THE KEY TO VERDUN

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2756, 27 April 1916, Page 3

THE KEY TO VERDUN

1 GERMAN FAILURE AT DOUAUMONT THE ENEMY'S INTENTION (From llr. H. Warner Allon, Iho representative of the IJcili.sh Press wit] tiio French Army.) Verdun, .March 4. It is from ono of tlio eastern or northcustom ['oris of Verdun that tlio bwsi idea as to tlio real moaning of (lie pro sent buttle can bo obtained. Standing on tlio paranej. of such a fort, ono Inn an oxtended view over tlio plain of tin Wpouvre. Nowhere than in Hint plain on tlio wholo live hundred miles of tin front, is the mud nioro diabolical. Com immieatiou' with the advanced lines ii frequently interrupted, since all move tiiont is impossible when mud and watoi rise above tho waist. Immediately above this plain, on tin east of tho Mousey Hses tho hilly pla teau that is called tho Hautes do iVlouso Hero tho heights reach an altitude o over a thousand feet and command tin plain below. At tlio edgo of tho plateai the viow is a wonderful ono, partial larly on a day'of clouds and lithil sun when strange shadows aro thrown ovc: tho woods and fields that lie below The jplateaujitsclf is a gigantic fortress Nothing has been spared by tho Frencl to muko it impossible for tho enemy tx reach tho Menso across those height. or to convert tho salient of St. Millie into an integral portion of their lines Trenches, barbed wire . entanglements overything that tlio science of nioden warfare has boon able to invent, havi been embodied in the defences. Ther< is not a slope that is not swept b; flanking machine-guns safely hidden ii shelters that only the largest shells cai destroy.• Seeking a Moral Success. The attack on Verdun was a very difh cult enterprise for tho Germans to nn dei-take, and to all appearance their oh ject was rather to obtain a moral thai a material success. Tho enemy kne\ tbt in present conditions an advance o more thau a few miles was impossible and Verdun was tho nearest objeotivi to his front. Such an advance at Vcr dun was irioro difficult than at man; other points of the front, but it had on' gleat advantage: it might lead to thi capture of a so-ca'lcd fortress, and con seouently produce a far greater mora effect than would bo the case elsewhere where tho ground was easier. From the Battle of the Yser to tin Battle_ of Verdun the French rotaine< the initiative of attack on tho Weston front. Once the war had settled dow) to the system that the French cal guerre do positions, the offensive be came a terrible problem, and the Ger muns did everything in their power t< avoid finding a solution to it. All thoi efforts were directed away from th Western front, with the hope of obtain ing'a-victory-without incurring tho ter rible cost necessary to break throng] tho French line. The battle of th Duiiajez cannot he described as an ex ception to this general principle,, sine in that battle the trench system wa far' more imperfect, and tllero wen many gaps between tho fortifications. Meantime,-however, the French wen trying vigorously to 6olve the problon of breaking through tho lino of Germai trenches. Steadily their offensive grev more important and more successful and it became clear' that the strengtl of the Gorman offensive was not increas ing so'fast as the vigour of tho Frencl nttacks. Tho Battle of Champagu showed conclusively that with a modcr ate amount of luck and careful organ isation it was possible to make a bread even in the perfected line of the Germai defence. . This month the findinj that their efforts in every other direc tion to break through''the. steel circh which surrounds them were useless, wen forced to concentrate their hopes or an offensive on the Western front. Thej had taken carefully into consideratioi the Battle of Champagne. : They admit ted that the French had opened t breach in their line, and they arguec that the imperfect results of the opera tions were due only to the inability o: their enemies to exploit tho first ad vantage that they had gained. In typi cal German fashion they appear to hav< decided to copy the French system anc at the same time to raise it to tin nth-power. The French, they argued to them selves, by firing so many shells on i front of so many miles, destroyed oui trenches; wo will fire so many more shells on a narrower front, so that w< can he certain there will bo no obstacli to the advance of our infantry. The French had not enough men, they considered, to carry their initial succesi to its. conclusion,' consequently they decided to mass a very large number o men behind their attack. The German waves of men passing through a comparatively narrow breach—the main infantry attacks were made on a front ol between eight and a half and nine miles —would then sweep out east and wesi round the defences of Verdun. N( doubt, given the strength of tho Frencl: artillery, the German losses would be heavy, but however terrible the casualty lists, they considered the capture* ol Verdun would be an ample recompense. The public, both in Allied and neutral countries, has not yet fully realised the fact that __ in warfare to-day a fortress such as, Verdun is merely a point in a five-hundred mile line 'of earthworks and entrenchments, and is no ionger a stronghold on the defence-or the capture of which the whole issue of a war may lie. Importance of Initial Attack. So the Germans opened their attack on Verdun from the north across the difficult country of the Haute de Mouse, oil the plateau of which they were already., established, -instead of attacking it from the east, in which case they would have had to scale the heights. The enemy's artillery opened a bombardment that has.had no equal in thia or any other battle, and this bombard, nient was followed by a massed attack of some seven army corps, or over three hundred thousand men. But the French wore not caught napping, as were the Germans in Champagne. Their 'artillery held its own and checked the German advance. The great initial attack did not give the results which the German High Command had hoped. The enemy's generals considered that such an attack must bo fully successful at once or not at all, consequently it is to be observed that the German communiques minimised the whole affair, suggesting that the operations were merely intended to modify tho line and were only of local importance. Wave after wave of men was sent to the assault, and the position, from tho I'Vench point of view, i became for a time very'serious; , The German conception of war is very different from that of tho French. The enemy has shown himself prepared to sacrifice an unlimted number of men to obtain an objective that could not really be of essential importance to the issue of tho war: The French, on the other hand, consider both in defence and in attackthat it is essential not to sacrifice more human lives than the objective is worth. Consequently the questions arose: How many men had the Germans been ablo to concentrate on this single section of the front, and were they in sufficient force to compel the French to retire from the main line of the defences of Verdun? Premature Rejofcing3. After successive attacks the Germans succeeded in obtaining a foothold on the higher part of the phttesu n»d in capturing the fort of Douaumont,' at

tho north-eastern corner of tuo outer rig of forts. It scorns clear that alter litis success the Qornmus believed that they hud broken through and that Verdun was in their hands. The Gorman communique set up a cry of victory, unci declared that the Brandenburgers were "firmly established" in the captured position. At this point, however, there came a change in tho situation. Just as, in the defence of Nancy, tho Germans, when they reached the Forest of Champnncux. below tho plateau of Amance, believed that the capital of Lorraiim was in their hands—only to find that tho real uefenco wn« just beginning— so at Verdun it was only on tho lino between the Cote du Poivre and Uouau. niont that tho onemy discovered thu full strength of the French resistance.. A counter-offensive was opened oy tho trench. The village of Douaumont was recaptured and the French swept round the fort. A lino of ro3istaacc stronger than any of the dofoneos fur. tiler north was drawn across tho wnvh of Verdun. The result of this unexpected mistanco soon becamo apparent. 'Fne German attacks, instead of being concentrated on the narrow passage th;eugli which they wore trying to force their way, became of a moro local character, and a sorics of diversions began. Tho surprise attack in Champagne oecuuied the most prominent part of Monday's Gorman communique, and Verdun seems to have been allowed to sink ■ to comparatively secondary importance. Thou various attacks were announced in tho Woeuvre, particularly in the neighbourhood of tho railway station at Fix.