OUR FAILURE IN THE DARDANELLES

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2610, 4 November 1915, Page 7

OUR FAILURE IN THE DARDANELLES

MR. ASQUITH'S STATEMENT

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY COMPULSION FOR UNMARRIED SHIRKERS STRONG CRITICISM By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright (Rec. November 3, 10.30 p.m.) • ' London, November 3. The House-of Commons was packed when tlie Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) delivered liis promised statement on tho Government's conduct of tho war. Thero was,a dramatic scene when Mr. Asquith rose to speak, the Prime Minister being greeted"* with rounds of cheers. He spoke in the most confident manner, and aroused general laughter by referring to the "email coterie of professional whisperers who kept their enemies supplied with a daily diet of lies." The, House interpreted this as a dig at the Northcliffe Press, and laughed derisively when Mr. Asquith said that the number of British recruits was enormous, but refused to givo tho number. Mr. Asquith sarcastically referred to the published statements of the doings of Cabinet. Sir Edward Carson interposed: "Some of tliem are true." Mr. Asquith replied: "Yes; but very few." The House listened to the Premier's references to the Dardanelles in tense silence, and displayed mixed feelings on hearing <Mr. Asquith's views regarding compulsion. The Prime Minister spoke for an hour and fifty minutes. . . , Mr. Asquith's Speech, Mr. Asquith said he Was afraid he had doomed to disappointment many expectations of. those who thought it was his duty to appeal in the guise of a criminal making the best defence he could, or as a white-sheeted penitent asking for absolution. He proposed to adopt neither attitudo, but to speak as the head of the Government. "Wo are," he said, "as determined as ever'to prosecute the war to a successful issue, and use every means and exhaust, if necessary, every resource in the attainment of that common supreme purpose. . It was true that to-day some parts of 'tho horizon were overcast. This war, like, all great wars, has been full of surprises Slid disappointments to all the combatants. It seemed at this moment that the situation in Britain called in an exceptional degree for three tilings—a proper sense of perspective—(applause)—a limitless stock of patience, and an overflowing reservoir of both active and passive courage. He did not believe that tho British people as a whole showed any lack, or any falling off in any of those qualities. All .they desired was "to be told, as far as diplomatic and military exigencies permitted, how the Causo stood, and to lie assured that in the maintenance and defence of that cause, tho Government antf the people were playing a worthy part. Thcro' could not bo a greater _ mistake jihan to suppose tliat the Government had a,n.v interest in concealing anything, subject to tlio one overruling condition that its disclosures did not assist, the, enemy. : How Do We Stand To-day? - How, lie asked, did-wo stand to-day? Tho speaker emphasised the fact ■that Britain began tho war with six infantry and two cavalry divisions, but in the operations described in Sir John French's dispatch to-day, , and in tho ■operations of September and October this year, ho (Sir John French) commanded not far short of a million men. To this must bo added the troops in tho Dardanelles and in Egypt and other theatres of. tho war, as well as the reserves and garrisons in the United Kingdom and outlying parts of tho Empire.' This gigantic forco had been raised from tho manhood of the United Kingdom and the Empire. Ho did not like to givo the precise figure, but it was ail unprecedented number of men. Tho contribution from India was splendid, and it was well known that Canada had- contributed ninety-six thousand officers and men, Australia ninety-two thousand, New Zealand twentyfivo thousand, whilo South Africa, after her most successful and brilliant campaign in German South-West Africa, had supplied important contingents for servico in East and Central Africa, and in addition had furnished 6500 troops for service in Europe. Wo had had a splendid contribution from Newfoundland, the West Indies, Coylon, and Fiji. Tho figures regarding the Dominions and other colonies were remarkable and significant. But oven these figures did not include their preparations for tho maintenance of these units in tho field, and the futuro expansion of the contingents already supplied, nor the vory large number of men from all parts of the Empire who had made their own way to the United Kingdom to enlist. I should also add, to complete that aspect of the story." said Mr. Asquith, "that in Rhodesia, East Africa, West and tho Colonies, important additions to the existing local forcos have been placed in tho field, and in other colonies and dependencies /' more remote from activo military operations all their defensive organisations •have received a profound stimulus."

' ' Navy's Magnificent Work. Mr. Asquith then turned to the work of the Navy in transporting troops. Since tho beginning of tho war the Transport Department of tho Admiralty, for the Army alone, had carried 2,500,000 officers and men, 320,000 sick and wounded, and nurses, 2,500,000 tons of stores'_ and munitions, and 800,000 horses, mules, and camels. These operations involved thousands of voyages through seas which at oiie time wore subject to raids by German cruisers, and which even noiv, though ho believed they were rapidly diminishing in stroii"th, wero infested by submarines. Tlie most remarkable fact hitherto was that the loss of life involved in tho whole of these gigantic oversea operations was considerably less than one-tenth per cent. He did not believe that the history of the world, or of any nation or age, could produce a comparable record. These figures did not includo tho millions of tons of stores which had been carried py tho Navies of tho Allied countries. , v Was anything in history, he asked, comparable with the actual service of the Navy itself Tho men of tho Grand Fleet had been living in tho twilight, so far.as public observation was concerned—unnoticed, unadvertised—but were performing with an efficiency and vigilance impossible to desoribo, or even approximate, a service to tho whole of tho Empire. Where is the German Fleet? Where was Germany's great fleet, about which there had been so much talk, so much science and money expended, which was to bo a perpetual men-, aoo to tho United 'Kingdom ?" "Looked up in tho' Baltic.," said the Prime Minister. "It dare not show its face in any sea where it could bo encountered. .Tho whole effective maritime and military resources of Germany upon the seas, after fifteen months of war, ha,vo been reduced to sporadic and constantly diminishing efforts by a few furtive submarines which havo sent to tho bottom far more innocent, unoffending oivilians than any military harm they havo done." Theso figures, ho added, wero more eloquent than columns of rhetoric. Ho could conceive of no hotter medicine for anyone who affected * to be downhearted or doubtful that tho Empire was playing its part in the greatest struggle of history. ,He was not going to apologise, either for tlie people of tho Empire, who had borne .their part so magnificently, or for the Government, which, to the best of its ability—no doubt with many shortcomings and mistakes, but to the best of its ability, and, ho believed, with the confidcnco of the great ma6s of their fellow countrymen—controlled, organised, and directed this groat campaign Land operations Briefly Touched On. Mr. Ajsquith touched briefly on tlio campaign on tho Western front, where the total casualties up till a week ago had been 377,000, or considerably more than twice the total of the original British Expeditionary Force. Happily the very largo percentage of recoveries from wounds had made tho net permanent wastago much smaller. , Tho Prime Minister affirmed that ho could 1 not pass without a tribute to the supremo fighting qualities of the Kussian soldier, which had never been more splendidly and more conspicuously manifested than during the recent retreat. The people of Great Britain had the greatest confidenco that- Iturisa would ulti-mately,-and before long, roll back the tido of invasion and reverse the position. lie would 1 like to say three words on our own important and highly successful campaign in Mesopotamia. Tho object of sending a force to that region was to secure the neutrality of Arabia, safeguard our interests in tho Persian Gulf, protect our oilfields, and generally to maintain tho authority of our flag in the East. Mr. .Asquith then related tho brilliant series, absolutely unchequer•od, of land and river operations which had been carried out until now. General Nixon's force was within-measurable distance of Bagdad. Ho did not think that in the whole course of tho war had operations been more carefully contrived, moro brilliantly conducted, and with better prospects of final success. The Attack on the Dardanelles. He now came to a not so unchequered chapter in tho story of our operations in the East, namely, the Dardanelles campaign. From the m. ment Turkey ontcred the war it was no longer possible, either from tho strategic or tho political point of view, to concentrate our cntiro energies in tho Western Tlie- ■ atro. Tho Turks threatened the Russians in the Caucasus, and indirectly threatened Egypt. The Turks were ahlo to close the Black Sea, and block our supplies of Russian wheat from the Black Soa, ports. Their entry also pro* ifticod a great and lasting effect ou the attitude of tho Balkan States. Consequently tho Government had to face tho question in the Near East, not merely strategically, but had to consider in consultation with its naval and ! military advisors the best and most politic eourso_ to take, eithor aggressively or otherwise. Britain in January had not. sufficient military forces available for sorvice in the j3ast to do moro than provido for tlio local defence of Egypt jjainut n jyikwi aJttack. which was ultimately defeated in Fabruan;.

The Government lmd then brought to its notice the possibility of a naval attack on the Dardanelles, and after full investigation, in consultation with its naval experts, including the Admiral Commanding in that part of tho Mediterranean, and' notwithstanding some doubts and hesitation in the mind of Lord Fisher, it felt justified in sanctioning the naval attack. People who thought or said that this attack was initiated without a full review of nil the latent- possibilities wore entirely mistaken. It was most carefully conceived and developed in consultation between the Admiral on the spot and the War Staff of the Admiralty, and before any final decision was taken tho plan was communicated to the French Admiralty, who entirely approved an:l agreed to participate. It was enthusiastically received and acclaimed by the illustrious Grand Duko Nicholas, then commanding the Russian army, who rightly thought that this campaign would assist him in tho Caucasus.

/ Navy Essays the Task and Falls. "The matter ivns most carefully reviewed over and over again by (lie War Council, and the operation then conceived," said Jlr. Asquith. "was purely naval. Wo could not alford at that time—Lord Kitchener said so. and we all agreed—any substantial military support. It was therefore decided to make the attempt with the Navy alone. I tako my full share of the responsibility for initiating that operation—my full share —And I deprecate more than I can say any attempt to allocate the blame to one Ministeror another, or the suggestion tliat some undefined personality of great authority and overmastering will controlled and directed our strategy. That is not tiie case. No one," he added, ■ "was more responsible than he. Ho thought, then, as everybody must have thought who knew the whole of flic circumstances, that we could run these risks, especially as very great objects -were in view, namely, to influence the whole of the Balkan situation in a sense favourable to the Allies, to open up cation with tho Black Sea, and to strike a blow at tho very heart of the Turkish Empire. Our operations culminated in an attack on the. Narrows which resulted in a set-back. The Second Disappointment, "The Government had then to consider whether further operations should be continued. It was the opinion of the advisers of the Government—and it seemed a very tenable opinion—that by the aid of an adequate military force one attack might still be driven home successfully, and Sir lan Hamilton was selected to conduct the expedition. Ho had witnessed tho naval attack on March 18, and ho and the Vice-Admiral on the spot wero in agreement on tho point that a joint naval and military attack was necessary. The active plan,pf operations was left to the judgment of the commanders on the spot, and there had never been any disagreement between them and the opinion held by the General Staff in Britain. The actual operations are familiar to everybody, and I will only say that in the whole course of tho war I have lievbr _ sustained keener disappointment than I experienced at the failure of our operations in the beginning of August. The chances of success then had seemed not only great, but preponderating, and the consequences of success would have been almost immeasurable. Success would have_ solved tho wholo situation in the Balkans, prevented Bulgaria from entering into the war, left, Constantinople open to capture, and would have been acclaimed throughout the whole of the Eastern world as a most brilliant demonstration of the superiority of the Allies. But it did not succeed, notwithstanding the magnificent exhibition, never surpassed, pf the gallantry and resource of the British trcops—and none wero more conspicuous than the Australian audNew Zealand troops, nor ought tho House to forget the extraordinary and magnificent services of the Navy." . Our Submarine Exploits. Mr. Asquith paid an eloquent tribute to tho services of the submarines, and emphasised the fact that up till -October 26, the submarines which had been operating in tho Sea. of Marmora had succeeded in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gun-boats, one torpedo-boat, eight transports, and 107 supply ships. He then described the arrival of the German submarines. "But the Navy," he said, "was equal to this, and selected safo harbours, while our small craft wero assembled in great numbers to maintain our communications with the Army, finally, a number of specially constructed vessels, largely due to the inventive genius of Lord Fisher himself, were sent to tho Mediterranean, and have done moit magnificent work. The Navy throughout has risen superior to all difficulties and maintained our communications with the Army intact. Was It Worth While? "I consider it still premature to fprm a judgment on the Dardanelles operations," said Mr. Asquith, "but we must consider what would have happened if the attack had not been undertaken. It is probable that the Russians might have sustained a serious set-back in tlie Caucasus; the_ Turks might have organised a great attack against Egypt, \while our expedition to . Mesopotamia might have been swept out of existence. It must also not be forgotten that tho British troops on Gallipoli were holding up an army of 200,000 Turks, and thus preventing them from doing incalculable mischief in other parts. Thc> present situation in tlic Dardanelles has received most careful and anxious consideration as part of the large strategic question which has been raised by recent developments." • Our Diplomatic Set-back in the Balkans. Mr. Asquit'h then explained how tho Allies had laboured ceaselessly for unity among the Balkan States. Ho admitted that the Tesult had beeiro disappointment and a failure. Ho pointed out to critics who wero talking; of '"greater firmness" and "greater adroitness" that unity of direction' was a most important asset. Germany had the advantage of such unity, while the Allies must consult each other, this latter resulting in inevitalle differences in the point of view upon any operation. Germany, further, had the advantage of making lavish promises to Bulgaria, whereas the Allies oould not barter an ay tho property of the Allies' friends behind, their backs, and without an assurance* of adequate compensation. Further, when tho Allies wore reproached for being too late in providing activo help for Serbia, it must bo remembered that up to tho very last month there was tho strongest reason for believing that Clroeco would acknowledge and act upoi> her treaty obligation to Serbia. When the Bulgarian mobilisation began, J.',. Venizelos (tho Greek Premier at that time)', asked France and ourselves for 150,000 men. This was on tho express understanding that Greece would mobiliso also. M. Venizelos later announced that Grccco must abido by her treaty with Serbia, but the. King repudiated, this declaration, and M. Venizelos resigned. These wero facts which should bo recognised bv people who woro complaining of tho alleged inertia of tho Allied Governments. Ho wished to say, on behalf of the Government and poople of Great Britian—and this opinion was also shared by France and Russia —that Serbia could not be allowed to become a prey to tins sinister and nefarious combination. The British p.nd French General Staffs luid come to a completo agreement on the issues involved on tl, "t point, and Serbia might rest assured that her independence was regarded by us as ono of the essential objects of the alliance.

Men, Munitions, and Money. Mr. Asquith next dealt with Homo questions—the adequate supply of men for the Army and Navy, the provision of munitions, and the common burden of tlie Allies' finance. The nation, ho said, had to consider how we could co-ordinate and adjust tho different ways of serving theso purposes so that the United Kingdom and the Empire should contribute most fruitfully and effectively to the common cause. The financial position was very serious. We wore buying' goods from abroad, in excess of our exports, to the extent of thirty millions monthly, as against an average of eleven millions before tlie war, and at tho_ same time we were making : advances to tho Allies and others which, as estimated for the current financial year, would amount to 423 millions. Wo alone amongst tlie belligerent nations could maintain a free market for gold, and indeed had exported a large_ amount. .We were, further, undertaking commitments which could only bo paid by a further export of cold or tlie sale of securities. •. Henco, rich and resourceful though we were, wo must cut our coat according _ to oiir cloth. Nevertheless, ho did not think that our. position compared unfavourable with that of Germany, where tho consumption far exceeded what could be produced, while her stocks were rapidly diminishing. Further, the standard of living amongst tlie greater part of tho population of Germany left littlo or no margin of reserve. Britain was in a much better position in this respect, but wo could not sustain the burden of tliis great war unless individuals and tho Government alike woro prepared to make greater sacrifices in retrenchment and economy. Tho average cost of tho Army was usually reckoned at £100 per head annually, but under tho present conditions this .had vastly increased, each unit costing at the rate of between £250 and £300 annually. Volunteer or Conscript? Mr, Asquith then dwelt on the question of compulsion, on which differences of opinion had arisen in the Cabinet. He admitted that voluntary recruiting as it had liitlierto been practised was haphazard, capricious, and, to somo otxent, unjust, but his objection to compulsion was based on the ground that under oxisting conditions compulsion would forfeit what he regarded as of supreme capital importance, namely, tho maintenance of our national unity. He would propose, not tha.t they should rule out compulsion as an impossible expedient, but that compulsion ought only to bo resorted to with something approaching general consent. ll© did not fear that thoro would be any necessity to resort to anything beyond Lord Derby's great national effort,' which was being carried out with the hearty goodwill of all parties. He emphasised tho point that married men who enlisted would not bo called upon to serve while tho younger and unmarried men wero holding baok. He hoped that the services of tho unmarried men would be obtained by voluntary effort, but, if need , be, theso would bo secured by other means. The War Committee. In concluding, tho Prime Minister dealt with the question of a. War Committee of tho Cabinet, which would have power to summon experts possessing special knowledge on all important questions. Cabinet should be kept constantly informed of the decisions of the Couimitteo. Also on all questions involving any departure in policy, Cabinet should bo consulted before decisive action was taken. Ho felt confident that only on these lines could successful conduct of the war be possible. Tho Committee should not be of less than throe members nor more than five. He attached the greatest importanco to a more complete and more intimate co-ordination between the staffs of tlie_ Allied Powers, a very happy illustration of which was General Joffre's visit. ' The National Spirit. Mr. Asquith affirmed that a great responsibility rested on him as head of tho Government, as could bo measured by what had happened, and what was still to happen. "Our best blood has been spilt and thousands of young lives cut short, while tho cry went up in cvor-inoreasing volume from torn hearts and mutilated homes. Wo might have stood aloof from this, the most moving, tragedy in the history of mankind, yet I do not beliovo that these sufferers will say that Britain could have acted otherwise. (Cheers.) Ho had laboured unceasingly in .upholding the common cause, and if thoro had been errors and shortcomings, and lack of foresight, ho would bo the first person to acknowledge it, but ho challenged anyono to prove there had been anything of cloth, indifference, and self-complacency to face unpalatable facts, or to conceal tho truth, 110 felt confident that we wero going to carry our righteous cause to a trinmnhaut issue. "I am not going to shift the burden until I am satisfied that I cannot bear it, or that it can be performed hatter by others. So long as I cujov the confidenco of my sovereign, of tho Commons, and of tho country, I shall not surrender this heavy task. "If there bo moments when wo aro tempted to be faint-hearted, let us ask ourselves, in what year of our history havo wo done more to justify our faith in our manliood and cur womanhood? It has brought us the story of the last hours of Miss Edith Cavell, facing a worse ordeal than death, watching the moments creeping on to her doom, slowly and remorselessly, iu death already swallowed up. Tt has_ taught our bravest men tho supremo lesson of courage, and in the United Kingdom and Empire there aro thousands nf such women. A voar ago wo did not know it. Wo have great traditions, but a nation does not exist ou traditions alone. I thank God that we have living examples of all thoso qualities that havo built up and sustained our Empire. Let us bo worthy of them, and endure to the end. (Loud cheat's.) Sir Edward Crey Defends Our Policy. Sir Edward Grey (Secretary of Stato for Foreign Affairs), following Mr. Asquith, emphatically denied that through vacillation and hesitation help had been lost tnTvirliifl. Wc lui/l (wen in slow «ih»iiti«ii!»u w itli tn tho 'iufct ma whiali could'ba made of tho force* .which hai been scat to tba Near

East, and there was absolutely 110 delay. "All the forces at our disposal were lauded at Salonika, and are now engaged in operations in the Balkans, while prepartions aro being made for sending further forces to the East. All the assistance in the power of Britain and France was given Serbia ill her hour of need, after the Greek Government tool; a different view of its treaty obligations to Serbia. . GOVERNMENTS POLICY DEBATED SPEECHES BY PAItLIAMENTARY LEADERS. The debate followed ou the formal motion for the adjournment of the House, and subsequently terminated without a vote. , Sir Edward Carson Attacks the Covernment. Replying to tho Prime Minister, Sir Edward Carson (who recently resigned the Attorney-Generalship in tho National Ministry on account ofliisdifferences on matters of policy) said that tho House and tho country woro really anxious about- three things; wliether our resources of men and material wero being used to the best advantage; whether what appeared to have been grave miscalculations could liave been avoided; and whether the machinery of tho Government was the most effective means of carrying on tlie war. Tho country was groping in the dark on these questions. They hud had a terrible revelation in. tho absence of an adequate supply of munitions, which showed that the Cabinet machine was utterly incapable of carrying on the war. It was impossible to understand why, at tho very moment the shortage of munitions was discovered, Cabinet took oil the expedition to tho Dardanelles, which hung round their necks like a millstone throughout the 6ummer. The Government was not justified in entering the Dardanelles at a cost of one hundred thousand casualties, and sufferings baffling description, unless its naval and military advisers could have given assurances of a successful conclusion to that campaign. There liad never been such, a story of miscalculations. Ho considered that the failure at Suvln, Bay was tho most disastrous and most vital of the whole war. Under the Cabinet system the Government was unable to make up its mind whether wo ought, or wero able, to proceed with those operations, or boldly withdraw and savo suffering and losses which went on with absolutely no hope of any result. We wanted tho best military staff we could get, and so far as ho could see when ho was in the Cabinet, there wa6 no staff at all. He did net think the Prime Minister's plan would be a great improvement. The whole question was one of concentration and responsibility. A small number of competent men should sit daily, with the best expert advisers, working out problems as they arose. The gravest instance of how Cabinet worked could bo found iu the Balkan situation. The Prime Minister had just said that the Govemment had niado np its mind, in conjunction with our Allies, to carry out our pledgo to Serbia, Ho (the speaker) wished that decision had been made weelcs ago. Valuable time was lost, and when he learned that this pledge was 110 longer part of the Government's policy, and that there were no plans for carrying it out-, he severed his connection with the Cabinet. Resignation Justified. _ Sir Edward Carson then read his letter of October 12, justifying his resignation, and pointing out that it was impossible for him to support the conclusion that tho War Council had reached the previous day. He wrote: "In view of Sir Edward Grey's declaration of September 28, 1 am unable to understand how England could abandon Serbia to her fate, without national dishonour. _ Even if wo are not bound, such a course would ho one of despair, and an admission of failure." 'Die ietter pointed out the probable effects of such a course on tho other Balkan States, and urged the Government to proceed vigorously with the concentration or troops in Salonika, and use its naval power where it was possible to demonstrate it. "Wo had resolved to preserve Serbia for the Serbians, as wft had undertaken to restore Belgium to tho Belgians, and enormous efforts could havo been made to compel Greece to fulfil her treaty obligations. The Allies sent troops to Salonika on Greece's invitation, and wo will lie rendered ridiculous in the eyes of tho Powers if wo aro compelled to withdraw." The letter continued: "King Constantiue's party is afraid of tho Central Powers. We ought to make Greece afraid of us. Our naval supremacy enables us to do this. I would not hesitate to inform Greece that unless she is prepared to continue her policy of joining tho Allies to defend Serbia we will .break off our relations with her." Sir Edward Carson concluded: "I do not helieve, once Germany is given access to the lines of communication, that it willbe possible to. maintain our forces in Gallipoli." He did not car? a straw what men carried on the war, so long as they used every possible effort to realise tho victory for which we all wero looking.

Irish Leader's views. Mr. John Redmond (Leader of the Irish Nationalist Party) said that Mr. Asquith's proposal in reference to the Cabinet. ivould silence the "wreckers" for the time being. He was against imposing compulsion, and unless the country was practically unanimous for it, it would be rolloy and a crime. The voluntary system had not had fair play in Ireland. Hitherto the Government and the War Office had given neither assistance nor sympathy, yet, despite this discouragement, between three and four hundred thousand Irishmen, were in the Army, including 115,000 in Britain, and Irishmen in tho Canadian, Australian, and Neiv Zealand Forces. Mr. G. N. Barnes (Labour) did not take any objection to Mr. Asquitb's statement on the subject of compulsion. The safety of the State must bo the supreme consideration, and if it became absolutely necessary to bring in compulsion for young unmarried men, who had not yet realised their duty, ho supposed it would be justifiable, but the time had not yot come. A "Wait-and-see" Policy. Lord Charlos Beresford did not think that Mr. Asquith's speech would relievo the nation's anxiety. Tho Government now knew we would never got through the Dardanelles. It was altogether wrong for Lord Kitchener to conduct the war while a member of the Cabinet. ' Mr. Asquith's cynical and callous doctrinc of "wait aud see" was absolutely fatal to our success in the war. Hitherto we had had 110 proper plan of campaign. Tho naval authorities had never been consulted with regard to the Dardanelles operations, but were simply told to do it. A large army ought to havo been sent to Serbia m the first instance, instead of embarking on a bliud gambling risk on Gallipoli. Sir T. F. AVhittakor doplored Sir Edward Carson's speech, would havo a disastrous effcct, in tho colonies and with our Allies. It looked as if Sir Edward Carson had taken to moonlighting.