PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2790, 7 June 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Additional news amply confirms tile favourable impressions formed (yesterday as to the outcome of tho naval battle in the North Sea. A clear acoount is now given of tho order of the battle, and it is shown that the Germans wero out-manoou-vrcd, and in addition that they signally failed to profit by such opportunities as chance threw in their way. Thus, tho Warspite's steering gear jammed as she was turning in the line, and she was isolated and practically surrounded by enemies. On paper she should have 4een blown out of the water, but in the event she sank one of her opponents and herself escaped serious damage. The Germans apparently had their whole High Seas Meet in action when no more than four battleships were cooperating with the British battlecruisers. Their absolute inferiority in fighting power is thus demonstrated beyond all doubt. _ It is plain that but for the fall of night the German Fleet would in all likelihood have been annihilated.

As to enemy losses, it seems abundantly clear that tho list is not yet completed. There is a volume of detail ovidence which points to more numorous losses than have yet been listed. However, it is confirmed that the Hindenburg and the Lutzow, two of the latest and biggest German battle-cruisers, went to the bottom. To these must be added the Dreadnought of the Kaiser class officially reported sunk, and the Westfalen, also a Dreadnought, the loss of"which is admitted by tho Germans. That makes four Dreadnoughts, and thero is a strong probability that the German story about tho Pommern covers the loss of another capital ship.

Our late cable affords evidence that at least five German Dreadnoughts havo been accounted for. It will riot be surprising if the final total is more tnan five. ,

It is announced briefly, but in terms that arrest- attention, that thero have been great Russian successes from tho Pripet marshes to tho Rumanian frontier, and that already 13,000 Austro-Germans havo beon taken prisoner. At the moment of writing there are no details, but the simple fact that the Russians havo so vigorously taken the offensive on their southern front in itself speaks volumes. Action on these lines by Russia should portend action on tho grand scale in other theatres, and it is possible that the evonts now reported mark the opening of a new era in the war, an era in which the Allies will launch such an offensivo against the Central Empires as they have not hitherto been in a position to attempt. There are,' however, one or two modifying considerations to bo kept in mind. One is that there may very probably be a.more or less protracted period of tentative sparring before tho Allies attempt to throw their full weight into a concerted offensive. Bringing superior force to bear against an enemy who has an enormously extended front to maintain, the Allies arc in a position to disturb his organisation and subject him to maximum strain before they actually attempt to strike a decisive blow. It may be expected that they will turn opportunities of this kind to full account. Another consideration arises from tho state of affairs now ruling in Italy. Evidently that country is somewhat in straits. It is admitted to-day, that the Austrians have effected a further forward movement, and it is not impossible that the Russian offensive is intended partly, perhaps in the" first instance, to afford relief to a hardpressed ally.

Even if itis assumed that action by this Russians cm their southern front has been hastened in this way, it does not necessarily jolnr,-,- mas tho enemy will profit materially by the circumstance. The weight of evidence is that the immensely power£ul .and costly efforts the Germans have made at Verdun to upset the

offensive plans of the Allies havo completely failed to achieve their intended purpose, and tho Austrians are not likely to succeed in Italy to a point that would make good the German failure. On visible evidence it is reasonable to suppose that the resumption of the Russian offensive should be regarded as a step in tho development of a general Allied offensive. Italy will incidentally profit, but that may prove ultimately to be a fact of secondary importance. ■

The general circumstances in which the Russian armies are placed aro by this time tolerably well known. In assuming the offensive tlfe Russians aro bound to concentrate their main efforts on the southern frout for a number of reasons. Until they have advanced a Iqjig way to tho west in Southern Russia and Galicia they cannot hope to achicvo more than a sound defence in the north, along the Dwina front, covering Riga and Dvinsk, and south from that region to tho Pripct marshes, which constitute a great extent of comparatively dead ground, separating tho northern and southern fronts, and also greatly hindering cross communications between the northern and southern armies. In the north the Russians aro at a serious disadvantage in the matter of communications, and the disadvantage would be accentuated if they sought to press forward to another invasion of East Prussia. In the south matters in this respect are more evenlybalanced, and the Russians have another incentivo to strike vigorously in this region in that success would be likely to exert an inilucnco upon developments in the Balkans.

On all grounds it is Russia's natural policy to take the offensive in tho south and stand upon the defensive meantime in tho north. It follows, of course, that it is wholly is Germany's interest to upset this arrangement, and if she does not presently resume the offensive in tho Baltic Provinces only lack of means will explain hor abstention from that policy. About six weeks ago there was an outburst of heavy fighting along the Dwina front and further south, a contest in tho main for strategic positions which would favour, in the case of Russia a sound dcfence, and in that of Germany a further offensive at the appointed time. The contest died down apparently without decisive advantage to either side. Sinco then there have been reports that the Germans are concentrating , force in the Baltic Provinces, but the fact that Verdun is proving such a hard nut to crack has possibly affected and limited German enterprise in other fields.

In the events reported to-day there is at least a preliminary indication that Russia is confident of her ability to hold tho enemy in the north while pursuing a more aggressive policy in the south. The front mentioned in the message, from . the Pripet marshes to Rumania, extends over a length of something like 300 miles, and tho offensive will necessarily be concentrated upon limited sections of this front.' Judging by the positions which the Russians occupied when, the offensive opened, the battles which have already yielded a return of 13,000 prisoners should have resulted also in a material gain of ground. When the Russians took the offensive on their southern front early in the year they concentrated chiefly against the Galician front opposite and north from Czernowitz and against sections of the enemy line along the. river Styr, in Southern Russia. Their principal success in this region was the capture of an important river crossing at Chartorysk, about 200 miles north of Czernowitz. Later the enemy was dislodged from river crossings on the Dniester, 40 miles north of Czernowitz. From Czernowitz itself, thanks to their progress in the January offensivo, the Russians are only a_ few miles distant. The adjacent hills havo been elaborately fortified. If Czernowitz goes, the Austro-Ger-man line will be detached from the Rumanian frontier, and swung back iifto Galicia, and as matters stood prior to the opening of the current offensive, the place was threatened both directly and by tho prospect of a turning movement in the north. Possibly when detail nows arrives it will-be found that the Russians'have taken another step towards reducing this notable stronghold.

Though conditions in the AustroItalian campaign are not to be ignored, the present state of affairs in the_ Western theati'e has a much more important bearing upon the question of a general Allied offensive. It is_ pretty_ safe to assume Ehat the Russians will not go far in their offensive without being powerfully seconded by their Allies in tho West. Unless the-Western Allies are ready to lend active co-operation in this way the Russians will presumably settle down to another period of waiting .after a limited effort. But meantime the Russian move is suggestive, and we havo at least tho fact to go upon that the Allies are in a position, as they have never been hitherto, to act" powerfully in uni j 6on. In their furious battering at Verdun ; tho Germans have altered foi the worse, from their standpoint, the balance of power, which was already mounting formidably against thom. A.nd the_ increasing stir of battle on tho British front during tho last few weeks is presumably not without its significant bearing upon events to come.

Some weeks ago the military correspondent oi the Times gave a ver> interesting account of enemy dispositions along the front from Nieuport to the Somme, which is now held, except on the extreme left, by the British Army. Against this front, according to Colonel Hepington, the enemy had posted in the middle of April no less than forty divisions, holding the line and in resqrve. At full strength these divisions would aggregate 800,000 of all ranks, and this aggregate would represent 500,000 rifles, and over 3000 guns. The great majority of the enemy troops are good Active and Reserve formations, at least, as good, Colonel IteINGTON considered, as those eng::g ; >t[ in assaulting Verdun, and hette; than any others in West or East. Reviewing the position at large, Colonel Repikqton took a somewhat doubtful view o£ British prospects in an early offensive if it should be attempted, but there are a number of factors which now appear to support a different opinion. One is that the Battle of Verdun has continued to daLo in full and even rising volume, and certainly at increasing cost to tho enemy. One point made by CoLoxtiL Rewxgton was that if tho oneiny, trusting to British inactivity, should move his reserves on , the northern front down to Verdun lie would by so much remove obstacles from the British path. Some recent reports have stated that the enemy has moved reserves down to Verdun, not becauso he trusts to British inactivity, but becauso cn

other course was open. fe. him. We have at the same time feacl tokens that he has less reason than ever to trust to British inactivity. Tho transfer of British troops','including the Australians and New Zealancf ers,_from tho Mediterranean theatre to France and the introduction of a strong body of Russians, 'obviously bear closcly upon an Allied' offensive 111 the West and increase tiie likelihood that it is in early prospect, On the whofe, the probabilities are that the Russian move is of very mucli more than local significance. Meantime Verdun remains the storm centre in the West. According to the latest news in hand, tb'e-cncmy has completely failed in spite." of tho most desperate efforts to drivd! home the attack to Hie south-east of Fort vaux, upon which ho has meat recently concentrated. The persistentattacks made north and soutjb of Fort Vaux are of a nature to a-wa. ken some apprehension for the safefcj • of this section of the line, but no ."act stands out more clearly from the history of the battle tlian that the i'rench have always hitherto . 1 'ad ample power in hand for a loi ;al countcr-stroko when it has seenicd necessary to safeguard their' main defence. A realisation of what i}he .brcnch have achieved in their defensive at- Verdun and what the Germans ha\c failed to achieve is ass'-isi> ec by a comparison of the line on which the battle opened with that >ow which it is now being fought, examination of the line as it stands to-day will show that at only twu points, Douaumont and Vaux, haws the Germans, after more than three; months of unremitting assault, como\ in contact with the Verdun line ofV defence, as indicated' by. the fort J positions. At Douaumont and on if part of the short 'front between Douaumont and the neighbouring Fort Vaux, tho Germans are established on or slightly inside the fortress line, but except at this northeastern corner of the Verdun' salient the line of'contact trends abruptly fort y r ° m ne permanent Mort Homme, for instance, stands three miles in advance of the line cf torts which extends south-west from the western bank of the Meusc along tho Gharny Ridge, and a similar position .obtains in t.'he area south of i'ort Vaux. _ Forts, it is true, arc no longer , the impregnable defences that they were before the introduction of modern heavy artillery. The Verdun forts have been dismantled, and the term permanent, has no meaning whero they are corifcrned except as relating to their former character. It is a fact, nevertheless, that tho siting of tho Verdun forts indicates a , 1 . 11 } 6 ,°* strong positions, a liuo which lends tsolf to defenco under modern conditions almost in the same degiee as when trust was reposed in standing forts. The Germans would nave to master this line in order to obtain even a local decision at Verdun. It has been the policy of tho J) rench to throw out their defences well in advance of what may be ed the main defensive line at Verdun, and, as has been'said, the Germans after more than three months of unprecedented battle are in touch with this main line only on one short sector, while elsewhere the French retain a considerable margin to come and §o upon. The fact- that this margin is still so extensive gives F l 01 ? t i f ad raean i n S to the contention that the ground between the former lino and the ono now occupied has been given up deliberatelv rather than because it could not be held and in pursuance of the tactics which ■ treat a limited extent of non-cssen-tial territory as a- pawn to be sacriiiced in the process of exhausting the enemy strength and producing the conditions which it is hoped will ultimately enable the Allies to launch a decisive counter-offensive.