THE ENEMY'S BLOODLESS WARFARE

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3195, 20 September 1917, Page 6

THE ENEMY'S BLOODLESS WARFARE

i » . LIGHT ON A FUTURE CAMPAIGN THE COMMERCIAL SPIDER (By E. P. P. Kowe.) [The following article is published by the authority of tho War Office, and forwarded on by the Royal Colonial Institute.] There is a bloodless warfare at which Germany is-even nioro adept than at tho warfare of armed forces. To a large extent it is fought secretly, and is therefore more dangerous than open conflict. In this warfare she is the enemy ot all mankind. "The German has industriously eaten his way into the economic lite of almost every other country; but he has not done it merely for economic reasons; the acquisition of wealth has been a secondary object, though a real one. The real objeot has been the acquisition of power, and his reasons have been primarily political. His economic life has had, so to speak, a political The German manager abroad has always had one eye on his business and one eye on Germany; and the Delbruck law, which purport to enable a German to become naturalised in tho country ot his adoption, and at the samo time to retain Ms German nationality and allegiance has in this respect been a wonderful weapon." These words by a writer with thorough knowledge of .his subject out lino Germany's economic policy towards all foreign countries. It is a policy of attack. The Gorman is not content _w h personal, or national, prosperity as =ucli, he must prosper at the.ultimata; expense of others. This predatory ambition has become for him a deep-seated ideal. It is not in itself a worthy ideal and the methods by which he seeks to forward its accomplishment are furtive and shameful. ' The Spider in Berlin. The German has hitherto shown himself the ready tool of those talively direct, a vast system of: organised, aggressive commercialism. The biaro is but the hands of this economic Frankenstein work far afield. A few years ago Possehl openly proposed the omation in Germany of an Economic General Staff. The suggestion was ha dlv necessary. To all intents and puiLesf°th? Institution already existed Thero is manifest a co-ordination in the direction of tho German commercial offensive that could scarcely be improved upon by the creation of a more miliESSedOrganisation. A »«£y ' affords a good example of the stralegj and tactics of this German "offensive is Italy. Germany's first-lino troop* are her bankers. They at least conduct the preliminary assault, and, having; entrenched theniselves, provide a rapportin" base for further advance. The principal institution through which Germany operated in Italy was thei Banca Commerciale Italiana -Four German baaks tnnk Dart in its foundation—tho Uleion°oaer, P the Deutsche Bank the Dresdner ■ Bank the Disconto Gesallschaft-*nd it worked under the direct influence of these and several others. Tho Banca Commerciale Italiana has been referred to in Germany as "tho.head of tho- line of German penetration beyond the Alps, and its German directors have lieen "reatlv lauded. "Theso mcn, J wrote ]{r TJebelloer, in the "Weltwirtachatt" in April, 1916, 'spun the threads of German dominion over Italian affafThere is the aim. in this case openly ad ; nutted, in a nutshell. It dominion that is ultimately sought, and before the war it was in many countries being rapidly obtained. ~, ■ . ~ 'i,„i. It would be impossib o in the short space of an article to give any adequate idea of tho aggressive activities of the institution named. In a short space, of time it bad fifty branches, and deposits, amounting to 790-million lire. Ihe greater part of this money, a most valuable hostage, was on loan, in Germany. It thoroughly understood that Dr TJebelhoer calls tho "typical German method of having banks and businesses working hand-to-hand." Ho expressly adds that it was founded not only to develop banking, "but to penetrato into the world ot industry." It' created, organised, and .controlled vast industrial undertakings. The extent of this control qan bo soen from tho published list of presidencies and directorates held by its two chiol German directors, Otto Joel and Toeplitz. "Its services," Dr. TJebclhoer continues, "are specially significant as regards electric companies ... it maintained in all these companies the condition that they should remain under tho control of the Allgemeine Electrici tats-Gesellschaft of Berlin." They were compelled to get all their electrical machinery from Germany, and became, in fact, the tied houses of a German firm. ... . . Tho achievements of ijho Commerciale in the IfaTian shipping world were perhaps as remarkable as anything else that it accomplished. By its interest in the Societa di Navigar.iono Generate and other Italian shipping companies it brought it about that the competition of Hie Italian mercantile marine with the German lines which monopolised so much of Italian trade, even coastal trade, was kept within modest bounds. It is a notable fact that when war broke put the Puglia shipping line of Bari, subventioned by the Italian Government, but controlled by the Commerciale, forthwith suspended its services. A Far Spun Web. But the operations of the Commerciale went further afiold. It succeeded, for instance, by skilful dilatoriness as intermediary, in. wrecking the, projected Italian settlement in Angola, because tho Deutsche Bank had an interest m the adjacent Lobito-Katanga railway. Furthermore it opened a "confidential information service ? " which underpin economic guise provided an inquisition of a most delicate kind. It is doubtful if the "schedules of information," which had already been obtained, when war broke out, ever found their way to Berlin, but, if they did, they were cortainly of value to the Imperial Government. These "schedules of information" were part of a direct system of spy-work which is found in its most complete form in tho activities of . another German agency, the Schimmelpfenglnstitute. The most vigorous branch of the Schimmel,pfeng Institute was that established in France. Its aim was to obtain information, professedly commercial, which should serve political and military ends. Duplicates of the French schedules that it collected wero sent straight to Berlin, where they were tabulated and analysed. In the words of a writer already c.uoted, "they supplied Germany, on the one hand, with complete statistics about any particular industry, and with a list of customers who might be seduced from the French funis by an offer of similar goods at a lower price, and. on the other hand, with military information reaching from a basis on which lo caleulalo the exact indemnity which would 'bleed France w'hite' to a list for tho German General Staff of exactly what produce and resources could be found in every French village in case of invasion." It must not be supposed that Germany's grasping hand in Italy was represented only by the Commerciale. Ihe fnnimercialo was not more than a finger of that hand. In Italy, and in London, too, there wis a branch of the hehimmelpfeug Institute. Thero wero also in Italy various other 'Germanised banks, such w> the Cralito-Italiano, tho Panca Frnncese e Italiana. and the janca Brasiliana Italo-Belga. . One more sianifieaiit point in licrmanv's vast system of peaceful hostility should not bo omitted even in so slight an account as this, which deals almost entirely with one country. German agencies in Italy, particularly the brandies of the Commerciale, were opened not where business ™«'r«H them, but where it might be useful to Germnnv to have centres of influence and information. Thus the twnjipinlo established a whole series of agencies otao to the Austrian frontier. -Another branch was opened at Salerno, where there wero already seven well-known banks to serve n population ot onlj 43 000, but whore there were also shipyards which might well bo productive of VhowMko of a most useful kind. What Germanv did in Italy she did everywhere. Kus-sia, m nnrteiilnr, affords ii remarkable instance nf her success in this bloodless warfare As everyone now knows, by domination in

peace Germany secured a paralysis of ] organisation in Russia at the outbreak of the. war. With Hie ground so carefully prepared the German leaders dearly believed that they had little more to do than to break in an empty shell. What drove Russia back in 1915 was not so much Mackensen's guns as the work done in previous years of peaceful hostility. _ Considering .the extent of this " •undermining process" it is marvellous £ that Russia was ablo to save herself, j", With- regard to Germany's campaigns in ' time of peace volumes could be written, ? taking every country in turn. In this i jrntyeot she has proved hnrfplf the j enemy of the world, and tho world, to ? save itself, must take due notice of the fact and shrewder measures for the r futuTe. ■ . I — V