PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2717, 11 March 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Decisive events are not likely to bo long delayed in the battle which continues with unabated intensity at Verdun, but at the moment of writing hardly any change is reported'in the position as it was set out in yesterday's news. What; change is visible turns against the enemy. Detail reports as far as they go indicate that the storm-centre of the battle is still in trie area west of the Mouse, where the Germans developed their last great attack, threatening the main railway approaching Vordun from the west. Official reports speak of pronounced success acnieved in this area in rolling back to an extent and making head against tho enemy's assault. Reports dated at London early yesterday morning state that the French are still making some northward progress west of the Meuse, while at tho same time they have broken furious assaults made by the enemy in great strength at Douaumont and further cast, in the territory east of the river. Judging by "their* icsults, the French counter-attacks west of the j Mouse are being developed in strong force and pressed with considerable vigour. They constitute almost the first definite indication as yet- afforded that there is a limit to the policy thus far pursued by the French of giving_ ground at Verdun for the sake of inflicting maximum losses ujDon the enemy. Now that the French infantry is attacking and recovering portion of the ground lately evacuated, some of the advantages arising from the past character of the battle are necessarily being sacrificed. There has been some ebb 'and ilow at many points, but hitherto, except in the Douaumont area, our Allies have left it chiefly to the Germans to throw forward assaulting masses of infantry in face of a devastating artillery fire. Unci'.: - tho cauluions described west of the Meuse. to" French must now be incur .'ins considerable sacrifices, and tue_ •iiTir.J.icd departure from their past trctics possibly marks a turning point in the battle, or at all events means that it has entered a distinctly new phase. Prominence has hitherto been given to the fact that the Allies are obviously biding their time and yielding ground at Verdun rather than launch a premature counter-stroke to tho enemy's offensive. It cannot', of course, be taken for 'granted that this policy will be carried to the point of sacrificing the railway crossing of the Mouse at Verdun and the- vantage poiht-s along the heights of the Mouse to the south, from which the French look across the Woeuvre Plain towards Metz and the frontier of Lorraine. This is one of several possible gateways into Germany when the Allies are ready to launch tho invasion to which it may be assumed that their plans ultimately tend. As has been said, a tentative indication that the Allies- may not intend to carry a' waiting defensive policy to the point of sacrificing Verdun and the heights of tho Meuse is supplied in their counter-attacks, which by this time have been developed upon a scale of considerable importance, in the area west of the river. It remains probable that any determined effort to foil and completely break the German offensive now concentrated against Verdun. wil involve action elsewhere than in the area of the present battle. Meantime the tremendous struggle is in a phase of extreme tension, with the defence subjected to a strain which is modified only to a liriiited extent, and. tentatively by the French coun-ter-attacks west of the Meuse. If the Germans are left free to concentrate all available artillery,, as Colonel Repington suggests they aro doing, against the front north and northrcast of Verdun, on. which they first attacked, the further penetration of tho defence will presumably be only a matter of time. It is possible, however, th'it the enemy may not much longer enjoy this measure of freedom. * * , * : ,r* news from Mesopotamia which may be called distinctly good, though it tells of a British success something less than decisive. According to a Press Bureau communication, General Aylmer, at the beginning of the week, crossed to tho right bank of the Tigris and advanced to within seven miles- of ICut-cl-Amara. Here the enemy was attacked on Wednesday, but-not dislodged from the entrenched position he had taken up. The Turks, however, General Aylmer reports, suffered very heavy loss, and beyond strengthening their position have since shown no activity, while tho British casualties were not heavy. Thus the peculiar position reacLcdis that a strong Turkish force is besieged by General, Aylmer's column, though not surrounded, seven miles from Kut-el-Amara, while at that place General Townshend, whom General Aylmer is out to relieve, 'is besieged by the Turks. It is a situation that does not seem likely to last. * * * * To fully penetrate its complexities is hopeless on the information in hand, out it may be noted that the right bank of the Tigris in the area of Kut-el-AmaxS (wWo tho river runs generally east; _is the south bank. liut-el-Amara is on the nOrth bank. That tho Turks opposing 'General Aylmer are located on the south bank possibly means that they were intent upon advancing down river and cutting the communications of the British column. In that case, General Aylmer has taken the bull 1 by the horns, and possibly lias.effectively checkmated the enemy by crossing the river. Though it is clear as to essential facts, the official report is in one detail slightly obscure. It is not clearly indicated where General Aylmer crossed the river, bin very possibly he did so at Umni-el-Henna, where he was last reported. This place is about a dozen miles below the point at which General Aylmer is now established. 0 # * * Dutch reports published yesterday declared that a powerful German squadron had been sighted, in the southern North Sea, To-day a raessaKO from Amsterdam states that i

the officials of the German Fleet have cabled to the Kaiser that the warships have returned to their base. Even now it is not established that tho enemy fleet really ventured upon an excursion in the open. As they stand in matter and form, the messages are not particularly convincing, and the one first received may be only such a rumour as is frequently born of nothing in seaport At all events, if the German ships did leave their harbours of refuge for a little time they have evidently not yet made any attempt to break the net in which they are enclosed. The story of the alleged jaunt would be more convincing if it had come in the form of a German official announcement that the High Seas Fleet put to .sea looking for its enemy, and returned to port disappointed. At he same time there arc no doubt other motives than a desire to claim credit for the fleet to which it is not entitled which might inspire its directing authorities to give it a brief run in the open. Cooped up as long as it has been in harbqur, the German Fleet must stand very badly in need of exerciso in blue water. The southern rcachcs of tin North Sea perhaps scarcely deserve such a descrilotion, but they at least constitute a better exercise ground for warships than the Kiel Canal and the naval harbours of the I Fatherland. Another possibility worth considering is that the Germans may hope, by an appearance or threat of naval activity in the North Sea, to divert attention from the Baltic, where, according to some accounts, they contemplate naval action upon a big scale. But as yet definite evidence is lacking that even the reported excursion on a recent date was really made. . ■* * * • An interesting, but upon the whole not very convincing, explanation of the reported removal of Turkish mines from the Dardanelles is supplied by the Home Tribuna.' The Austriansi "it says, have completed two Dreadnoughts and propose to rush them through the Dardanelles. It must he admitted_ at once that there is no way in which more could bo done, at a given outlay, to stiffen Turkish resistance than by carrying out this project, _ assuming always that it were feasible. Turkey evidently needs help, and it is equally true that where the invasion of the Turkish eastern provinces is concerned tho Russian naval command of the Black Sea is likely to operate as a factor of capital ■ importance. Its importance is evidenced already in the landing effected by tho Russians east of Trebizond, and tho subsequent advance on that place which is now in progress. This may be only a beginning. _ It would, for instance, be no astonishing development if the Russians at a later stage of the campaign should land forces considerably further to the west and strike at the communications of the Turkish armies fighting in the eastern provinces. The appearance of .two Austrian Dreadnoughts in the Black Sea might easily transform the situation, more particularly as it is not certain that the Russians have completed any of their Black Sea Dreadnoughts. They have three under construction, which were originally intended to have been completed in 1914, but whether •any have been. completed oven now is uncertain. Contradictory reports on the subject'have been issued,'but there is no definite evidence that any one of tho three ships is in commission. Obviously, in any case/ it would be very greatly to the advantage of the enemy if Austrian Dreadnoughts, which there are poor prospects of turning to any effective account in the Adriatic or Mediterranean, could be transferred to the Black Sea. * * * ■ .The weakness of the Italian story is _ that the l difficulties of effecting this transfer appear to be insuperable. Times have changed since the Goeben and Breslau ran the gauntlet of the Allied Fleets and refuged at the Golden Horn. The emergency measures of the early days of the war have given place to an-elabor-ated naval organisation, in which the Italian Fleet has a place as well as that _of, France and a section of the British Navy, and it is possible to hold with a great deal 'ol conlidcnce that the _ achievement of the Goeben is not likely to be repeated. ■Events have shown that the Austrian Fleet, or its speedier units, enjoy_ a restricted measure of freedom in the Adriatic, as the German Fleet .perhaps docs in the North Sea. But it does not follow that Austrian capital ships are likely to be allowed to 'pass from the Adriatic into the Mediterranean without being brought to action by a greatly superior force. And even in the unlikely event of them evading pursuit in tho southern Adriatic, the problem of entering the Dardanelles would in all likelihood be insuperable. It should be well within the power of tlje Allies to maintain a close blockade.of the Dardanelles by mines and otherwise, in spite of all that enemy submarines can do to prevent them. The probability is,_ however, that Austrian capital ships attempting to reach Turkey would not get beyond the southern Adriatic. .» * * * Two Dreadnoughts, it is suggested, will • attempt the dash, and that number would very possibly suffice to reverse the balance of sea-power in tho Black Sea and influence the Armenian campaign in a way calculated to inspirit the Turks and prolong their active partnership with the Austro-Gcrmans in the war. But the completion of two Austrian Dreadnoughts is not a recent event. Three Austrian Dreadnoughts—sister ships, or nearly so,' each armed with a dozen 12-inch guns—were in commission at the outbreak of war, and a tjiird is belieyed to have been completed since, probably last year. It is of course, possible, though not very likely, that Austria may still attempt to execute the project, but since it is ono in which much would depend upon secrecy and surprise it is the less Jikely to be attempted, now that it has become a subject of sossip - , , . , . | Major Winston Churchill has made another speech on naval matters which is not calculated to better the unfavourable impression made by his alarmist utterance reported' a couple of days ago. On that occasion he suggested, without saying so in plain terms, that naval construction had been allowed to fall dangerously into arrears. Met by Mr. Balfou'r'b statement to the 'effect that the rate of naval construction is not, upon tho whole, open 'to criticism, and that what Britain has achieved in this direction compares most favourably with what has been done by any other country, Major Churchill, without retracting his previous utterances, takes refuge in even less definite, statements and language. Talk of disquietude and doubt by one who so recently relinquished the political control of tho Admiralty is indefeus-

ible unless he is prepared to shoft that there is need for radical rc» form. This Major Churchill has made no attempt to do, and apparently has no intention of doing* *, * * o He is equally unfortunate in his references to Lord Fisher. The First Lord, he says, is welcome' to all the rhetorical retorts derivable from his (Major Churchill's) relations with Lord Fisher. Judging by the reports which have appeared, Mr. Balfour did not resort to rhetorical retorts. AVhat he did was to suggest that, there was ground for profound stupefaction in Major Churchill's perfervid demand for the recall to office of the distin-" guished sailor from whom he saicl six months ago ho could get no clear guidance or firm support. In other words, Mr. Balfour- convicted hia predecessor in office of amazing in j consistency, and Major Churchill 1 does not mend his case now by, airily brushing, aside the conviction' and declaring bluffly that the fact) is that it would be greatly to tho public interest that Lord Fisher should be associated in some way ( with the,carrying out of his own naval programme. The • essential point at the moment is that Major Ohurohil'l seems to stand convicted not of gross inconsistency, where Lord Fisher is concerned, but of. having made an alarmist speech which he has signally failed to justify by criticism that comes near to being effective, or is likely; to serve any useful purpose.