OUR GALLIPOLI ADVENTURE

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2605, 29 October 1915, Page 5

OUR GALLIPOLI ADVENTURE

| REVIEWED BY MR ASHMEAD BARTLETT A DISMAL STORY ALL-ROUND FAILURE ASSERTED Br Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright (ltec. October 28, 8 p.m.) London, October 27. An audience of 2500 people was present at the Queen's Hall to hear Mr. Aslimead Bartlett's lecture on the Dardanelles. Mr. Bartlott emphasised the necessity for saying nothing which would be helpful to the enemy. Whatever criticism wo might indulge in regarding after events, we must- admit that the scheme was a great conception. . The importance of opening up a passage to Russia's Black Sea ports was obvious to everyone. Unfortunately Britain entered the expedition witliout a real knowledge of the Turkish strc-Dgth. We thought the Turks were on their last lags, and believed thai the "Sick Man of Europe" was sicker than ever. We had also been led-astray by reports of groat Russian victories in the Caucasus. Though the Russians smashed .the Turkish army, they were unable to follow up the victory. Mr. Bart-lett estimated that there were at least SOO,OOO Turks under arms. This was a big number for Britain to tackle, in view of her commitments elsewhere. Mr. Bartlett proceeded to detail the Australian and New Zealand landing, with tho aid of large maps. Tho Naval Operations, Referring «to the naval operations, the lccturer snid that it was quite possible to justify the use of the largo surplus pre-Dreadnought fleet in an attempt to force the Dardanelles. "Unfortunately there has been little co-or-dination between the military and naval operations, not only in the Dardanelles, but throughout the war. After the outer forts were demolished on February 25, the graver problem of t.he Narrows arose. Here, direct naval gunfire was of little use against guns behind earthworks. Nevertheless, 14-inch Krupps and coast batteries would not have stopped the fleet in the narrowest passage—which is 1400 yards. Three lines of mines in the West Narrows made tho task impossible, despite tho heroism of the trawlers and minesweepers.

The attack which followed a council of war on March 18 was the most htnarkablo sea-fight since Trafalgar. After the naval battle Mr. Bartlett dined with several of tho .officials at tho Turkish Embassy in Rome. They showed him reports from Constantinople, disclosing the fact that the Turks ivore extremely frightened at the fear,ful noise of the bombardment, but they firmly believed that a ■ Divine Providence .was protecting them, since there had practically been no damage, only twenty-eight- being killed and forty wounded, while two guns wore destroyed. Mr. Bartlett told Admiral De Roebeck ibis, and tho Admiral said: "I am surprised—l thought I only destroyed 0110 gun." Mr. Bartlett added: "The diplomatists have let us down badly in the Near East." Landing Force Too Small. After tho Turks had been given this warning—on February 19—we undertook the landing in April with far too small a force, which, consisted of the 29t'li Division, the Naval Division, an Australian Division, and two-thirds of a divisian of mixed Australians and New Zealanders. These started a desperate attack on the whole of the Turkish Empire, and tho history •• of the world contains no more remarkable episode than the way they got ashore and held their own tho first day. They had the most gallant troops, but lacked the preliminary and other organisation which other nations consider essential. The landing enabled the magnificent body of Australians and New Zealanders to write one of the greatest pages in history. "I havo never," said Mr. Bartlett, "seen such determination in any body of men. The Australians and New Zealanders were delighted to be entrusted with such a colossal task.

"After their initial success they pressed inland, but at the end of tho day wo heard that things were not going well, and the Australians and Now Zealanders were likely to be driven back to the beach. The crisis was referred to Sir lan Hamilton, and no more difficult problem was ever placed before a commander, ; but lie bolcllv put his foot down and told the Australians and New Zealanders to hold on. With great cheers they resisted every attack during tho night, and were finally able to thoroughly establish themselves.'' As to the popular query: Why did not the Allies persevere with the attack on the Asiatic side? Tho fact was that we hardly had enough troops to hold Cape Holies. It was essential to bring back the French for extending our lines. Another possibility was a landing at Bnlair, but though the naval demonstration revealed no Turks, wo landed no troops. Cape Helles was selected because the landing could easily be covered by the fire of the battleships. The Landing at Anzac Unwise. Mr. Bartlett considers that the landing at Anzac was unwise, as our hands wero _ full at Oapo Eelles withstanding Turkish counter-attacks. If the Australians and Now Zealanders had been' put ashore at Cape Helles tliero would have been enough men to eaDture Achi Bnba—not a decisive event, but a useful achievement, in view of future operations. The task of the Australians and New Zealanders was to push on to Maidos, capturing'the Nan-ows, but tho scheme failed. A new situation arose after the failure of the May attacks, and new plans should have been introduced at this juncture. It was quite evident that tho Turks wore not feeble, and were not. going to surrender the Dardanelles. British divisions continued j to arrive, and were used in various l local attacks to little purpose. A false | optimism prevailed at this time. Everywhere people seemed to think it an accident that the Turks had held out so long. In reality they were becoming more skilful and more tenacious daily. Their positions on Achi Buba and Auzac were stronger than at Plevna. The Suvla Failure. "No regulars were landed_ at Suvla. Trained to fight in any climate, tie attackers deserve all honour and consideration, but they had been trained to old-fashioned skirmishing warfare. We require for Gallipoli men trained in modern trench warfare, and when unable to see their officers are required t.) work individually. They failed in their objective in capturing tho Anafarta Heights. The British nation is one of tho thirstiest in the world, and it was impossiblo to supply the Suvla troops with water, particularly as the Turkish corpses had fouled tho wells. The whole operation at Suvla WR6 far too difficult. In the face of «»odera rifls-fire. tie Australians wdJL

New Zealanders at Anzac put up a remarkable fight, and it is a great tragedy that tlio.y did not succeed. They lioped that if they took tho position' they would get to _ Constantinople, but it is useless to hide tho fact that wo wo have had a very bad reverse. When tho Bulgarian attaches found that wo had failed tlioy reported that they thought that the other side would win. Now that tho Bulgarians and the Turks have joined up with the Austro-Germans coming south, it is too much to hope that wc will reach Constantinople. I don't think we can. advance any further than tho Dardanelles." Tho operations in Gallipoli wero severely handicapped by the difficulty of getting a concentrated artillery- fire upon the trenchcs. Tho commanders in France know tho country; tho commanders on Gallipoli didn't. The British Cabinet in July dccidcd to send out reinforcements to secure decisive results. It would have been far bettor to have used these troops to force Bulgaria to join our sido. Tho Bulbars could liavo got astrido' the Bulair Isthmus and with our attacks on the coast by our submarines in the Sea of Marmora we could easily have cut off the Turks in Gallipoli. Tho Bulgarians wore sympathetic with Russia then, and to the last did not desire to fight against the Allies.

Our Pledge to Serbia. "Our pledge to help Serbia was made with all honourable intentions, and it is deplorable that we are unablo to redeem • it. Serbia must not go under, or make terms. It will be useless for tho Allies to pour/ troops into Salonika. The difficulties aro enormous—mountainous country, a railway, but no roads. It is equally impossible to attack Bulgaria. Only threo or four weeks remain in which a campaign will be possible. Our mistake was in not going to Macedonia long ago, to occupy the Vardar line, which is one of tho best defensive positions in tho world. lam not pessimistic. We are bound to win the war, but we are going tho wrong way about it. Our enemies aro now' able to send men to any part of the Near East in threo or four days—wo tako threo or four weeks. Our troops arrive in the worst condition. When wo direct our forces in the right channel tho real end will begin. "The diplomatio situation wanted proper stage management. Tho diplomats needed plenty of money to spend, and as this was lacking Serbia was sacrificed. In view of Bulgaria's indecision our best course would have been to land north of Bulair. The difficulty was the length of the communications, which would have 'been thirty miles if Enos had been chosen as the base. If wo had landed at Bulair alone, sea communication would have been equally lengthy, though the Navy undertook to land the troops anywhere. Even if tho attacks from Anzac had succeeded, Mr. Bartlett felt convinced that this would not have meant getting to, Constantinople, as tho Turks'had fortified the channel beyond the Narrows at. the entrance to the So ° if Femora. Even if a large part of- tho Navy had reached ConstantinoDle, it was doubtful if the Turks would have surrendered. "I have never wavered in my opinion that tne wero attempted had not the smallest chance of success." Mr. Bartlett declared: _ "What our submarines have achieved in the Sea of Marmora has been so marvellous that when the complete tale is told it will almost atone for our other mistakes on the Peninsula." MR. ASHMEAD BARTLETT TO-VISIT NEW ZEALAND. By Telegraph—Press Apfinrlation—Oonyriehl London, October 27. Mr. Ashmead Bartlett is arranging a Iccture tour of America, Australia, and Now Zealand..