PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2931, 17 November 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Though a big revival in the enemy submarine campaign against merchantmen has been in evidence for some time past, the actual amount of shipping destroyed during this period of revival has been hitherto largely a matter of conDefinite information on the subject will be- found, however, in a passage of Viscount Grey's reply to'the representations of the American Government in regard to the' Black List. In the course of his statement (which was published yesterday) the Foreign Secretary mentions that between June 1 and September 30 the enemy submarines sank 262 vessels, of which' number 65' were neutrals. Viscount Grey does not give particulars of tonnage, but while ,the position is to this extent still undefined the figures quoted certainly indicate that during the period of four months to whieh they relate the submarine campaign reached formidable dimensions. Looking at British'losses alone it will be seen that they averaged just about twelve ships per week during the four months. In the corresponding four months of 1915, which also were a period of abnormal submarine activity, British losses-averaged approximately seven "ships per week. Unless the average tonnage of the ships sunk touched a' much lower figure in 1916 than in 1915, the German submarines destroyed considerably more British merchant shipping in the four months which ended on September 30 than in any other period of equal length since the war began. Ther6 is reason to believe that neutral losses also have been greater during the last few months than at any previous period of the war. It should be noted that there is no question of a steady average in the weokly_ toll of ships destroyed hy submarines. Such a. thing would be foreign to all previous experience of the pirate war on merchantmen. Each period of abnormal activity by the underwater craft has witnessed a rise to a maximum rate of destruction and- then a drop from that maximum, usuallj a sudden drop. The cliniax of the 1915 campaign was reached in the last three weeks of August and th< . first week of September. In thcs< • four weeks 49 British ships were de . stroyed, but the rate of destructior ■ immediately afterwards fell, awaj i to comparatively insignificant pro . portions. It is highly probabh ■ that the present campaign, when v I is viewed in retrospect with ful : evidence in hand, will disclose i i similar rise and fall, and indeed ! evidence in hand suggests that th< i point of maximum destruction wa: ; passed some time ago and that thi i decline to a much lowor rate of do • struction is already well advanced ). Viscount Grey's statement pointing i to an average loss of twelve Bvi i tish ships per week during a per i ibd of four months must be se 1 against the fact that losses durini - some wrecks past have manifestl; 3 declined to a much lower average t During portion of the four months f loss'es undoubtedly touched a mucl • higher rate than' twelve ships pe e week; in recent weeks, as in forma 1 tion goes, tho number, of ships sun! 1 per week has been much less tha: 1 twelve. ;>, * * . * c We are justified in assuming wit ■lsomo confidence that the sam

broad conditions have ruled in the period to which Viscount Gbxy's ' statement refers as in past periods ' jf abnormal submarine activity. This would imply tha.t the Germans, either hy turning out submarines of an improved type or by heavily augmenting and reinforcing their raiding flotillas with boats of ordinary type, succeeded in temporarily making head to some extent against the British anti-submarine forces. The enemy i lias been able on several occasions Lo extend his depredations in this way, but on each occasion he has done so at a cost in submarines which has made his success temporary, if not ephemeral. The antisubmarine forces liars, on occasion, :een unable £pr a brief period to keep pace with tho enemy's augmented effort in submarine piracy, and the past four months obviously present an example in point. But the reign of tho submarines has invariably been brief and tho enemy has in every case paid for an extended career of destruction in losses of submarines about which there is no room for uncertainty, though under the policy of the British Admiralty no announcement is made-of the number of enemy underwater craft accounted for. Matters in all likelihood have taken the course here outlined in tho period covered by Viscount Grey's statement. The enemy appears to have established a record in the destruction of British merchant ships in a given time, but there is evidence also that the anti-submarine forces of the Admiralty have met and countered his latest effort as effectually as those by which it was preceded. » « * • The Financial Secretary to the Admiralty is quoted to-day as stating that out of the total British tonnage of merchant vessels of over a thousand tons we had lost to\ September 13 only slightly over two and a half per cent. It is not quite clear whether this takes account of replacements which have occurred simultaneously with losses of shipping by submarine attack and otherwise, i But even if tho statement indicates the balance to the-bad in ships of tho class to which it relates, it shows that the Germans are a very long way short of achieving decisive results in their.submarine campaign. At the sape time the situation is serious enough to give point and force to the demand that the ■ Imperial Government should announce its intention (in concert with the Allies) of exacting ton for ton of German shipping, at the conclusion of the war, in restitution of the shipping sunk by submarines. It would be absurd, as well as unjust, to allow the Germans to profit after the war by the extent to which their submarines are altering the balance of the world's shipping as between the various maritime Powers. Presumably no such folly is contemplated, but a specific announcement by the Allies of their intentions would not only set all doubts at rest, but would tend to impose a check upon the activities of the enemy underwater craft during tho remaining period of the war. Lord Beresford's demand for the strengthening of the Board of- Admiralty by the introduction of new blood, the appointment, as he puts it, of "younger men fresh from the sea," manifestly has a great deal to commend it. As information stands, the invaluable experience gained by officers at sea, in constant touch with the actual conditions .of naval warfare, might well have been drawn upon more freely than it has in the higher control and administration of the Navy. 'At the same time Lord Beresford's statement that in the control of the Navy a policy of attack has been abandoned in favour of one of defending the mercantile marine seems to be subject to important reservations. To say that the experience gained by officers in the actual stress of naval war would be invaluable at AYhitehall, and that the Board of Admiralty would be strengthened if this experience were freely drawn upon dfies not necessarily imply that radical or sweeping changes in the broad policy now established arc possible or are called for. A polic.y of (attack in full development is clearly impossible .while the German navy elects to remain bottled uy. in its ports, and the British Fleei has certainly not been slow to at tack in the infrequent occasion; when the enemy has emerged frorr his seclusion. Such a position ai exists to-day is admirably snminec up by Mr. Julian Cowjbtt in Sonn Principles of Marine Strategy. Il is possible, he says, for the enem.i to remove his fleet from the boarc altogether. He may withdraw it into a. defendet port, where it is absolutely out of you; reach, without the assistance of an army No amount of naval force, and no amoun of offensive spirit, can avail'you,' Tlv r result is that in naval warfa'ro an om harrafisiiig dilemma assorts itself. I you are in a superiority that justifies ; vigorous offensive, and'prompts you ti ; seek out your enemy, with a vie? 1 to a decision, the chances are you wil i find him in a position where you ea.nno touch him. Your offenco is arrested I and you find yourself in what, at leas theoretically, is the weakest general posi tion known to war. . This being said, it is, of course, tru , that the "reticent strategy" of th [ Germans and the conditions whicJ [ result only emphasise the necessit; . of making the freest possible us . at the Admiralty of the unrivallei I experienco which has been gained i; k the war.