TINO.

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2962, 28 December 1916, Page 9

TINO.

THE KING WHO HAS RUINED GREECE A CHARACTER SKETCH Writing in the "Daily Mail," Walter Christmass gives the following account of the perfidious King of Greece: King Constantino of Greece is one of the strangest phenomena of the present time. Hardly three years ago lio was the idolised hero-King of the united Greek nation, and now— — King Constantine's character,, is brusque and obstinate; he is to a remarkable degree void of that superior intelligence and all-conquering amiability which characterised the deceased King George, and which enabled him to lead the country through many trying and difficult years to development, extension, and honoured position. From his very childhood tho present King has shown a deplorable lack of self-control. His fits of uncontrollable anger and temper were always a source of deep and never-slumbering concern to his parents and brothers and sisters. And the fits did not grow less as years passed by—on the contrary. It goes without saying that the King's temperament did not soften when a painful illness about a year and a half ago necessitated an operation, the result of which, so far, lias been a wound which does not seem fo heal.

On the other hand the King is being praised for his great loyalty, for faithfulness towards friends, and, last but not least, for his Kind and friendly behaviour towards the soldiers of ■ the armies he so often led to victory. A handsomo and manly appearance, a courageous, energetic, and resourceful general; a man whose usual liatd and sullen countenance is at times radiated by a charming and almost boyish smile that leaves big dimples in his yellow face. ■

"His Majesty is a sort of human cocktail," as one of the representatives of, 0110 of the big American neewspapers once remarked to me after an audience of the King. The last time I saw the King, a few months ago. he was seatod on horseback reviewing 20,000 troops—a royal, proud, and dignified appearance with the baton resting on the saddletree, whilo keenly watching every detail of the .equipment and movements of the defiling troops. All of a sudden the blood rushed to his pale face; he raised the baton as if he would throw it, and at the pitch of his angriest voice, a flow of repri : mantis and offensive oaths left his royal lips—a flow of words which, translated into simple English language,! would make the* stoutest trooper in the British Army blush. Then His Majesty, hammered tho baton against the saddlo.so as to make his brown Hungarian gelding prance and rear—and the little intermezzo was over and the review continued.

Even tho oldest of his colonels and generals do not escape whon theso uncontrollable fits overpower, the King, Oaths are rained upon their grey heads, and many a valuable officer has with anger resigned after such treatment. It was surely a. mistake that the. military education, of the King was entrusted to Berlin and Potsdam, because even if lie learned in the most excellent way the art of warfaTO, which was very useful to him in tho wars of later years, his whole character and bohaviour were boing "Prussianised," which could'only do harm to tho futuro ruler of Greece. Prussian militarism can never: grow. deep in indpendent, free, and.democratic Hellas. The King's, knowledge of Germany's preparation for war, and of the whole coiist-riiction of the titanio war machine which he had been 'studying carefully from the very beginning, led. him to believe firmly in the ultimate victory of the .Central Powers. He —like many others all over the world—made this a basis on. wliich to establish all his hopes for the future development of his country. And tlie events of the first year of war supported his views to tho greatest extent, more particularly tho defeat, of trie English and French at GaUipoli. Most brilliant and attractive fanfares of music havo undoubtedly been sounded from Berlin and Vienna for their own glorification, and have impressed the King's mind far more strongly than the sober offers of tho Entente.' '

King Constantino is a most ambitt--OU9 man—lll which' respect 110 is an equal match for iVehizelos. It was clear to the King and the Premier that tho .world-war should be used as a stopping-stone for a step forward towards the realisation of the whole Hellenic, ideal, which means the extension of the frontiers of Greece to all parts of the country round the Aegean Sea inhabited by Greeks— Macedonia, Thrace, west coast of Asia Minor, the whole Aegean Archipelago, in Epirus, the southern part of iaerbia, and South Albania.

While both the King and his Premier at the outbreak of war were unanimous 011' the desirability of this goal, their respective opinions as to the various ways of its fulfilment formed the sharpest possible contrast. Venizelos was just as firmly convinced of the victory of the Allies as was the King 6f that of the Central Powers, and lie was a ■strong champion of the maintenance of the treaty with Serbia, which had to he completely abandoned if tlio King's ideas should be orowncd with success I

Consequently the overthrow of Venizelos was necessary, and it was also essential for the King to bo surrounded by a Ministry which would adopt his personal policy. The last happened, as is well known.

If ICing Constantine had had a reasonable understanding of his own limitations it is hardly conceivable that ho would havo placed himself in command of the ship of Stnto during the dangerous voyage which has now ended in hapless wreckage. The straight, clear course would have agreed better with his own nature and capacities. Only a most experienced, clear-headed, and cunning political juggler could havo mastered that double game which formed the fundamental idea of the King's policy.

' The idea existed that it was of importance for Greece to remain ready and in abeyance until the right moment arrived. Tho army was to be kept mobilised with its main strength Tound Salonika. It was essential to maintain to all intents and purposes a friendly neutrality towards the Entente until the undisputed superiority of the Central Powers was an established fact. It seems beyond doubt that the, Greek policy was formulated in accordance with distinct understandings with the Foreign Offices of' Vienna and Berlin.

The most important point was to weaken the born enemies of Hellenism in the Balkans —Serbia and Bulgaria. The calculation was that tho two countries should light and destroy eacli other. In seemed' beyond doubt that Serbia would bo overpowered by the _ Auatro-Bulgarian superiority. A victorious Bulgaria would, however, come out of the conflagration weakened and exhausted, and would furthermore be decimated in tho light to follow against the 'An-glo-French army at Salonika. Tho development of the conflict in conjunction with a cleverly handled policy would then produce tho opportune moment for King Constantino to placo himself at the head of h.is army of 350,000 men, when ii decisive battle would bn fought, resulting in tho glorification .of Hellas and the King liimsolf. It was not long before doubts as to the wisdom of the King's policy mado

tlieir appearance—first in the Venizelist Press, naturally; but soon also in the circle of his friends and adherents.

As bad luck would liavo it, the war was too long drawn out, with the result that the Treasury ran short of money. It proved extremely costly to maintain a mobilised army, and money was not forthcoming- The troublo was that the Entente began to doubt tlio sincerity of the Greek Government, and consequently refused to advance any money. For the last time the King received a most tempting offer from England to settle the relations between Greece and the Allies. But tlio King did not seize the opportunity. His obstinacy did not allow him to submit. Then the patience of England and France was finally exhausted.

What fate the near future has for the Greek King; and his dynasty is to be seen—at the host it will not be mild. The King must be considered a lonely and isolated man in his own capital. Both friends and foes have abandoned him.