GERMANY'S MANPOWER

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2656, 30 December 1915, Page 6

GERMANY'S MANPOWER

SIGNS OF EXHAUSTION

EVIDENCE FROM CHAMPAGNE

(By, Joseph Reinach in the "Morning Post.") The German Press, inspired by the military staffs, has published such inexact information'about tlio recent engagements in the Champagne that it is, I think, necessary to return to the consideration of a few points. The conclu- ' sion can be drawn readily from a few well-established facts. It should be noted, firstly, that during the whole course of the battle in tho Champagne (September 25 and 26) the Germans were incapable of making any counter-offensive of any considerable scope; they could only react by very much localised counter-attacks on places where they felt themselves specially threatened. The largo reserves were all engaged as isolated units. Such a method is like using patches of material to stop a. break in a dyke. Its deficiency proves tlie extent of the confusion. To re-establish its prestige the high command was forced to resume the offensive with more method, and this is what it has attempted to do. Our initiative in September had forced the high German command to bring back from Russia a largo. number_ of divisions, at least ten./ Those divisions have not yet taken their place ill the line, and it is their presence that has enabled the enemy to «ngage actions of some importance. Tlie Gerinap Stalf has at last found it necessary to attack in order to raise tho "moral" of tlio forces on'the Western theatre of tlio war, wliich was greatly depressed by the serious checks met with previously in Artois and the Champagne. A few successes, even of quite local importance, would remove the impression caused by the retreat, by the numerous surrenders —25,000 prisoners—and the losses of material. In the district round Tahure and Mesnil tho Germans were in the presence or an adversary that even after tho great assault of September 25 and 26 did not cease advancing by a series of attacks and fortunate encounters. On the 29th again at Courtine wo advanced orer 150 metres almost without losses, taking 267 prisoners, including two officers of' the 14th Bavarian Regiment, and killing or wounding 400 men. In the night of the 29th-30th the enemy- made four counter-attacks, but in vain. Having so keen an adversary, which kept advancing trench by trench, the Germans decided fri reply not by a , passive resistance, but by an offensive over ail extended front, the front' extending from th" Vistula to Courting. a distance of about three miles, file attack was preceded' by a very violent bombardment. Suffcftating and tear-prodiicing _ shells were used, and it was especially intense on the hill .at Tabure, on the "Toothbrush," and on tlio "iMamelles." attacks were successive, and were, delivered at soy era 1 points of tho front, in front of the Vistula trenches, and, at Courtine, at Constantinople trench, not on a continuous line. The.v wero thrown back on the eastern edge of Tahure. They succeeded only on tho Tahure hill where our troops suffered severely from 'asphyxiating gas. The enemy reached the top, but wo kept all the southern slope. .Emperor Reported at Sedan. On Octbbar ,31 the enemy tried to follow up his only success. Ho was that day repelled everywhere with heavy losses, and the German offensive consequently stopped. _ According- • to the statement of prisoners, the Emperor came to Sedan during the battle. So, at least, the troops were told, and they were warned of the importance of the action in which they were to take part. : I would draw the attention of soldiers to the following notes that have been communicated to me by the most competent authorities, and that the German Staff, whatever its .audacity, will have'some difficulty iS"cS*;traclic.tffls-. The numbers of tne companies Wtfe about 200. The proportion of older men and of recruits or die 1915 class should 1 be emphasised, while there were several untrained Landsturm,_ that is, men who have never done military service. To quote a singlo example. Of 330 prisoners belonging to the 49th Regiment, 136 were men of the Landsturm who had not served, 80 were recruits of tho 1915 class, and 38 of the 1914 class. In this group of an active regiment there were only twelve men left belonging to tlie active class's?. eral men had been assigned to guard the coasts, and' had'just been sent to the front after rapiSly passfng thrffSSti the depot. The officers who wore maSe prisoners complained of the .'lnsufficient vatue_ of the ffllinstructed Landsturm. 'Companies have only . one officer and battalions are commanded by a captain or oberleutnant. Among three "stellvertreter" officers made prisoner one was a road-maker, an old non-commissioned officer, forty-eight years old, who had till then been in the barracks; the second was a non-commissioned officer belonging to the active army, but sicklylooking, while tho third suffered from heart trouble. The. two latter a few .weeks ago were-kept in barracks in charge of the instruction of troops as unfitted to take the field. Some men stated that the officors kept in their fuiikholes during the attacks or went sick just before they were delivered, and one of tho officers made prisoner did not deny the fact. The Fourth Prussian Division had already suffered sevorely in Russia, a fact that had depressed the "moral" of ' the troops. For instance, the fourth company of the 49th in January, 1915, in front of Warsaw, only numbered 28 men, and was sent to tho Carpathians, and in April received - reinforcements seventeen times. Thirty-five men were frozen in the Carpathians, and on May 17 tho company, which was before Przemysl, only numbered 47. Tho Offensive a Necessity. The fact is that offensives such as those taken on October 30 and 31 aro a necessity for the German Staff. The troops they have available on our front will enable them to prepare several, and we must expect in the following weeks a series of Gorman attacks of the same kind. Artillery preparation, thanks especially to asphyxiating shells, may give the Germans a jocal success on the first line, • but its infantry are not capable of exploiting to any extent an advantage gained by such means. This is what happened on the 31st. The attack was directed on what the enemy probably considered the weakest portion of our front, being that most recently conquered, and consequently that most hurriedly organised. Tlie plan of the enemy' was shown in tho selection of the points of attack. This was to upset the defences of tho Hill of Tahure and tho "Toothbrush." The village of Tahure lies between these two crests, and in this way ho would havo threatened our lino towards the oast (Hill 193) and towards the south, near, Courtino. The success of kutli an operation would have had the advantage of raising the "moral" of the troops engaged, and could have been used for publicity purposes to dissipate the effects of the olieclc at Champagne. ■ A. .few trenches captured at the summit of the Tahure Hill, on the slopes of which wo are still holding our own, represent a result quite out of proportion to the extent of tho effort made. The complete cheek of the attacks, which wore resumed next day, nil the 31st, shows that the limits of the capacity

I fantry is to-day very rapidly attained. The losses sustained were too great for the German command to continuo tlio onterpriso 'L'acitus wrote of Germany that sue was tlie tamer of men. AVo do not hesitate to admit that' tlio effort made by Germany - on the thrco fronts, the Franco-Belgian, Russian, and Serbian, is worthy of admiration. One may consider that at the moment the Central Empires have available 120 army corps belonging to the active army; of these 55 are in France and Belgium, 45 in Russia, 10 in Italy, and 10 in Serbia. Consequently, valuing tlie army corps at two divisions of 35,000 men, ws get: 1,800,000 men against English, Belgians, and French.. 1,500,000 men against the Russians. 350,000 against the Italians; and 350,000 against the Serbians. That makes a total of 4,000,000 com-, batants, not including Turks or Bulgarians. The exhaustion in men is becoming clearer every day. . Here aro tho facts: Tho 1915 class, which for a long time was kept under training as reserves,- is now entirely on tho frpnt. Tho men belonging to tho Landsturm, including the untrained 6econd class, have been called in "up to forty years of ago. Tlio depots contain only wounded, untrained men of the Landsturm from forty-one to forty-five, the 1916 class, and volunteers of the 1917 class. That represents four months' waste. A last revision has been made throughout tlie whole. Empire to get together a few contingents of men who had previously been declared unfit for all service. Further, workers in war factories havo been incorporated everywhere when tliey can be replaced by women and children, ihese latest incorporations aro producing a profoundly discouraging effect on the people. j prisoners' Letters. Tho extracts from letters found on j prisoners in the '.Champagne and recently published aro significant. Thus: Brunswick, September 23, 1915. —Yesterday we had the revision of tlie lists. Out of 200 men 180 have been taken, 90 per cent. You can guess whom they are taking; only cripples have been passed over. ' • Brunswick, September 24, 1915.— I There is strong feeling here. None are lot go. Anyone who has head, arms, and legs must go whether ho can or not. September 23. —Yesterday I was at Sc'lincle. Out of 150 men who had, bean rejected as definitely unfit for sorTico 130 wero taken. While all these signs must' be takon into account, it should not .bo.forgot•teu- that wild animals like tigers and bears are especially dangerous when they have been wounded and aro beginning to feel defeated. It is then that their defcnco becomes most savage and that their desperate attacks are most terrible. They kill tho hunter before dying of tlieir own wounds. It is the business of the hunter to bo more carcftil than ever and to make every effort of which he is capable. i