PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2985, 24 January 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Whether or not President Wilson's address to the United States Senate, which is reported at somo length to-day, is intended as a reply to Me. Balfour's recent memorandum, it does him little credit. Like the Peace Noto which he sent out a 'few weeks ago, Mr. Wilson's latest utterance is chiefly remarkable for its snuffling hypocrisy and for a refusal to recognise the moral issues raised in the war. His talk about peace without victory and much clso in a similar strain is cithor proGerman or meaningless. Manifestly it repeats the offence of which he was guilty when, in his Note, ■ ho alleged a similarity in the expressed aims of statesmen representing the opposed belligerent groups. It is not by peace without victory that the bitter wrongs of the nations Germany has outraged or sought to outrage will bo redressed. And it is not by peace without" victory that Gorman militarism will bo destroy- 1 ed. The Allied nations which are leagued in a great and gallant struggle for right and justice as against the domination of bruto force will retort upon the American President's ignoble speech with indignant denunciation, tempered only to the extent that indignation is limited by contempt. v** ' * On one point, in regard to Poland, Me. Wilson made a remarkable break. Ho said (as reported) that an essential condition future peace is a united, Independent, autonomous Poland. If be means, and this is the strict meaning of his words, that German, Austrian, and Russian Poland must bo united in an independent -kingdom, he will find himself at loggerheads with Germany and Austria, ■for it is oertain that neither of those countries will voluntarily make the conccssion involved. Germany is at present trying, apparently quite unsuccessfully, to beguile Russian Poland with a bogus offer of autonomy, certainly not of independence. But it is certain that neither Gormany nor Austria will of their own volition release the Polish territories which were under, their dominion when the war began, and it is unlikely that they will oven offer these territories autonomy. Russia, on the other hand, has promised to unite the Polish territories and grant thorn autonomy, under her suzerainty. It is not to be pretended that this will completely mcot Polish demands, but it seems to bo tho nearest approach to a practicable settlement that is likely to be made, and it would pave the way for further reforms in the future. If President Wilson is ambitious of assisting to promote a Polish settlement, he should join with the Allies in endorsing the Russian proposal. As it is, baffled attempts aro already being mado in his own country to find out what his statement about Poland really means. Taking experience as a guide, it seems likely that the President will calmly decline to satisfy this curiosity.

Yustbrday wc wore told that Germany ia again threatening that blockade of England which her submarines havo long attempted in vain. _ To-day it is stated that Britain is adopting new methods of fighting the U boats, and that a vessel equipped under the new methods is leaving a Canadian port with a valuable cargo. The form in which the message is pnt suggests that an important detail in the new methods will he the arming of merchantmen with heavier and more powerful guns than they have hitherto been in the habit of carrying. It is highly probable that this policy is now being adopted; _ Discussing the submarine campaign so'mo weeks ago, tho naval correspondent of the Lundon Times entered a strong pica for tho adequate armiug of merchant ships. Now that ive ato face to face ivith an■othejj and "Mora daagsroua submarine

cam-Daigii 1H ftllitill tho enemy boats nro Itlrgßri Cah'.V jleaHcf rum, ami aro capable of operating at a long distanco from port (ho wrote), tho position lias bccouio more urgent and important. Tho liowor submarines no longor lie in wait under headlands ami in shallow water,-;, but attack tho ships in tho open sea. Scores of cases have demonstrated tho danger to our ocean-borno traffic. Moreover, a small gim mounted astern is, it lias been demonstrated, no longer a sufficient protection. The guns carried by tho nower enemy submarines outrango such guns, which carry at tho farthest about ftOOO yards, whereas tho Runs enrried by tho eubmarino havo a rango of from 11,000 to 12,000 yards. The U boat can, therefore, keep at a safo distance and shell the merchant steamer till she fiinks her. Tho need is for heavier gnus or at least nuns of longer rango mounted both in tho bow and stern. It is unfair and unlike our British practice to oblige our gnllant morchant seamon to run away from tho enemy beforo they can bring 1 their protective armament to bear. Furthermore, it is exceedingly likely that in order to perform this operation the merchant ship will havi), to present lier vulnerable broadsido to.'tho enemy as a target for shell or torpedo. 'I'hero may be diplomatic difficulties to surmount before British merchant ships can be armed as they should be, but these cannot weigh ill tho balanco when tho gravity of this matter and the interests of tho Emniro aro considered. The contentions of the Times co 3» respondent receive support from a statement made by Mb. Churchill in tho course of a House of Commons debate in November. It was quoted in this column not long ago, but is worth repeating. He believed, he said, that of the attacks which had been made upon our shipping, roughly, four-fifths of the armed ships had beaten off tho attacks and escaped, and that, roughly, four-fifths of the unarmed ships had perished. As an argument in favour of arming merchant ships this scorns conclusive. * • # *• '# According to the Tinics naval correspondent, to some extent guns for self-defence were furnished to British ships in 1915, but it was to a very small extent. Principally the ships so provided were those requisitioned for Government work. The offical explanation of. the failure to arm other ships was the scarcity of guns and ammunition, other requirements being more pressing. The guns provided were mostly small, and were mounted at the stern. The value even of this measure of protection was proved over and over again, the experience of many captains being that the enemy submarines did not continue to attack steamers provided with guns. The correspondent added that probably very few of the merchant ships carrying foodstuffs to England were armed at the time ho wrote (at the ond of 'November, 1916). It is to be hoped that the equipment of merchant ships with efficient guns, mounted both in bow and stern,, is by this time, proceeding apace. No doubt the official explanation regarding other and more urgent demands was valid when it was advanced, but the fact that it was found possible during the latter part of 1916 to turn on a big soalo from naval to mercantile shipbuilding suggests that it was probably .found possible also to concentrate upon the production of armament for merchant ships. It will be easily realised that a ship adequately armed has vastly better chances ox escaping destruction than an unarmed ship. Operating in the open ocean the submarines must to a great extent abandon tho lurking tactics which they used to practise in coastal waters from which f.ijey havo now been driven by tho vigour of tho naval hunt. Even in ocean cruising they may at times sight an approaching ship and lie in wait for her submerged. But they must often trust to an open chase, running on the surface, and in this connection it will bo remembered that tho later German boats are said to" have a surface speed of twenty-two knots. Dealing with such a submarine running on the surface a merchant ship adequately armed would have an cxcellcnt chance of holding her own, but hardly any. morchant ships aro capable of escaping from a fast modern submarine by trusting to their speed. * m . • • i ~ c " The diplomatic difficulties to which the correspondent alludes may quito possibly arise, and particularly with America. The right of merchant ships to carry defensive armament is well established in international law and usage, but in the present war the United States has recognised tho right with reservations. It is possiblo that the American Government might refuse to concede the status of a merchant ship to a vessel carrying powerful guns in bow and stern, but it is not by any means certain that the refusal could be sustained on legal grounds. Evon if it could tho limitation' involved would apply only to a section of tho Allied mercantile marine, and by making the utmost possible use of Canadian ports that section would be reduced to a minimum.

Peoplb who like searo stories about what Germany is going'to do will find a choice specimen in a message which a British correspondent has thought it worth while to transmit from Amsterdam, no doubt as a sample of the stuff with which Gorman publicity agents arc regaling the Dutch. With fcho notable oxcoption that no mention is mado of Zeppelins, the story, is comprehensive. It promises sensational developments on land and sea, and any details overlooked may bo regarded as covered in the general statement that all forms of frightfulness arc stored up. A story like this, bearing its character so plainly on- its face, may for the most part be left to speak for itself, but it contains one exuberant effort which deserves particular attention. It remarks that large new armies will soon be ready, and that these armies "axe'said to number 120 corps, and consist largely of men be'tween forty and forty-five years. With the youngest levies, they arc already concentrated in West German depots, suggesting a confirmation of the reports thai. Germany will mako an early attempt at a new offensive in the West." This is tall talk with a vcngeanco. It has been computed that the German armies on all fronts, with their auxiliary forces, line of communication troops, and so forth, have an aggregate strength of 5,000,000. This is an extreme figure. It means a big increase on the armies .which Germany had available in the earlier stages of the war. But it is thought that by enrolling men well above the normal military age and boys, Germany has managed to increase her total military strength (apart from the now limited number of untrained or partly trained reserves waiting to be called up) to about fivo million men. This would give her 250 divisions at full strength (20,000 men) or a somewhat larger number under the new system of weakening the strength' of division?,

We aro told in tbc Amsterdam mcssago that Germany lias 120 corps in her wostern depots. Ono hundred and twenty corps would amount to at least 240 divisions, or possibly to a larger number, for sumo German army corps consist, or used to, oi three divisions instead of two. What the Amsterdam message says, therefore, is that practically tho whole strength of the German armies available for all fronts is massed in tho western depots in readiness for a new offensive in tho Western theatro. To mass 120 corps in her western depots Germany would have to strip' both the West front and that part (a big part) of the East front which is held by German armios, and it is doubtful if she could complete tho concentration without drawing upon Rumania and the Balkans as well. * *' » * . There is little news at time of writing of events in the war theatres, but unsuccessful German attacks at Verdun appear to have been upon much more than a raiding scale, and their failure is correspondingly important. Material progress is reported in the work of rounding up tho enemy forces which remain afoot in East Africa.