PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2628, 25 November 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

It is now possible to form somefairly definite ideas about the progress of the struggle in the Balkansi'he broad conclusion is warranted by late events, particularly in Greece and in Southern Serbia, that a stage has been reached from'which matters are as likely to develop favourably to the Entente as otherwise. It would be rash to assume that the Austro-German and Bulgarian aggression has reached its maximum development, and is already upon the wane. Apart from the fact that the greater part of Serbia »s in enemy occupation, tho opening of communications with Turkey and the passage of supplies into that country represents a positive achievement by the enemy, and a factor which must be expected to tell, perhaps very potently, in future passages of the struggle for supremacy in the Near East. On the other hand, no clear idea of the'position would be gained if it were ignored that many opportunities of profitable action are open to the Entente, and that the enemy enterprise even how is menaced by great and visible dangers. So far the enemy have had it largely their own way, both in the invasion of Serbia and in getting into touch with Turkey- They have opposed powerful forces to muoh weaker forces, and the inevitable result has followed. The_ position now reached is that tho Allies, by takingfirni measures with Greece, have gained a secure base for future action. An earnest of better things -to follow is given in the definite local check inflicted upon the enemy in' Southern Serbia, at the furthest limit of his invasion. In considering future prospects it must be kept in mind that the Allies (unless the new-born hopes entertained of Greece prove to be unfounded) are now in an advantageous position to remedy the disparity of force under which they have hitherto suffered, and that the enemy will hardly bo able to further develop his enterprise except by bringing additional force to bear under circumstances which do not altogether favour such a course.

The question as to whether the Allies are prepared to strike for decisive success in a winter campaign in-'the Near East is,still more or less open, but it can hardly be doubted that they are in a position of advantage to take up such an enterprise, and that tho enemy, despite the measure of success he has attained up to the present, iB much.less advantageously placed to oppose ;t. It was pointed out yesterday that a firm footing in Greece not only enables the Allies to-render effectual aid. to Serbia, but affords them a valuable base for a renewed attack upon Turkey. Salonika lies more than 160 miles west of the nearest point on the Turkish-Aegean Coast, but it is the nearest safo and commodious port available to the Allies, and therefore the best base of operations for a winter campaign against Turkey. Its value as a base is enormously increased by the fact that it- is connected with Constantinople by rail- The total length of the railway, which follows a somewhat winding,route, is more "than 400 miles, but about a third of its length runs through Greece, and as matters now stand in that oountry may be 'regarded as freely available to the Allies. Another long section, through Bulgarian territory, runs at an _ average distance of about ten miles from the coast, so that sea-power and the resultant freedom to make use of sea-trans-port should have an important bearing upon its capture and use. It seems quite possible that this railway represents a practicable route for the advance of an Entente army through Bulgaria into Turkey. Making Salonika their main base the Allies would, of course, be 'able to utilise to some extent tho minor ports on the coast-line opposite the railway, though none of these ports would in themselves constitute a satisfactory main base. Taking it for granted that,_ a campaign on these lines is possible the only question open is whethorthe Allies arc in a position to detail the force required to carry it through, and to repel any counter-stroke attempted by the enemy. • ■»'•# #

Here many considerations enter. Everything depends in the first instance upon whether the Allies attach the same importance to the-con-quest of Turkey and the opening of the Turkish waterways as they have done in the past. The blockade of Russia involved in the closing of these waterways has been to some extent neutralised by the use of alternative routes for trade and war supplies. It is particularly noteworthy in this connection that Russia will be able to import war material from America and Japan right through the winter by way of Port Arthur and other ports on tho coast of China, when her own port of Vladivostock is frozen in. Port Arthur, Fusan (at the end of ~tho Corcan Peninsula), And a number of other ports on the Chinese coast are connected by branch lines with the Trans-Siberian railway, and Russia is assured of the use of some of, tucsa ports, It still remains that he;' trade is. jaj

shackles, and that a great part of this year's harvest remains locked up,' with results highly injurious' to her foreign credit. The'opening of tho Dardanelles and Bosphorous would immediately release an enormous volume of Russian exports, and also ifould afford a much more convenient route for the passage of war material into Russia than is now available. On this ground and on account of other obvious advantages that would attend a decisive victory in the Near East, the Allies have motives practically as strong as ever for making a determined effort to reach Constantinople- » * * t

On the question of relative strength it is impossible to speak in absolutely definite terms, because exact information is lacking but lat i developments in •' the main theatres go far to justify a belief that thn Allies, particularly in the West, hold considerable reserves at disposal, and are in this respect vastly bettor placed than the- enemy. There are reports to-day of German reinforcements being sent to Constantinople, and other similar suries have been transmitted of late predicting a considerable increase in the German forces in the FaiKans, but all such stories rest upi-n a doubtful basis, and meantime there is the undisputed fact that the Bulgarians have up to the present borne a considerably greater burden than their allies in the campaign against Serbia. It is a strictly moderate estimate of possibilities to say that if theAustro-Germans mean to leave it mainly to the Bulgarians and Turks to make headway against the Allies in the Near East it should not be by any means impossible for the Allies to place a preponderating force in the field. The other main element in the situation from this point of view is that if conditions in the main theatres and in the Italian campaign do not forbid a heavy reinforcement of Bulgaria and Turkey by the Austro-Gcrmans they at leastmake it highly improbable. Tho position reached in the Italian campaign is reviewed in another column. -It need only be emphasised here that a decisive Italian success on tho Ispnzo front besides opening fch», road to Istria and the Adriatic sea-board would clear the way for an Italian flank attack upon the Austro-German communications with the Near East.

RiiPOMS allege that dissatisfaction with the war is gathering head in Bulgaria, and in their aggregate effect visible facts seem to amply warrant a belief that the Allies are in a position to undertake a tvigorous_ campaign in the Near East. An Allied advance against Turkey from Salonika as a base would, of course, hardly be undertaken without the assurance of powerful Russian cooperation, but it is most unlikely that this co-operation would be withheld. When she does move against Constantinople Russia may be ' expected to put forth no limited effort for of- all the Powers concerned she has the greatest interests at stake.

A Petrograd report states that ten German divisions (about 200,000 men) have been withdrawn from tho Russian front for service in tho Balkans. The report is not official, but represents the most definite news of this, character yet received, and the news is somewhat unexpected'; possibly' it is untrue- The troops may be moving to tho Western front. It is' evident, of course, that a movement of German troops towards the Balkans does not necessarily mean that they aro destined to reinforce the Austro-Germans in Serbia, .or to move into Turkey. It is a possibility worth considering that they may be intended instead to reinforce the Austrians on tho Isonzo front, where the Italian assault promises to oulminate in' a great victory. A late official message reports another important success by the Italians on this front, in the vicinity of Gorizia. They have stormed one fort, destroyed others, and captured a thousand prisoners. If the Italians break through the Austrian lines on tbe Isonzo, and it is said to-day that the main defences, at Gorizia, "hang on a single thread,'' the Austro-German enterprise in the Balkans will bo menaced vfrom this quarter. In the ciroumstances reinforcements at disposal are more likely to be employed in assisting to stem the Italian assault than in extending the operations in progress further south.

Reports in hand regarding Greece and the Balkans, though <tney embody some interesting details, do not greatly alter the essential features of the position disclosed yesterday. As" regards the campaign in Serbia, it is now definitely established that the Bulgarians have been checked and driven back m South-West Serbia. The improvement that has taken place is most marked, and is not yet fully explained. A weok ago the position at Monastir was regarded as hopeless, and the fall of tbe place was momentarily expected. This is shown in some belated disrjatcb.es, whioh no doubt were delayed by the censor while the action of Greece was still in doubt- To-day Monastir ib no longer in immediate danger, and the Serbs are pressing forSvard something like 20 miles to the northeast, on the heels of a Bulgarian retreat. Beyond the fact that they are strongly posted on the main railway in a position lending itself tp a forward movement, little is told, at time of writing, of tfcelate doings of the Allied troops in Serbia, hut some highly-interesting information is contained in dispatches which, like those relating to Monastir, have been delayed. It is quite' clear that until an understanding had been reached with Greece the Allies woro able to send only a portion of the_ total force landed at .Salonika into. Serbia. French troops under General Sarrail made a gallant effort to junction with the Serbs, but failed for lack of reinforcements. They wore outnumbered three to one. According to one message, only the French section of the Allied force has yet been in action, but some time ago it was mentioned that British cavalry had participated in a .successful action against the Bulgarians. Evidently, however, the greater portion of the British force has hitherto been kcepinsr watch and ward in Greece and" along tho railway. Tho whole force is now presumably free to act against the- Bulgars, and this goes far to (wplain the relief of tension in South-Western Serbia.

Tiie extreme activity of the rival airmen indicated by the record of aerial combats/on different sections of the battle-front in tho Western theatre given to-day may bo taken to show that somothing big is afoot in this quarter. The aeroplane observers are always at work, but their. greatest activity is displayed when there is suspicion of enemy movements of an important nature It is qf vital cpnwMi to aafasufird ;agM»« tho swot mmm at wees

that the aorial squadrons should operate freely, and it is equally the business of the opposing airmen to prevent these observations being made. In the present instance tho supremacy of the Allied flying men seems to have been clearly demonstrated. But what is behind it all? Is it a new German or a new AngloFrench offensive that is afoot?