PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2598, 21 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

_« . It has been said of this war by an American wit that the fiercest fighting has not been on ths battlefields, but between non-combatants. Rcacl as it was intended to be read the gibe has point, and it has never had move than at the. present moment, when acute political discord in Great Britain threatens to militate against that whole-hearted concentration of effort which is the first essential to efficient- prosecution of the war. It cannot indeed be _ ignored that the political dissensions which exist in Great Britain and Allied countries have already exerted a hampering and harmful influence upon the strategy and warlike operations of the Entente. Ample proof of the fact is to be found in the critical and unsatisfactory state of affairs in tha Balkans. There is much to be said in favour of the view that the Austro-German menace in this region demanded a smashing counter-stroke, but admitting for the sake of argument that the Entente had the choice of action or abstention from action in the Balkans, there is still to be noted a depressing absence of any decided manifestation of purpose. To dato tho policy of the Entente in the Balkans has been one of tinkering half-measures', and half-measures arc nt> more effective in war than in less impprtant undertaking. A German _ newspaper is quoted to-day as stating _ that the whole strategic situation in the Balkans anticipated the Entente decision. ' • s * » This is undoubtedly true, and oven now it is far from certain, to say the least, .that the several Entente Powers have reached a firm and concerted decision where this vitally important . campaign is'concerned. The hope of a recovery of position and prestige in the Balkans rests .upon the possibility that the Entente may abandon hesitation and halfmeasures for 'firm and decided, albeit somewhat belated action. This hope, thanks very largely to the magnificent stand made by the Serbs, has not entirely disappeared, but it is not made brighter by the fact that a political and Cabinet crisis of serious dimensions exists in Great Britain. In France the position is apparently more satisfactory, but until concord and agreement are reached in tho British Cabinet, it seems hopeless to expect really resolute and determined action in the Near East. « - * » The assurance 'of France's unchanged policy given by tho. Prime Minister of that country to Sin Edward Ghev, presumably implies amongst other tilings that France docs not intend to relax her efforts: at l:ho Darclanalles and in the Balkan Peninsula-. Sir Enw.utD Grey's reply, promising continued and stosflfasC wj-uiwiUott >vltb Fvnhtc, carries )«B wejaM &o far as fatast

lampaigns fire concerned than if igroement existed, in t-lw .British Cabinet on the questions of military io]icy involved. TIk 1 fact must be. laced moan time that a party in England, no doubt represented in tho Jabinet, is opposed to any consideriblc enterprise in the Balkans, and idvocatcs the abandonment of the Dardanelles campaign. Probably ;here is little prospect of this section ;ainir.g the upper hand, but that uicii an extreme position should bo ;aken even by a minority indicates ; division of counsels which can only jo regarded as most disquieting in ill emergency demanding instant and I'jgovous action. /Die real danger is that a compromise may be struck jet-ween action on tho scale which the occasion demands and the opposite policy, which would give the Austro-Gcrmans a clear run in the Balkans. * * » * The danger of a half-hearted policy being adopted in the Near East is increased by the admitted necessity of pouring the greatest possible strength into the main theatres, but such a policy is nevertheless as seriously open to objection as that of completely withdrawing the Entente forces. Adopting the latter course and concentrating uudividedly upon tho war in main theatres would mean abandonment of the hope of passing a free supply of munitions into Russia before the war has entered a final and decisive phase. If the Entente Powers decide upon a defensive campaign in Serbia, and a- holding campaign at the Dardanelles, this hope will equally be abandoned, but in addition a considerable number of Entailt troops will bs absorbed in operations, holding out no prospect of early advantage. The choice seems to lie _ between throwing 'such an army into the Balkans as would have a prospect of decisively defeating the enemy and opening free communications with Russia or bringing a smaller force to bear which cannot be expected to do either one or the other This being the position, the maintenance of a very considerable Entente force in the Near East appears inevitable, and the only way to secure a profitable return for the outlay of strength involved is to strike with decision for tho mastery of ike Balkans, .the conqucst of. Turkey, and an open road into Russia. * . * * » Taking the- standing and reputation of the officer appointed to succeed Sir lan Hamilton as a guide it would appear that it is intended to prosecute the campaign against the Turks with, unsparing vigour. Sir Charles Monro is one of the Generals who have won rapid promotion since the war began. Particulars of his service given to-day show that he went to France in command of a Territorial division, but commanded a Regular division in the world-famous retreat from Mons to the Marne. A T o better test of leadership was ever applied than in_ the continuous battle the British fought in their_ retreat against enormously superior enemy forces, and under those conditions Sir Charles Monro so distinguishedhimself that he was later given command of an army corps. He thus rose very rapidly from a comparatively unimportant command to one of high importance in critical days when tho Allied armies were fighting for life against the initial momentum of tho German Invasion. Of such a it is easy to believe that bo is richly endowed with lead'srlike qualities, and bis appointment to the Dardanelles holds out an unmistakcable_ promise ot vigour and enterprise in the conduct of the campaign. No definite reason has' yet' beeii assigned for Sir lan Hamilton's' recall, and comments by the London newspapers indicate that the event is still more or less a subject of speculation, but the terms 'in which General Monro is eulogised, and other references, equally indicate that be is expcctea to hamlle d'n exceedingly difficult military enterprise in a fashion to which his predecessor has not proved equal. * » * » It is now claimed in a German communique that the Bulgarians have cut the Belgrade-Salonika railway by capturing Vrania, a place 'west of the line, and fifty miles south of Nish. Allied reports in hand neither deny nor confirm the report. The severing of the Serbian main line of communication would, of course, be a very serious matter, and would be likely .to exert a material influence upon the whole campaign, but even by their own reports the enemy are not yet shown to have achieved any decisive advan-. tage. They claim further headway south of the Danube, but there is no mention of their reaching tbe Timok' Valley, on the north-western frontier of 'Bulgaria, as was re. ported yesterday in a Rumanian report. The Allies in Southern Macedonia have driven the Bulgarians still further back from their frontier. * » * » » Unless it is true that the Bulgars have cut the main railway at Vrania, current news _ discloses no .decisive development in tho campaign. Campaign events apart, there are a number of reports, of no particular authority, whioh aver that Britain and France are sending large reinforcements to tho Balkans . and suggest that Greere may be on the eve of taking action with the Entente. The only reference, at time of writing, to Russia's part in the Balkans is a report that she is sending a large contingent, to Macedonia. As she has no way of getting there except through Rumania, Bulgaria, or' Turkey, the project does not seem feasible.. * * # * According to one German report Marshal von Hindenburg's forces in the Baltic Provinces have at one point so far penetrated the Russian defence as to reaoh the bank of the Dwina. The Russians report continued heavy fighting in this region, but admit no reverse. As the line the Russians have hold for weeks is in places quite close to the river the success alleged _ by the Germans is no.t necessarily important, even 'f it has been won. In the south the Russians are still pressing the _ attack and report to-day further inroads upon the enemy positions and captures of prisoners. • > * * * A very- encouraging account is given in one message of the development of Russian ammunition supplies. The local output, it is stated, has been more than trebled in four months, and orders have been given to the southern armies not- to spare ammunition. It is nofc_ impossible that Russian progress in Sou!;n-:rn Russia and Galicia may yet operate as a determining factor 111 inducing Rumania to enter the war. T.iis, ' apart tbe increase in the production ! of munitions within the boundar- ! ios of Russia, is doubly important in view of the possibility that t.ic ' Dardanelles may not be opened foi I (Hiinr (.line la win?- By thi>; >im< II Russia, must bs m receipt of very

largo quantities of munitions from Japan and America, but .supplies from fcliuso and other outside sources will be cut otf during the wial.er, wlien both Archangel and Vhdivjstock are frozen in.