The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1916. FAILURES OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2899, 11 October 1916, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1916. FAILURES OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM

vol Arv.W Wt of General von akmin tells us some very interesting things regarding the state oi Army. tn o information it contains was of course-meant to •oe strictly confidential. This disappointed General's Ule of woe was ear of the iIAiSER and his Ministers. This fact makes his admission of the failure of his war machine the more impressive. ±Lis memorandum gives us a glimpse of the German Army as it really is, and we find that though it may. still be a wonderfully efficient fighting machine, it is very fai' from being the invincible organisation which German braggadocio depicted it. The veil which has concealed its weaknesses has for a moment Deca raised, and we see that SOWQ of the wheels are apt to get Piocked at times, and that the machinery is being thrown badly out of gear by the tremendous power of the -British and French attacks. The confessions of Von Aemin will tend to further upset the widely-held opinion of German supremacy in the art of war, and more especially in capacity for leadership and organisation. How often in the past have we heard critics ot our own shortcomings belauding German efficiency. We have been frequently told that the German Army organisation works with clock-like precision; that everything, to the minutest detail, is planned out with the utmost thoroughness; that nothing -is left to chance, all things being regulated with scientific exactness, liut Vox Ariiin's report tells a different story, and it is "but one of many indications that our enemy's boasted superiority was nothing more than a temporary advantage, due to his greater preparedness for war. That is to say given the same opportunity for preparation, British organisation and British leadership are at least equal to Gorman, even in that field in which Germany specially claims superiority. There is no call to underrate the skill and capacity of our enemies, but it is about time we gave up overrating them and belittling our own powers. General von Akmin admits that the Allies are better equipped in the way of airmen and aircraft; that they have bettor artillery; and that German counter-attacks fail owing to lack of weight and method. Von Amun has had the opportunity of judging the German military system by its works. Ho sees it at close quarters. Experience has revealed its imperfections, and he has told his superiors just what ho trunks about it. The truth is that the machine is being battered to pieces by the superior weight and organisation of the All'ies.

The Allies have undoubtedly made many mistakes in. this war. But Germany had an enormous advantage at the start, and we can now see that she failed to make the fullest and most effective use of her re60iirces when she dominated the situation: Her blunders are greater than ours. In proof of its assertion that Germany's mistakes have not onl.v been numerous but fatal, tlw Spectator gives a striking list of the'most apparent of the blunders which our enemy has made. . (1) Germany miscalculated the difficulties of rushing upon Paris and forcing Franco to a separate peace before Itussia. and Britain could get ready. (2) She blundered strategically when she advanced precipitately to the JTtrne, leaving General Castelnai; and the unbeaten fortress troops of the French eastern frontier in her rear. (3) She miscalculated the amount of ammunition she would need, :,nd ran i short in the autumn of '914. I (i) She failed to see that it she flid not break through at Ypres in .1914. or early in 1915, her chance would te gone for ever, and she did not make an effort as violent as she has since made at Verdun. (•5) She noglectad lo enter Warsaw in the autumn of l!Hl, when it was practically undefended. (6i Sho miscalculated Iho advantage of overrunning Russian Poland and the Haltic Proriocs, and utterly failed' to force Eussia lo a separate peace.

u lO 6 ?travagant Telianco upon the 0 f Turk*?, and on policy of tha road to Bagt the world, in Egypt, in . Africa, 6he relied -upon diplo'Jtricues which were abortive. \ J J °be blundered in her submarine f? ne ßlected the opinion of the United States, and was compelled to accept tho humiliation of nominally abandoning her methods. Q 0 ) Sb o has deceived her own people, and has been, forced to continue such expensive and unproductive enterprises as tne attack npon Verdun in order to impress public opinion at homo.

This list, of German blunders could be added to, and especially in the matter o£ stupid and wicked acts of terrorism. The German mind seems to utterly incapable of forming true ideas regarding the moral instincts' of civilised humanity. Hero [ their blundering reaches its climax. Colonel Fbyler, a Swiss military critic, declares that tho essential moral blunder on Germany's part is to havo driven the conscience of the whole world to be the greatest ally 9f her enemies. The Allies are fighting for idealism against rampant brutality (writes Colonel Feyler), for the culture and faith that nineteen centurics of Christian civilisation have handed do-wn. In such a struggle they must have the moral support of every nlan and woman ■who prefers justice and freedom to Teutonic tyranny and barbarism. To those over-ready to find fault , with our own- leaders and their methods, a study of the failures and blunders of the much-belauded German system should prove a healthy and profitable recreation.