The Dominion WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1917. THE WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2985, 24 January 1917, Page 4

The Dominion WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1917. THE WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING

Giving due heed to the leading facts of the submarine campaign, Germany's latest, threat of a blockade of England, mentioned in a New York cablegram yesterday, can only bo regarded as a hollow attempt to feed the' German people / with falsQ hopes. It is not to be do•nied th&t tbo submarine campaign weai;g a more formidable, appearance to-day than at any previous ,stage of the war, but there is an ' absolute distinction to be drawn between a campaign which works out in a steady and far from negligible drain on Allied and neutral flipping and the effective blockade , of England which the German people are being taught to expect. From the Gorman point of view the ' distinction covers the difference between failure and success. Much as the enemy submarines have improved upon past performances in the remarkably sustained campaign i which first reached considerable proportions in the later months of 1916, they are still a very long way from having approaohed decisive results. Tho facts of the existing situation were epitomised a few days ago by Sik John ■ Jellicoe. The submarine monaoo to tho mer- ' ohant service was, he said, far greater now than at any period of the war, and required all our energy to combat. He was confident it would be dealt with, but the shipyards- and engineering, shops must put forth continuous and ungrudging efforts to make good the losses. . . . The nation could depend on tho Navy being ready, resourceful, and reliable. 1 Tbo First Sea Lord at onco admits the gravity of the submarine menace and is confident that it can be dealt with, and though not all tho circumstances of the underwater campaign are open to tho public gaze, enough is known to make it possible to broadly appreciate the grounds upon which these opinions aro ■ based. Without accepting all tho sensational stories that aro afloat about the enormous flotillas of submarines that Germaqy now has at disposal, it is evident that sho has succeeded, in spite of heavy losses, in materially increasing tho flotillas with which sho entered the war. Account must be taken also of an improvement in type and in armament which has enabled the submarines to extend thoir cruising into tho outer seas and to operate there with effect. It is not by attempting to maintain blockading lines of submarines on the sea approaches to Great Britain that Germany, has so notably extended her depredations on merchant shipping, but largely by sending out raiders ablo to range far afield and to remain away from their ports for a period which is probably lengthened by the utilisation of submarine depot ships like the merchant submarines which havo carried a few bargc-lpads of cargo across the Atlantic. By these methods Germany has altered and modified to her advantage tho conditions under which tho submarine campaign was cS'nducted in 1915. That year witnessed two distinct chapters in the campaign, in cacli of which _ the destruction of merchant ships rose to considerable proportions, and then fell away to a minimum. Whon Mr. Balktor declared in September, 1015, that the submarine campaign had failed, merchant ships ' were lieing destroyed at a rate which then constituted a record. His declaration was justified, however, when only a few weeks-later the rate of destruction fell to relatively insignificant proportions. Tho only feasible explanation of these circumstances is that in tho areas to which it was then chicfly confincd, particularly .the seas around Great Britain and the western approaches to tho Channel from tho Atlantic, the submarine campaign was carried on at a cost in submarines which made its continuance impossible. The later and presumably more numerous submarines now operating appeal - to have gained a measure ' of immunity by extending their , cruising into tho open seas, whero i the close patrolling and elaborate anti-submarine tactics organised ih • the narrow seas about Great Britain cannot bo applied. The North Sea still holds its perils for submarines as for other enemy craft, but on two } occasions a German surface ship ( has contrived to pierce tho block- • ade, and it must be expected that . some of tho submarines which attempt the same feat will succeed. No doubt a given destruction of merchant shipping still involves the sacrifice of a certain number of submarines, but it is probable that in recent months the proportion has • been altered to the advantage of the ' enemy. It docs not by any means follow that the urider-water craft are assured of an indefinite continuc ance of their career of destruction. 0 By keeping away from dangerous j. areas liko that of the vita), crossi, Channel communications between England and Ffacce, tho subma-

nncs are sc om . c iv measure of immunity for the time beintr, but it is an immunity limited U the ability q£ the British naval aittiioiito devise anti-submarine racii.sures which "will apply, effectively to tho fconditiulis now existing. , x'-oe statements made in ono of today s s cablegrams that Britain ia adopting new methods of fighting tho U boats is assuredly not idlo talk;. What these methods are in | their entirety v c shall not know until after tho War, perhaps not i/heD, but a, Juoasure from which a great deal >u to be hoped is tho equipment of merchant ships with guns Or sufficient power to enable them, to defy open attack by any subyaarine. In this matter, as in v>mo other details of war preparation, Britain has been rather slow to act, but there is no doubt that now tbat the enemy submarines aro cruising at largo in the outer seas the effectual arming of merchant ships is an essential step towards defeating their piratical campaign. As to the results which tho submarines have achieved in their later operations, Ministerial announcements made in Great Britain in November last showed that "the total British gross tonnage of merchant ships of 1000 tons and over at the beginning of tho war showed a net loss up to September 30, 1916, of slightly over two and a half per cent. This was due to all causes." At about the same time it was stated that sine© the commencement of the war we had lost something like 2,250,000 tons of shipping, but that during the same period nearly four-fifths of that amount had been added by new construction, commandeering, and purchase. These figures relate to a period in which the British construction of merchant ships, which is now being rapidly expedited, was subordinated to naval_ construction, and fell away to a minimum. Taking account also of the possibilities of making more economical use of existing tonnage, by shortening tho stay of ships m port and in other ways, and of increasing tho output of British home-grown supplies, it is well within the facts to say that the enemy submarines are a long way from approaching the results at which they aim. Even if their depredations were likely to continue _ indefinitely on tho present scale it is probable that measures of replacement and economy would suffice to counter their effort. But it is not at all likely that they will succeed in maintaining the present rate of destruction for any great' length of time. In past periods of the war the temporary success of the submarines has been followed by ultimate failure, and it is likely that when the arming of merchantmen and other measures are in full operation past experience will be repeated.