PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2788, 5 June 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The naval battle that was fought last week in tho North Sea was much the greatest of the war. Its outcome leaves the British blockade of* Germany and of tho German Navy not merely unbroken, but unaffected. The result is unquestionably a British victory, though a great part of »the German Fleet contrived to return to port; returned, as accounts go, in two sections and in a sadly battered and disorganised state. One section fled south to Heligoland and the Elbe, and the other, consisting probably only of somo of the lighter units, made for home by way of the Little Belt and the Baltic. In the circumstances the German talk of victory and "a conquering blow" is, of course, arrant nonsense. Tho simple truth is that the German Fleet made a limited excursion, venturing _ a little way outside the area in which its mine and submarine defences arc organised, and after fighting at advantage for a time against' British battle-cruisers and other ships of the inner line, was compelled to make a hasty and disorderly retreat well before the strength of the British Grand Fleet was brought to bear.

Another name than victory must be found for the achievement of a fleet which escapcs destruction by getting as quickly as possible out of harm's way, and that is precisely what the Germans did on this memorable occasion. Tho only question outstanding is how far their discomfiture is modified by the balance of losses -on either side. On this point information is incomplete. The-main question to be settled concerns the fate of two German Dreadnoughts, one of which (according to Sir John Jellicoe) was disabled and brought to a standstill, while another is believed to have been sunk by gunfire. If these two ships have shared the fate of the two definitely known to have been sunk, Germany's losses in effectivo fighting ships arc greater absolutely, as well as proportionately to tho strength of tnc respective fleets, than those of Great Britain. At worst tho overwhelming balance of strength against Germany has not been seriously disturbed.

As reports stand the action began with an eueounter of destroyers about eight miles south-west of Stavangcr, on the south-west coast of Norway, and therefore opposite tho Skager Rak, which leads into tho Baltic. The bigger ships apparently engaged considerably to the south of the point indicated, off the west coast of Denmark. During the battlo the ships steamed south, and .therefore into an area- which is strewn with mine-fields protecting the German coast, and is a lurking ground for German submarines. The immediate occasion of the German retreat seems to havo been tho fact that heavier British ships than reached the sccno of action in time were approaching, not only from tho north, but from the west. Of tho threat this offered to their line of retreat the Germans were no doubt made aware in good time by their Zeppelin scouts. The airships figured prominently in the battle, not as combatants, but as scouts, in which capacity they arc undoubtedly best fitted to render effectivo service. Two of them, it is reported, wera destroyed.

Piecing together details, we find that the Germans steamed north from the vicinity of the Elbe, 'no

doubt hoping to pit superior force against a section of the British Fleet, as in the event they wcro enabled to do. To a great extent they were favoured by conditions. Not only wore they fighting in, or within easy distance of, their zone of mine and submarine defence, but, as the battle developed, factors of light and range told in their favour. It began in tho fading light of a misty afternoon, and was continued into the hours of darkness. Serious fighting began at four o'clock in tho afternoon, tho battle reached its culmination between six and eight, and terminated, according to one report, at ten o'clock. At the outset tho light was poor, and the extreme range of visibility was six miles, only two-thirds of tho distance at which Sik David Beatty's, squadron made effective practice on the fleeing German battle-cruisers in tho battlo of the Dogger Bank. Almost from tho beginning the range must have been something considerably short of six - miles in last week's battle, and it would necessarily shorten as night came on. Tho better gunnery of the British ships would thus lie to an extent discounted, while Germans would have tho best possible opportunity to resort to the extreme rapidity of fire which is their ideal in battle tactics.

It is of tho first importance also that tho conditions ruling enabled tho Germans to make the fullest possible use of their secondary armament. British ships surpass their German -contemporaries in the size and striking power of the guns in their main batteries, but tho British ships known to have been engaged in tho recent battle carried a weaKcr secondary armament than their an-tagonists—4-inch guns as against the German 6-inch. In many of the British battleships, and in 'all the battle-cruisers to date, the secondary armament is an anti-torpedo armament, intended for use against destroyers and" submarines. The underlying idea_has-been that a ship with her striking power concentrated in her main batteries is capable of effective work at a range at which any secondary armament would be useless. In general the idea is no doubt sound enough, but this battle has provided' an occasion on which long-range firing was impossible. The difference between four and six-inch guns in the secondary batteries of the contending fleets must therefore have bccome a matter of serious importance. No fact stands out more clearly from the story "of the battle than that the British ships which got within striking distance of the enemy took every possible risk in endeavouring to bring him to a decisive engagement. Allowance must be made for factors not yet disclosed, but on visible facts it would seem that absolutely reckless risks were taken in trying to induce-tho Germans to face a battle instead of running for port. After the destroyers had played their part as decoys and drawn the enemy on for a distance, f the battle-cruisers and armoured cruisers evidently fought a closo and determined action while the heavier British ships were still far away. This, in tho circumstances which have been touched upon, was an act of supreme daring the more remarkable since all its risks wero deliberately taken. By virtue of their speed, tho British ships could easily have avoided action until they wero backed by. a force comparable to that of tho enemy. Bad thoy dono so the Germans must either havo returned to port or faced a contest with an equal or superior force. ■ It was recognised, presumably, that if tho choice wero left to tho enemy there would be no battle, and tho evidence suggests that the British tactics were based upon a determination to force a battle at all risks. Battle-cruisers and armoured cruisers •fclosely engaging tho most powerful German battleships afloat were facing desperate odds. When it is considered further that the engagement involved chasing the enemy into his own mine-fields, some cause for wonder appears that tho British losses were not very much heavier than they actually proved to be. * * * «

. An opinion fnat the battlo was info essenco an attempt by the British' ships to hold the .enemy to a decisive engagement is in no way inconsistent with a belief that the Germans, when they sallied out, hoped for an engagement with the odds heavily in tEeir favour—that is to say, for an action with a small section of the British Fleet, culminating in a retreat to port before the British ships could bo reinforced. At present there is no suggestion that, the Germans had any larger object in view. It seems at all events to be quite clearly established that if they had set their hopes upon gaining any such larger object the hopes were not realised. Various theories have been entertained as to the lino of action that might be taken by the Germans if they ventured a naval battle. They might, for instance, have fought a delaying action in the 'North Sea with intent to covcr the escape of a. fleet of cruisers destined to prey on British and Allied commcrce.

Another possibility was an eifort to sever for a time the sea communications between Britain and France. It is true that in this enterprise German ships would havo to encounter mine and submarine defences not inferior to those which protect the German coast, but the possibility that the enterprise might be attempted has been seriously discussed. As reports stand there is no indication that the Germans last week made any attempt to strike for a decisive result or attempted any attack except upon the ships which tried so hard to induce them to keep the sea. The explanation of the fact that some of the lighter German ships returned by way _of the Baltic instead of accompanying the main body in its flight to the south seems to be that these units wero intercepted and cut off from the main body.. If these leading facte are confirmed by fuller and more detailed reports it will necessarily appear that although the battle fought last week was not in itself decisive, the prospects of the Germans now attempting any serious naval enterprise have as a result of the battle been very greatly diminished. They havo at least lost enough ships to make the balancc against them proportionately as great as ever: probably they have lost more. In addition'to that many of the ships which got back to port arc considerably damaged—the Germans themselves admit the fact.

Ox all grounds it seems tolerably certain that if the Germans still have it in mind to attempt ■■ some strait naval enterprise they will find it necessary to postpone giving effect to the intention for some timo to come. From this iioint of view the policy of throwing the lighter

British ships into action at such desperate odds may bo amply justified in its results. There will bo no room for doubt on the subject if it proves that the Germans- have lost four 'Dreadnoughts instead of only the two which have certainly gone to the bottom. On general grounds a contention tiiat the policy of forcing the battlo in the conditions which ruled was, unduly reckless might bo based upon the consideration that tho Navy has shown itself capable of performing its essential function without taking undue risks. During twenty-two months of war it has kept the seas open to the .Allies and closed to Germany, ancl undoubtedly it can continue to do so without attacking the German Fleet inside itri minefields. There iis a limit to the risks which may justifiably be t-afesn for the sake oi bringing tie German Fleet to action, and it certainly seems that this limit was closely approached last week.

The death-roll in. tlr's battle will undoubtedly be very heavy on both sides. Taking as a basis "the very limited number of officers saved from two British Dreadnoughts and two armoured cruisers, it seems _ not unlikely that the roll of British . dead may reach a total of five thousand or more. Deplorable as such a loss is, it will not materially cut' down the strength of the naval personnel as it is now constituted. When war broke out there were 146,000 officers and men in the service, and 67,000 'reservists. At tho end of January, i"9IG, there were on activa servico 320,000 officers and men. Parliament had authorised the N>\vy to work up to a- strength of 350,000 officers, men, and boys, by March 31 • this year. .There are said to be engaged on ship construction, repairs* etc., for the. Navy -about 700,000 men, making a total forco working for tho Navy ashore" and afloat of over 1,000,000 men.

The pith of the news about the land war at the moment is that the Germans are straining every nerve to delay or prevent an Allied offensive. This is the view advanced in a French semi-official report, and it is certainly supported by events as far as they are visible. The assault on Verdun is being pressed more furiously than ever, and it is a splendid triumph for the French arms that in spite of the incessant assaults lately made by tho' enemy with an utter disregard of cost in lives his recorded gains are practically nil. An advanced trench at Fort Y.aux seems to be the most important gain to the enemy after a long series of assaults under conditions of massacre. While matters are in this shape at Verdun—the unprecedented efforts of the Germans still breaking against the steady French defence—there is news of events in the locality of the Ypres salient. Sere the enemy has attacked with sufficient vigour to penetrate the British advanced line at some points. The British also have had local successes. The action 'appears to be taking on a general character, though reports as yet. are somewhat inconclusive. It is quite possible that these reports are the. first intimation of a great battle.