PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2509, 9 July 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

~6 A message from Athens dealing with the presence of German submarines in the Aegean Sea is plau-. siblo .enough to awaken a feeling of uneasiness in the minds of those who have followed the past developments of the Dardanelles campaign. The presence of submarines in the Aegean is no new thing, as the recent destruction of two British battleships bears' witness,' but the impression' has been conveyed, rightly or wrongly, that both the submarine which sank these, ships and its consorts were being well looked after by the destroyers and hydroplanes of the Allied Fleet, or were being held in reserve to supplemcht the existing defences of the Dardanelles. Mention has been made in more than one message of submarines lying at the Golden Horn. The exploits of British submarines in the Sea of "Marmora have demonstrated that the passage of the jstrait in .face of hostile force' is not an impossibility, but the loss of two British-submarines within a brief period shows that it is extremely hazardous. , It may be supposed that in the short scction of the strait in their possession the Allies have taken all possible, precautions to prevent the-passage of hostile submarines, and on this account,' together with the fact that torpedoes and other submarine supplies are not likely to be very plentiful at Constantinople, ancl that the Allied warships have painstakingly sooured the Aegean coast outside the' strait for submarine depots, ; and destroyed them-when found, it seems reasonable enough to ; suppose that any German submarines at the Dardanelles are likely to operate cautiously and conserve their supplies until the attempt to force the Narrows is made, c These considerations are not completely disposed of by an unofficial report of f no particular authority, but it is not to be denied the report is to an extont disconcerting;

As it stands, the report runs decidedly ahead of facts. ■ It states that the Anglo-Fre'noh Admiralties are disturbed regarding the news that seven big German submarines have appeared in the Aegean Sea,, compelling tho withdrawal of the big ships and ihvolving_ a catastrophe to the Army. It is true that the big warships have been withdrawn for th(; time being, and that only the smaller naval craft are at present co-operating with the land forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula, but tho'Army is not yet at the point of catastrophe. The very latest official dispatches, at_timc of writing, show, that it is assailing the enemy with a vigour which affords suffi.eicnt proof "that its supply lines by sea have not yet bden. materially affected. • The submarine menace may bo imminent, but it has materialised as yet only in' the destruction of the battleships Majestic and Triumph some weeks ago ; lt is to be said also that the position as between the submarines.and the forces to which they arc opposed is by no means so one-sided as tho Greek message suggests.,lt wdhld bo foolish to attempt to minimise the offensive power of the submarine in general, but the possibilities of a submarine campaign in connection with the defence of the Dardanelles must be measured by what is known of local circumstances in the sea-areas concerned. Some of these circumstances have, been already touchod upon. K must bo admitted at onco that anything that could bo accomplished by submarines playing a morcly defensive part in the upper readies of the Dardanelles would be entirely surpassed if they could contrive to conduct a systematic campaign against warships and transports in tho Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Transports - passing from Britain to France have beeil immune from submarine attack so far; no doubt largely because they have made the short passage as a rule at night. Ample liaval protection and other factors must also bo taken into account, but tho practicability of I night-voyaging is probably tho &ost

important of all. No such immunity would, of course, extend to transports and supply snips in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, which from the base in Alexandria to the Gallipoli Peninsula is a distance of over 600 miles—more than two full days' journey for the average transport. • • • * *■*'«. The peril to which transports and supply ships would bo exposed from submarines ranging in the Aegean is so obvious that it need not be enlarged upon. On the other hand tho fact that a submarine campaign against these ships has not yet been inaugurated _is the best possible proof that it is not an absolutely simple matter to set it on foot. The time when submarines could have operated with the most deadly effect at the Dardanelles would have: been during the day or two immediately following the landing. It was then vital to follow up the troops first landed with reinforcements, artillery, and supplies of all kinds. In those critical days the transports and supply ships must have presented an easy target for submarine attack. Even destroyers could probably not have protected them in the then l existing circumstances. Tho chanoo was not taken, presumably because the submarines were riot there to take it. ' There is only tho as yet unconfirmed Greek report to show that' as many as seven German submarines are operating in the Aegean even now. The presence of one enemy submarine at the Dardanelles would be enough to warrant the withdrawal of the Digger' Allied warships until the time comes for them to renew the attack upon the forts, not necessarily because risk is overwhelming, but because 1 it _is wiser to avoid it until some definite end is to be gained by facing it. * * * - •

Even if the German flotilla has been, raised to. the strength indicated it v has yet to be shown that it can paralyse the Dardanelles campaign. Like other- war-craft, the submarine is -an enemy to bo fought, and it -has its limitations. In the first place it is very doubtful whether Turkey can either keep a flotilla of submarines supplied with torpedoes and some other essentials from her own resources, or obtain these supplies from Germany or Austria. It was stated recently that no supplies had reached Turkey through the Balkans for a month past,, and unless the attitude of Rumania has been misinterpreted this state of affairs is likely to continue. The connivance of both Rumania and Bulgaria is essential to supplies reaching Turkey by laud, for on the western side of the Balkan Peninsula Servia opposes a barrier which now extends to the Adriatic. Apart from the supply of torpedoes, it is to bo remembered that -Turkey herself possesses no submarines, so that docking and repairing facilities for the German craft-rand all submarines require a good deal of. attention in this way—are likely to be lacking. It is conceivably, though not very likely, that the submarines might operate from Austrian bases in the Adriatic, but if they .did they would spend much of their time travelling' to and fro. . There is a voyage of about a thousand miles either way to be .negotiated._' 'Whatever .the state of' supplies in Turkey im'ay' be any submarine depots established on the outer coasts are liable to be raided by Allied warships. The only remaining alternative to the submarines is' to work from a base inside the Dardanelles, and take, each time they need supplies, the risk of passing'-the. strait —a risk that is no doubt by this time 'considerable. For direct action against the submarines the Allies 'will have whatever light cruisers and destroyers and other naval small craft they can muster, and hydroplanes. These, last would perform extremely useful service both in locating and attacking the submarines and in spying out their bases. Tjhe Allies, in one way and another, are in a position- to conduct a very vigorous submarine hunt, though whether they could effectually protect the whole of their transports arid supply ships is another matter. The suggestion that the Dardanelles campaign is threatened with catastrophe need not be seriously considered, but there is a real danger that submarines may succeed in hampering and delaying the campaign which otherwise seems to be in a fair way to be carried with reasonable speed to a successful conclusion. The intervention of the Balkan States is now more than ever desirable, and no doubt every effort will be made to enlist their aid. • A land march on Constantinople from the north would solve many problems, of which the submarine problem—if it develops as threatened—iriay be one of the most difficult.

One point cleared up. in Sir lan Hamilton's dispatch covering tho early operations of the Dardanelles campaign is the failure to occupy the Isthmus of Bulair, , : the narrow neck of land which forms the connecting link between. the Gallipoli' Peninsula and the mainland of European Turkey. A landing here would have cut the land communications of tho Turkish armies in Gallipoli with their main, base at Constantinople, and much, surprise has been. expressed at the' fact that the landing , was not attempted. The simple explanation is that, it was impossible to land on this section of tho coast, or at any spot north of that on which tho Australians and New Zealanders landed, because the cliffs were too high and steep.

At the moment there is an aggravating absence of details about the great British aerial raid upon "a German port, supposedly Wilhelmshaven," mentioned in a Berlin message transmitted by way ' of New York. From the facts supplied it appears that the raid was on tho lines of that made on Cuxhaven some time ago—cruisers and destroyers approaohing the German coast and sending up a flight of seaplanes. The tenor of the enemy report indicates that the raid, or reconnaissance, was at least successful to' the extent that the invading force gathered some useful information and got away undamaged. It is not admitted that any damage was done by aerial bombs, but it _ may be taken for granted that British seaplanes did not fly over Gorman naval / depots without doing some damage. Very probably, however, the affair was a. reconnaissance rather than a raid, for only a very numerous squadron' of aeroplanes could inflict material damage upon a strongly-fortified naval base. It is not at all likely that the expedition is intended to precede a naval attack on any of the German coastal ports for the short German coastline on the North Sea is fortified like no other in the world. Apart from any prospect of a naval attack, however,, there Eire many excellent the British Adniralj®

should be anxious to know what is going on behind the German coastal fortifications. * * * *

One reason was . possibly touched upon by Lord Selborne (British Minister of Agriculture) in reference to submarines which he made in speaking upon a Bill in which the Government is taking power to conserve live stock supplies. Emphasising the need of husbanding food supplies, Lord Selborne said enough to show that the submarine campaign is very seriously regarded by the Imperial Government, as indeed it needs must be.. It is very probable, as Lord Selborne suggested, that the German Admiralty is putting the whole of its shipbuilding strength into tho building of submarines in the hope of striking a. mortal blow at the British carrying trade. Practically the only way in which Britain can hinder these activities is by air attack, and whether or not the raid now reported had any reference to the submarine campaign it is likely that aerial raids upon the most comprehensive scale possible will be directed against the submarine construction yards as time goes on. Enterprises of this character have met with somo success on the Belgian coast, but stronger air-forcea than have been employed in the past will be required to operate with effect against submarine yards in the German naval, ports.

Asphyxiating gas, as it is employed by the Germans, seems already to have lost some of its terrors, but it is still in constant use in the main theatres of war, and its use by- the Turk's at the. Dardanelles has been predicted. The question of devising the most efficient form of respirator is thus of very great practical importance, and deserves all possible attention. One difficulty experienced with the respirators in use is that of keeping them wet, as they must be to serve* their intended purpose, for there are occasions when 1 water is in very short supply on the fighting lines.. A correspondent has suggested a simple way out of the difficulty. Ho states that if respirators were moistened with vinegar and carried in a small silk case, they would remain moist for days, and in addition the vinegar would' to some extent neutralise tho effect of the noxious gases. In practice soldiers could moisten the' respirators before leaving their base, knowing that they would remain fit for service all the time they were in the firingline. As a precaution the troops at the Dardanelles have- been supplied with respirators, and it might bo worth while to supplement these in the mannor suggested.