The Dominion. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1916. CRITICISM OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2924, 9 November 1916, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1916. CRITICISM OF THE ADMIRALTY.

The periodical outburst of criticism of the Admiralty, which is now running its course in England, presumably headed by the J.iA;>i«:-:-worth Press, should occasion little surprise and less concern. Almost every little passing success of the Germans along the coasts-of England has been followed by a similar outcry from one section or another, regardless of the fact that the successes achieved by the enemy were of quite minor importance, and were rendered possible only because the British Fleets were engaged on duties of immensely greater, importance in the general scheme of naval operations. The present criticism is the outcome of the attack by German torpedo vessels in the English Channel, an attack which proved practically fruitless from the point of view of any military or naval gain, and the real purpose of which was completely foiled. :The critics appearto overlook the fact that the British Fleet has certain tasks to perform which are of vital, importance, to the successful conduct of the blockade of Germany and Ibe prevention of enemy fast cruisers escaping from the North Sea to the ocean routes and preying on Allied shipping. It is obvious that in the disposition of tho vessels of the fleets and flotillas under liis command, Admiral •Jelucoe cannofc afford tewtake any risk which may imperil tho successful performance of his main task. This naturally gives the German Admiralty an opportunity, within a limited scope, of indulging in raiding expeditions and rapid clashes by fast craft at points seemingly open to attack. Very little has been accomplished by such raids arid dashes up to the present time, and on more than one occasion the raiders have been taught a very sharp lesson. But their purpose is not meroly to inflict damage but to endeavour to foi'cc tre J-.ritJsh Admiralty, under tho pressure of public opinion, to depart from its main plan and thus weaken the blockado and the general strategical advantage of our Navy.

It will bo recalled that as the result of the raids by German battlecruisers on the East Coast towns ol England, there was a. great outcry in the Press. What was tho Great Fleet under Admiral .Iblucoe doing that it permitted tho German warships to roam in the North Sea bombarding unprotected British waterside towns? What was the use of the Navy, it was asked, if it could not' protect our own shores? This, of'course, was just what tho German Admiralty wanted. Tho disposition of the British Fleet under _ Admiral Jellicoe made' it impossible for Germany to accomplish anything of importance with her Navy, and all the timo tho blockade against her ports was increasing in efficiency. Germany's only hope was to catch the British Fleet or a section of it at a disadvantage, and the only chance of doing this was to pursue tactics which, though they might bo of no military benefit in themselves, might influence British public opinion and lead to political, pressure being brought by tho British Parliament on tho heads of the Admiralty, and possioiy occasion unwise Interference with the plans of the naval experts. This actually happened after tho East Coast raids. A section of tlic British Battle-cruiser Fleet was detached, presumably in response to the popular outcry, to safeguard the' south-eastern coast of England against enemy raiders. Mr. Balfour at the time mado what was deemed to be an indiscreet utterance on the subject. Later, the Germans, knowing of the change, sought to entrap this detached section of the Fleet into an engagement with a superior force, hoping to destroy it before the main British Fleet could arrive. This is thought to have been the purpose of the cruise of the German Fleet which ended in the Battle of .'Jutland, and it was only the consummate skill and seamanship of Admiral Beatty that enabled him to evade the trap set for him and in turn to ensnare tho enemy. The point that we are stressing, and which has been repeatedly stressed by naval experts in Britain, is that the Admiralty and its naval commanders should not, under any circumstances, be subjected to political interference in the actual performance of the task which has been entrusted to them.

They know, as the public and the politicians canuot know, how lc« to dispose the vessels at their command to defeat the main purpose of the enemy, just as they know best how to_ fight their ships. If with all their experience and training they are not better informed and better able to judge of what is necessary and how to accomplish it than is the man in the street, then Heaven help the British Navy. But no one who gives the matter any thought at all, or who pays tho least attention to the magnificent record of the Navy and its 6plendid efficiency to-day, can have a moment's doubt as to the wisdom of placing tho fullest confidence in the competence of those who plan its strategy, and those who carry out those plans. The Channel raid, which has given rise to tho latest outburst of criticism, was an incident quite insignificant in relation to the tremendous issues at stake in the North Sea. The escape of even one fast German ocean ' commerce raider into the open waters of the Atlantic would have been an occasion for infinitely greater concern. 'No one would wish to treat with indifference the minor efforts of tho German Admiralty, and every proper means should be taken to counter and defeat then".; hut the decision as to tho'vist method of meeting the situation may be safely left to our naval experts. Popular clamour for this or ' that interference with tho working of the Navy is likely to prove more dangerous if given effect to than the unaided efforts of our enemies on the high seas.