PROGRESS OF THE WAR
Russia is manfully shouldering the burdens of the J'J/ife/ile- in (;he Middle East, and with results that at the moment overshadow actual events in any other theatre of war. Much has been said at different times about the possibility of a Turkish advance through Persia, but it is becoming daily more evident that the l'urks have a defensive campaign on hand in -Armenia which is likely to absorb no small share of their energy and available resources. The Russians are now said to be commencing assaults on Erzcrum, which is not a fortress only, but a fortified plain, and it is reported aiso that the Turks have fourteen divisions of regulars On the Persian front—anything from 200,000 to 280,000 men#besides irregulars and Kurds. "Persian front," as it is used in the message quoted, presumably means the whole Caucasian front south from the Black Sea, though a great part of its length is well clear of Persian territory. News of ,these developments is not official, but the abscnce of official intelligence seems to be accounted for by tho fact that the Russians have lately been grappling with the problems of maintaining an army ahead of a wide expanse of some of the ruggedest and most difficult mountain country in the world. The nearest railway available to their troops in Armenia is distant something like 250 miles, in a direct line from their front near Erzcrum.
An inkling of the transport problems by which the Russians arc faced is to be gained from the statement that the country through which they are working on the approaches to Erzerum is roadless, and that the troops are compelled to drag the guns through passes nine thousand feet high. Granted that current accounts of the fashion in which the campaign is developing presently receive official confirmation, clinching proof will be, supplied that the Allies are at length preparing to make a great bid for supremacy in the Near and Middle East. The Caucasian campaign cannot by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as a blow at Turkey's heart, but it is understandable only as an element in a great offensive scheme. An extended Russian advance from Armenia through Asia Minor is not to bo looked for while the Ottoman Empire still has a great part of its military strength at disposal, and is in open communication wiih Central Europe. But the fact stands that the Russians have struck boldly forward for a distance. They are closing in unon a powerful Turkish for-' tress—chiefly formidable as being r great cntrenched camp—which would provide them with a valuable advanced base 'for further offensive operations. 'In a word, they are inviting the most powerful counterstroke' of which the enemy' is capable.
Taking action on these lines, and .; accepting the not. inconsiderable risks involved, the Russians must bo impelled by some very powerful motive./ Such a motive' is. not to be found in a desire to lighten pressure on the British columns in Mesopotamia, though the Russian stroke incidentally has this effect.. Neither will a desire to.prevent an invasion of Persia account for the development of the Caucasian campaign on the lines reported. Having only-that object in view, the Russians would rather have held the mountain line from which they '.have now struck forward to Erzerum, and concentrated in Northern . Persia against the, Turkish flank. -The. mo.st probable explanation of the movement against Erzerum; with its attendant labours and risks, is that it represents- a powerful effort to upset the enemy's offensive and'defensive plans, and compel such a distribution of hif forces as he would carefully avoid if freedom of choice were left' in his hands. Such a movement is understandable only as being intended to hamper the Turks by pin-' ning down forces which they need elsewhere, if not for offensive action, to meet the prospective onslaught of the Allies in and from the Balkans. In its present stage the Russian action in Armenia is really , open to no other interpretation.
Impressively as -the Caucasian campaign is taking shape,, there does not. seem to be any reason to alter an opinion that the' Russians will most powerfully and effectively cooperate with the Allies in theNNeatr t Last by direct action in the Balkans, or at all events that such cooperation is likely to be an extremely /important factor making for an Allied; success. The Caucasian campaign is being developed as an exceedingly important diversion, and is capable of further development on these lines, but it cannot bo expected to absorb the whole strength of the Turkish Army. When the Allies make their move from Salonika they will have to reckon upon Turkish opposition as well as upon that of. Bulgaria and whatever forces the Austro-Geraans can make available in the Balkans. In these circumstances a Russian attack upon Bulgaria,, with or .without the assistance of Rumania, would be at least, a, very important factor. It might, indeed, oe essential unless the army at Salonika is being raised to an .even greater strength than is now anticipated. • ' ' » * B
An explanation is now given of an incident in tho Mesopotamian campaign of which the bare facts were reported a week ago. At that time news was received from General Townshend. who is besieged at Kut-cl-Amara, that the Turks had evacuated their trenches on the land, side of that place, increasing their distance from the British positions by about a - mile. Mr. Candler, a war correspondent, explains to-day that the Turkish withdrawal was enforced by a rise in the river which flooded their trenches. The incident has turned to the advantage of the defenders in giving them easy possession of an elaborate series of entrenchments, upon which the enemy had evidently expended a vast amount of labour, but otherwise cannot be regarded as particularly important or as implying any material alteration in the general trend of the campaign. An extraordinary _ feature is the nature of the position the Turks found it necessary to evacuate.. It consisted, according to Mr. Candler, of twenty-two rows of deep trenches, apart from miles of communications honeycombing tho whole ■ position. Either the Turks must have been sapping very industriously up to'the British entrenchments or they are intent upon converting their investing lines into a strong field fortress so as to maintain the siege with the smallest possible force. * * / * ; « ' Wnumn undue risks have been UaJwn, in MesQDota.miou.in yj&yj g£ the.
limited forces available, cannot yet be determined with any confidence. A general defence of the campaign as it had then developed was submitted by the Marquis of Crewe in the House of Lords in December last, soon a Her General Townshgnd had retired from Ctcsiphon, where ho was within 18 miles of Bagdad. The chief points made by the Marquis of Crewe were that General Townshead's force did not consist, as had been supposed, of a single division only, but included additional troops, and that the advance upon Bagdad was not a rash military adventure, but an enterprise deliberately planned with the full approval of the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia, at that date Sir John Nixon; This, however, does not dispose of the fact that General Townsiiend's force 7 was_ hopelessly inadequate for ulie work it was set to do. It is now evident that if General Townshend had reached Bagdad'ho would at best have been besieged there under circumstanccs of much greater peril than those by which he is no\v faced at Kut-el-Amara. On any general survey of the campaign, however, it must be admitted that it shows a .considerable margin to the good. The attempt to reach Bagdad has failed fen* the time being, and it was probably unwise to make the attempj. until diversions elsewhere had to some extent cleared the way. But the _ campaign at large*is serving a highly important, purpose as an outpost defence of India and a secondary purpose ■in safeguarding _ the Anglo-Persian ,Compan3 : 's oil pipe line, which is useful to .tho Navy. The troops enr gaged are holding considerable enemy forces in play, airtl though General Townshend's garrison at Kut-cl-Amara l and the columns attempting to relieve that place appear to be still in an exposed apd dangerous-situation, their prospects are greatly brightened by the rising importance of the Russian'operations in Armenia and the consequent attraction to that theatre of large Turkish reinforcements.
There is official news that a Zeppelin has foundered in the North Sea. _ She was sighted in a-sinking condition by a trawler, which apparently did not stop to investigate. It is not by any means the first time that the bis; but fragile airships have been overtaken by such a fate. Before the war began one was destroyed by stress of weather and another as a result of an accidental explosion. Others have per-' ished since. A Zeppelin and a Schutte-Lanz, a rigid airship ■of similar type, were both wrecked.on the Danish coast in February, 1915;
Germany, it is now stated, relies upon a treaty made with the United .States in 1828 as giving her the right to take a naval prize into an American port. The nature of the treaty_ has yet to be disclosed,, but its _existen.ee possibly complicates the position. In the ordinary way the Hague Convention would' override a much older treaty covering the same ground, but here again, as has been pointed out, a difficulty appears in that the three Powers concerned are bound in differing degree by the Hague regulations governing the entry of prizes into neutral ports. Germany has subscribed in full to regulations which concede the right of sequestrating prizes in neutral ports. The United ' States have expressed adhesion to the regulations, but with a reservation which excludes this right. Britain: -has tentatively taken up the same attitude towards the regulations as- the United States, but without formally ratifying her acceptance. Great Britain's demand for tho release of the Appani indicates that she ■ con-' sidcrs the' United States Government bound by its own attitude towards the Convention regulations,' but America is not prepared to at once admit this view. _ Meantime . . tho identity of the raider remains undetermined, though Sir Edward Merewether's statement shows . that she is a very much larger and more powerful ship-- than the steamer Moewe, of twelve hundred tons, entered on Lloyd's Register.
The Compulsion Act is to come into operation in Great Britain on Thursday next, and unencumbered single men' who have not attested by that date will- be enlisted and added three weeks ' later to the strength of. Derby groups already called up. Finality will thus very soon be reached in a measure which was very necessary to the efficient prosecution of the war, and indications are that the opposition it at first threatened to arouse will reach no serious dimensions. The opposition has, in fact, died away in a fashion which speaks of national awakening. Very probably many' of the men concerned will seize upon the brief period of grace , now remaining, leaving only an inconsiderable minority to be compulsorily en-, listed, but this does not mean that the Compulsion Act was anything less than vitally necessary; ■> » * * » Practically the only ne\vs in hand from the main theatres is a brief statement that a great calm reigns on the Russian front. It is the sort of news to inspire hackneyed references to the calm before the storm.
Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19160205.2.25
Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka
Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2687, 5 February 1916, Page 4
Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,888PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2687, 5 February 1916, Page 4
Using this item
Te whakamahi i tēnei tūemi
Stuff Ltd is the copyright owner for the Dominion. You can reproduce in-copyright material from this newspaper for non-commercial use under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0). This newspaper is not available for commercial use without the consent of Stuff Ltd. For advice on reproduction of out-of-copyright material from this newspaper, please refer to the Copyright guide.