some rectification of the wrong done to France in Alsace-Lorraine, and also got pretty well our own way in Asiatic Turkey Instead of meeting the Germans at their weak spot, wo chose, for reasons largely sentimental, to attack them where they were..strong.- .We played into tho hands of those who made the worst blunder in the whole of military history—namely, the invasion of Belgium." There is something to he said for the opposing view which has . dominated Allied strategy—that everything clso must be subordinated to the necessity of concentrating the, greatest possible strength in the main theatres. But there is no doubt that the failure of the Allies to attack Turkey' in overwhelming strength while that alternative was open has invited heavy penalties and threatens to givo rise to serious problems before; the war has come to an end, if not to gravely affect the settlement. ■ In order to.realiso the nature of tho problems that aro liable to arise it is enough to look at a map of thowar areas. Only the late German Chancellor and ,thoso who share his views pretend that the war map affords a reliable indication oi thetrend of the war, but it is a matter' of common sense to recognise that in recasting it to their liking the Allies will nave to solve some very difficult problems, and that this applies with particular force /to Turkey. For tho time being PanC4erinan dreams are all but realised. Germany to-day controls, and occupies with her own ; and allied armies, a wide belt of territory, extending unbrokenly across Europe from the North Sea and the Baltic and through Asiatic Turkey to Mesopotamia and Southern ,Palestine. She is in full command of the direct routes by land to the 'Near East. If she continued to now thorn she would dominate the world. Since'the Russians aro no longer to be counted upon as reliable allies it must be said that only tho British armies in Palestine and in Mesopotamia stand between her and tho realisation of her longoherished project of striking at the very vitals of the British Empire It -may bo argued- that the commanding geographical position which Germany now holds counts for little in face of the. fact that she is steadily approaching defeat in the main theatres other than Russia. To the extent that tho Allies are jointly pledged to-restore Serbia and Rumania, and that a reconstructed barrier will thus bo opposed to tho "Drang nach Oston in the Balkan corridor, this view is manifestly sound. But to assume that the decisive defeat oi the Teutonic armies in Europe will connoto tho loosening of Germany s hold on Turkey and the creation of conditions making for a stable peace seems to be taking far too much for granted. .With Russia abjuring all annexation of Turkish territory.and possibly disinclined to assume even tho control . ot a protecting Power over Armenia, or to maintain her sphere of influence in Northern Persia, a d .!ffi l danger ; appears that grave d"hculties may impede such Bettleraent as would free Turkey and the Turkish railways from German domination If these difficulties proved insuperable the restoration of the invaded Balkan States would be a poor guarantee of the future peaceof the world. . . The essential problems by which the Allies are face-d in dealing, with Turkey are interestingly reviewed Iw Mr H 0/Wood in an article in tho'current FortniMly Review. At the present moment, he remarks, the international situation is so complicated and many of its factor, are so far from .clear that it « impossible to go into detail bs to the future of Turkey or of its iail-

ways. But so far as the Bagdad line is concerned two things scorn certain—first, that sooner or later it or some other railway from the Bosphorus'to the Persian Gulf will bo completed, and, secondly, that its ownership and control will depend upon tho results of tho war, and particularly upon the fate of Turkey. Wo must leave no stone unturned, Mu. Wood justly observes, to prevent the conclusion of ii peace which would leave the enemy in, or enable him to regain, a predominating control cither of tho actual Ottoman Government, or of an enterprise which, once it is denuded ol its political control, can easily be regularised in such a manner as not to endanger the future interests or.jsafcty of Great Britain or her Allies.

At a given moment (he adds) it seemed certain that the completion of the Bagdad railway «B a Gorman enterprise would be one of the greatest diplomatic'triumphs ever personally secured by a reigning monarch, and Hint Great Britain, and to a lesser.degree Franco und Russia, were destined to-be utterly and permanently out-inanoeiired on an nil-important issue. But in the East, perhaps more than in any, other part of the world, we must hope that the effects of tho past will now bo destroyed, and that the danger of future German hegemony will bo obliterated. If these- vital objects be not achieved—and they aro vital objects for all the Allies—the advent of peaco itself will still leave us faco to face with the danger of a renewed conflict for German domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. It is therefore tho obligation permanently to separate Turkey from Germany, both politically and militarily, and consequently to frustrate a plan, which will never be forgotten by the Kaiser and his Pan-German subjects, far more than the necessity for the actual defeat of Turkoy, which, must be our Eastern goal. That goal may be won oither on the field of battle or in tho arena of diplomacy. Whether anything is to be accomplished with Turkey in the field of diplomacy events must show, but it is plainly a vital matter to the Allies that they should not only defeat any new military schemes Germany may hatch in Turkey, but should as definitely make it their aim'to reduce the Ottoman Empire to submission as to overthrow tho armies of the Central Empires in Europe. The failure of Russia has greatly modified the immediate strategical situation, and the occupation of Constantinople no longer offers the same decisive military results as it seemed to offer at an earlier stage of tho war. The Russian' failure has had tho effect also of seriously impeding effective military action by tho Allies against Turkey. But, it has at the same time emphasised the necessity the Allies were already under of extorting such terms as will definitely release, the Ottoman Empire and its railways from German control. We may expect in the near future to hear of important developments in the campaigns in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and the outcome will have a powerful bearing not only on the conditions of peace which may finally be arrived at, but on tho future of the whole world.