PROGRESS OP THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2902, 14 October 1916, Page 8

PROGRESS OP THE WAR

It is now evident that the reportsfirst received did less than .justice to the -latest Italian- success, which ranks as one of the most important of the campaign.'. As reports stand, it has cost the Austrians a loss of ten thousand prTsoners and ' very much heavier losses in killed and wounded. As to the advance achieved not many details have come through as yet regarding the position in the Trentino, but according to one correspondent the enemy front has b?en broken.-in this region over a distance of thirty miles. The Italian advance. on the Isonzo front is visibly important. The Austrian defences gave way on a. front of', ten miles,, from Vertoiba (a mile arid a ; half south and slightly, east'of Gorizia), across the valley of the Vippacco, and then for several .miles across the Garso plateau, oh which' the Italians have now gained an extended footing. The immediate result is a material extension of. the movement- which threatens Trieste, and at the same time'the Italian operations are subjecting the enemy to heavily increased pressure and should incidentally afford perceptible relief to Rumania. In this connection it has to be remembered that the Italians, .between Gorizia. and the head of the ■Adriatic, are in effect advancing through a bottle-neck. Their front widens as they advanoe, and the extra pressure upon tho enemy is measured accordingly. As his affairs stand, the necessity of defending a. lengthening front must bo counted certainly not less important than "the heavy immediate losses to which he has been subjected.

Very impressive accounts are given of the circumstances in which the late Italian attacks were launched. An intense bombardment of five days preceded the infantry assaults, and this bombardment, we are told, extended to a great part of the front between Lake Garda (at the southern end of the Trentino) and the Adriatic. The fact that assaults were launched simultaneously in the Trentino and on the Isonzo is in 1 itself significant of the rising power of the Italian Army, • particularly ; in the; factor of artillery. _ In considering the manner in which Italian prospects are visibly opening out, full weight must, be given to the fact that Italy has now developed a striking force and offensive power which she was far from possessing in tho opening months of her campaign. This point was emphasised by Lord Northcliffe, in an article written during a visit to the Isonzo front shortly after tho ifill of Gorizia:

For the reasons that at first made the progress of the British Army slow (he remarked), Italy is only now. beffinnmj; to put forth something like her _ Teal strength. She has much strengthnnti t reserve. A most distinguished Italian officer remarked: "What we have done now has been pood, useful work which wo could have done a year ago had we had guns and ammunition."

To his remarks Lord Northcliffe appended a warning against underestimating the strength of the Austrian defensive organisations, but the continued penetration of the enemy defonces on the Isonzo and elsewhere certainly carries double significance when account' is taken of the expanding power of the -Italian Army.

About immediate _ prospects in Mesopotamia very little is known. Since it was announced, shortly after tho fall of Kut-el-Amara, that the, British _ had penetrated the enemy linos at'Es Sinn, a few miles fhnyn .river frpjn that ,pla,ce, praeti; ca-lly" "nothiug has "been said 'official-' ly about, the progress of_ the campaign. In the speech which was reported yesterday, however, Mr. Asquith said that real headway was being mado in Mesopotamia, despite 'difficulties; and that the health of tho troops was good. This, may bo taken to. mean that good progress is being made in remedying the shortcomings in transport and medical organisation which so fatally hampered tho Tigris divisions last winter. Any important extension of the Mcsopotamia-n campaign is 110 doubt dependent on the action of the Allies in tho Balkans and that -of the Russians in Armenia. Thero can be no temptation to undcrtako another premature and risky advance up the Tigris when, in tho natural course 'of events, tho difficulties opposing the enterprise , will ultimately be very greatly reduced,

After giving King Constantine more time to reconsider his position than he had any right to expect, thfc Allies have now taken measures In Greece which reduce the authority of that monarch to a shadow. The seizure of ths Greek Fleet and of certain forts, and the' transfer of the principal Greek railway, that tvhich runs north from the.Piraeus,'are obviously calculated to safeguard the Allies against any effort of Greek treachery, and ensure the security of their base and communications. This, however, is only one aspcct pf the matter. The authority of which the. King has.been divested is being, transferred to the Provisional Government, headed by M. Venizelos, and that statesman is now free to fully show his hand and to formally dcclare that Greece,' under the Provisional Government, will make war side by side with the Entente army based on Salonika. With remarkable, moderation, M. Venizelos abstains even now from any declaration of hostility to tho King, but he makes it quite clear that Constantine now holds his position on sufferance, and will no longer be permitted to impose a ruinous ancl dishonourable policy on his country in the interests of Germany. The Allies and the Provisional Government between them seem to fully command tho situation, and prospects of a speedy and effectual prosecution of the Balkan campaign are as a result very greatly brightened.

It is not to be denied that tho story of the British campaign in Mesopotamia , has its depressing features, but it is necessary to distinguish betwen the circumstances and results of the campaign as a whole .and those of the "advance on Bagdad and the subsequent attempt to relieve General Townshend at luit-el-Amara, dealt with in a dispatch from Sir Percy Lake which now makes a somewhat belated appearance. Much has been heard from, other sources about the lack of adequate transport and other matters alluded to in the cabled summary of Sir PriF.cv Lake's dispatch. These defects in organisation fatally hampered aiid impeded the divisions operating on the Tigris/ and undoubtedly were the immediate causc of a dcatli-roll much heavier than it would otherwise have been, and of avoidable hardships and sufferings endured by the wounded in transit from battlefields to base. These facts do not seem to admit of any palliation.. At tho same time it must be I recognised 'that the Mesopotamia^

campaign, though it has been in some respects badly conducted, is not' by any means to l.io written down as a failure. Against the costly and-disas-trous failure of tho advance on Bagdad, there is to be set the successful invasion of an extensive tract of enemy territory, and the 'fact that this enterprise could not havo been neglected without leaving very dangerous opportunities open to. the enemy. Tne advanced operations on the Tigris have witnessed radical and sweeping changcs of fortune, but.the British occupation and domination of the vast extent of Southern Mesopotamia, havo been maintained throughout, almost without' challenge. ,

The successful invasion of Southern Mesopotamia has undoubtedly been attended by results of high importance to tho Allies. Probably, if no British, force-had- advanced fromthe head of tho Persian Giilf, enemy, submarines would long since have been operating in that sea and in the Indian ; Ocean. Besides making impossible any such extension of the German naval operations, the British expedition has secured to the use of the Allies the output of the Persian oilfields. .Probably, however, tho expedition has served its chief purpose in assisting .to a material extent to check the Turco-German designs of promoting a "Holy War." As events turned out, the enemy's propaganda in Persia achieved very limited results, but if they had been freed from embarrassments in their own southern territory; the Turks might very well have succeeded in setting; all Persia in a blaze, and the blaze might have swept far before it ■vas quenched.

Meantime the Allied'.'offensive oil the Macedonian front is developing apacc. Beyond the Str.uma the British are now in close touch with the town of Seres, which the enemy is holding strongly, but interest centres a.t tho moment- in the : operations against Monastic : The- fall of that •place is now,declared to be imminent, and at the same time it is suggested that the immediate sequel will be a rapid Serbian '.advance northward to the =Vardar, ■ a movement which it is expected will be greatlyfacilitated by the' roads the Bulgars have constructed between the Vardar and the frontier, east'of Monastir. A very interesting point is. raised regarding the Babuna heights, which stand a,bout thirty miles north of Monastir and something over half that distanco west of the Vardar valley. In the ordinary way these heights would afford the enemy immensely strong positions, covering the approach to the Vardar and its vital railway, but the suggestion now made is that tho roads con-; structed by the enemy will probably enable tho Serbians to outflank the heights on the eastward. It is mentioned as a fact supporting this theory that the Bulgars have lately reinforced the troops defending the approaches to those roads, at the extraordinary cost of weakening thc_ front south of Monastir, on which thoy are fighting a losing battle. If tho facts are as stated, an extended retreat by tho Bulgars through Serbia should follow quickly on the conquest of their frontier defences.