PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2762, 4 May 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

It often happens that isolated events in the war attract attention, (because of their isolation; in a degree out of proportion to_ their real importance, while more important, but less obviously defined, developments in the main theatres are passed over with comparatively little notice. During the last week, for example, the revolt in Ireland, and latterly the fall of Kut-el-Amara, have tended to monopolise' attention, but simultaneously there have been developments in tho Western theatre which must be regarded as of the' highest importance. German newspapers arc jubilating over the Irish outbreak and the fall of Kut-el-Amara, and talking about England's "black week," nut they seem to have very little to say .about the great assault on ,the French at Verdun of which they lately entertained such high hopes. The simplest explanation of these tactics is that there is nothing to bo said about Verdun which would bo read with satisfaction in Germany and that the enemy newspapers are glad of anything which will serve to distract attention from the colossal failure of the most powerful offensive which the war has yet witnessed. Nothing would be gained by minimising the serious importance of tho outbreak in Ireland and the fall of K'ut-cl-Amara. Between them they make the past week black enough. There is nevertheless much reason to believe that in the perspective of history the week which has witnessed these events will look blacker for Germany than for England. Instead of a limited loss in a minor campaign and the disorganisation incidental to a rccklcss but not very formidable rebellion, Germany is faccd by the failure of an effort for decisive victory—an effort made on a_ scale and at a cost commensurate with the vitally important objccts it was sought to achieve.

In this it is assumed that the Verdun offensive has passed its maximum, and failed. Such an assumption possibly still calls for a certain amount of reservation, but visible evidence undoubtedly suggests that tho Germans have given up hope of breaking through the main French line at Verdun. At the end of last week a semi-official statement was issued from the effect that tho Battle of Verdun was probably at an end. Recent detail news supports this general statement. For weeks past the Germans have made hardly any progress in their offensive. Their only notable recent success was tho occupation of the Bethincourt salient, which the French evacuated iu order to strengthen their line west of the Louse. Now the tide seems to havo turned. The French have launched successful attacks both east and west of the Mouse, and have done something to strengthen their threatened line. Following upon the visible warning of tho German offensive this is a suggestive development. Taking the extent of ground gained as a guide, tho French have won their principal success west of tho Meusc, on the northern slopes of Dead Man's Hill, the position to which they retired after evacuating Bethincourt. Tho forward movement south-east of Douaumont, on the other :side .of the river, may ultimately prove, however, to bo more important, for it is in the Douaumont area that the Verdun position as a whole has been most closely and seriously threatened since the early days of the German assault. West of the Meuse the French have more to come and go upon. At all events it is established that the Germans have suffered a material loss of ground in the areas i where, until latelv, they were pressing tho attack with maximum power, and in the circumstance there is an obvious Suggestion that their offensive has lost its driving force. It is a factor of the utmost importance that the French have throughout carefully economised their resources at Verdun both in defence and in counter-attack. We may be tolerably sure that they paid no extravagant price for their late successes, and that a weakening in the German effort must account in large | part for the changed aspect of the battle. '

That Germany has failed, and failed finally, at Verdun, is now all but certain, and while this does not mean that she is at an end of her offensive power, it does mean that she is much less likely than seemed possible a couple of months ago to turn it to effective account. There is news to-day of tentative attacks on the British front, at Ypres and elsewhere, which may be intended either to hinder a British concentration or to pave the wav for an attack in force. The likelihood of an attempt to break the British front has diminished, but it has not quice disappeared. There is also the possibility to be kept in mind that Gsrmany may yet attempt some great stroke against Russia. But nothing can set aside the fact .that she has failed in a, great effort for victory under more favourable circumstances than she can ever again hope to compass. i She struck at Verdun in the hope of at least creating such' conditions as would have compelled the Allies in the long run to declare a draw, and in the event has squandered a great body of strength without coming within mcasureable distance of her object; More than this, sho has exhausted her opportunities of dealing with her enemies in detail. If they leave her the initiative of striking the next great blow in the war it will be for the reason .that such a policy, best suits their own ends.

Conclusive evidence of the super iority of Allied airmen in the main theatre is give a in a set of official figures transmitted to-day. During April 72 aeroplanes were destroyed, of which 4 were British, 20 French, and 48 German. A Paris official report gives the number of German aeroplanes brought down by Frcncli airmen during April as 31, and states that in the same period six French aeroplanes were worsted and fell in the enemy's line's. This return is , evidently incomplete. It makes no mention of French machines which fell in their own lines. The total figures for the month show that the Germans lost just twice as many machines as the Allies lost in the aggregate. This may fairly be accepted as indicating the quality of«the contending air services, since April was a month in which both sides were supremely anxious to obtain mastery of the air. Since the Verdun offensive opened the German airmen have necessarily taken greater risks than they were . formerly wont to do, and the result is seen in a long list of machines destroyed. It is a state of affairs which should make an end of the doubts and fears awakened by the recent Fokkcr scare.

FitOJi detail reports it would appear that not a few of the aeroplanes recently destroyed have been defeated in aerial duels, a form of warfare in which the Allied aviators have established an unquestionable superiority. Of this there are further striking instances in the current news. It is likely that the comparison of losses would tell even moro heavily against Germany than it does but for the fact that anti-air-craft artillery has been raised to a very high pitch of_ efficiency and counts as an increasingly important factor. On this subject it is' remarked by a French authority that before the war three thousand yards was regarded as the maximum flying height for useful purposes, but flying in war time at this height some aoroplahes have been brought down and others flying at 10,500 feet have been hit. "Experience," he. adds, "has taught both Frcnch and German aviators the danger of flying low, though during the offensive in Artois and Champagne, as clouds were very low, the aviators had to fly from dawn to dusk at little more than 2400 feet. The difficulty of gauging the height of machines still remains' considerable, and errors of 1500 feet are quite common. Most batteries aim at between 7500 and 8500 feet, which is the normal height for an aeroplane to fly at, and Garros and some other pilots have used the knowledge to fly at about 4000 fcot, where they have been able to see better with no greater danger. Garros indeed used to maintain the paradox: 'If I had a machine that would fly 100 miles an hour with a motor that I could absolutely trust, I would only keep 450 feet up. Gunfire would be powerless to touch me, and occasional spirals would prevent my being hit by rifle fire.' This machine now exists, but Garros unhappily is no longer bore to .test his hypothesis."

Currekt news of the Mcsopotamian campaign indicates • that the situation has been comparatively little

changed by the fall o£ Kut-el-Amara. It is stated that General Gorringe, in command of the Tigris Corps, is expected to advance as soon as the weather permits- If the statement is based upon reliable information, it is full of promise. It implies that the British forces on the Tigris are in adequate strength to press on towards Ba'gdad, and that no southward move by the Turks along the Shatt-el-Hai, towards the Euphrates, is considered likely or practicable. There is no reason to doubt that the message quoted correctly describes tho actual position in the campaign.

Anticipations to which it is impossible at present to give very definite form are raised by a Russian official mcssago which states that: "In the direction of Bagdad, the Russians have repulsed the Turks towards the west, and captured their artillery." This must apply to tho Russian column operating in Western Persia, and it points to operations on a scale of some importance. In fact, as it stands, it goes rather ahead of what'' might reasonably have been expected of the presumably small Russian force which is approaching the Turco-Persian frontier, and was reported some time ago to be about 130 miles distant from Bagdad. An advance through the mountains of Western Persia and the Mesopotamian desert to Bagdad is not in itself impossible, but in Western Persia the Russians are already operating at the end of very long and difficult communications. It seems impossible that they can enter Mesopotamia from the east in such strength as would enable them to cope with the force the Turks are capable meantime of assembling to cover Bagdad. Certainly the Russians havo a better opening further north for pressing the invasion of Turkey. At Bitlis they command one of the principal passes through the Taurus range, into the Syrian plain. An advance on Bagdad from the east might, of course, serve a useful purpose if tho' Turks were meeting heavy pressure simultanqonsly in Armenia and on the Tigris.