The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1916. A GIANT'S WEAPON

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2672, 19 January 1916, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1916. A GIANT'S WEAPON

It seems a long time since we List heard anything definite about the doings of the German battleship fleet. _ Compared with the great happenings on land tho "sea affair" has of late been unsensational._ Isolated incidents have been occasionally chronicled, but no naval battle on a large scale has taken place. The three outstanding events of tho war as far as the Navy is concerned are the action off Chile in November, 1914, tho battle of the Falkland Islands in the following month, and the engagement in the North Sea last January, when the German armoured cruiser Blucher was sunk and two German battle (cruisers were put out of action. In the early stages of tho war we were daily expecting news of a titanic conflict between the battleship fleets, of Britain and Germany, but aa weeks and months went by and nothing of the kind happened we gradually set tied down to the belief that tho enemy had finally decided not to take the risk of fighting the greatest naval battle in history. Yet tho possibility- of the German fleet sailing forth to battle has always existed. On one occasion German newspapers boasted that the Kaiser's navy had steamed out into the North Sea to find tho British battleships, but failed to see anything of them, and now the news comes by way of New York that the German fleet made three sorties in December, which appear to have been in the nature of a promenade well within their own mine-protected area. It seems that the Gorma.n people are beginning to ask unpleasant questions regarding _ the inactivity of their navy. It is not surprising that they should hint that the time has come for the great fleet upon which so much money has beou spent should do something to justify its existence. The blockade is causing hardship and privation in Germany, arid people arc naturally asking why the German battleships are nos making any attempt to relieve tho pressure. It is stated that the I'ccent sorties were undertaken for the purpose of making tho public bcliev.i that the German navy is seeking for the opportunity of a trial of strength with the British Fleet. Whether this explanation is actually tru-i or not, it is quite possible that the pressure of public opinion may foriffi ths .bs-fid ef the Qr.fraio (Jqv. oi'iimsnt and causa a chanaa in oe-y&l

policy. The "day" of battle may never come, and yet it may come, and conic like a tiiief in the night. Tin British Navy is waiting, and watching, anc! preparing for that great day. A British Admiral recently stated that he had not had any leave sinco the war beg.in. "I should never forgive myself," he went on to say, "if the day came and I was not here. Whatever may be the fortune ofr younge men, I don't think I shall live to see the British Navy confronting an enemy again. I cannot miss the chance for which I have lived since,-as a small boy, I joined the Britannia." This lino spirit permeates our Navy from the Commander-in-Chief to the lower deck. The* whole band of' brothers are animated by the same cagey desire to come to grips with tho enemy. Though it is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of the roio which the British Navy has played in the present tremendous conflict, some leading authorities on naval warfare are of opinion that we have not made the fullest use of the special opportunities of taking tho enemy by surprise which our umivalled sea powev has given us. Tho spirit of the Navy and its efficiency as a fighting machine are all that could be- desired. The Fleet is ever ready and willing, but it is contended that the political control has not been characterised by sufficient boldness and breadth of vision. We do not acem to have an adequate vealisation of the uniqueness of our position. In an instiuctive article in the. Fortnightly Bcviciu, Me. ! Archibald Hurd expresses the opinion that we are too much inclined to look upon the Navy as "our sure shield," whereas it might be better described as "our incomparable thunderbolt." Tho Grand Fleet (writes Mr. Hurd) is not the instrument of a weak Power on the defensive—timid, distracted, and 1 confused; it is the weapon of offence of a people who rule nearly one-quarter of tho earth's surface, atul, its a consequence of successful initiative on the outbreak of war,'hold all tlie world's seas at their command. You must pass in rapid survey the battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, and destroyers under the orders of Admiral Sir John Jellicce in order to understand .the source of England's greatness; you must watch the operations of some of tho 2300 patrol vessels, minesweepers, and other auxiliaries which are the antennae of the Grand Fleet, if the Navy's ceaseless activity is to be appreciated; you must have some knowledge of the movements of tlie 2000 and supply ships if yon would plumb the naval resources of this country; you must comprehend what it means to carry by sea, ill face of the foe, 2,500,000 officers and men, besides 320,000 sick and wounded and nurses, 2,,W0,000 tons of stores and ammunition, and 800,000 horses, mules, and camcls, if you would realise tho extraneous work which has been done under the protcctionvof the Fleet. It is indeed a wonderful record, unparalleled in the history of warfare. _ It helps us to realise" tlie magnitude of the resources of our Empire. It makes us feel (to quote Mil. Hum's words) that "we arc not pigmies but giants, and the Grand Fjleet and its extensions constitute a-giant's weapon." We arc never tired of talking about the magnificent work the lyfavy has clone. We know that it has stood between Germany and the mastership of the world, and wo .recognise that its achievement has so far been the one decisive factor in the war. Yet it is doubtful whether we realise tho fu'l_ might of our giant weapon, or all its possibilities. Our attention has been so closely conccntratcd on tho land campaigns and the formation of new armies, that wc have come to regard sea power almost as of secondary importance. Now that tho German flag has been swept off the oceans, many peoplo have come to think that the Navy's occupation has gone as a weapon of attack. Mr. Hurd declares that "we become the slaves of land strategy instead of the masterful exponents of maritime ■ strategy which controls the whole situation for the Allies. Because of the Fleet wc stand to-day head and shoulders above all the other nations engaged in the war. We should lead in strategy and not follow.". In discussing tho likelihood of a battle in tho North Sea on a grand scale, Mr. Hurd says it is impossible to say what may or may not happen, but he thinks that the probability of an encounter between tho two fleets is not very great. It must, however, be borne in mind that important changes have taken place in the control of Germany's naval forces, and no one can tell what tho new' men may do. It may bo' taken for granted that they wiil do their utmost to justify the trust placed in them, especially in view of the fact that their predecessors had been displaced presumably becauso of their failure. At the beginning of the war the Germans placed great hopes in a process of attrition by means of which Britain's margin of naval supremacj would gradually be reduced to vanishing point. But there has been no such process. On the contrary, after seventeen months of war, the margin is greater than before. Mr, Hubd, like others who have recently been privileged, to visit tho Grand Fleet, is more impressed than ever with its might and its readiness, and like others he also hinta at possibilities of a tremendous an-d perhaps unexpected part it may yet play in the final act' of the great world tragedy.