PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2452, 4 May 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

An interesting'development at the Dardanelles is tlie withdrawal of the French troops from Kum Kale, on tho Asiatic side of the entrance to the strait, and their departure for a secret destination. Emphasis has frequently been laid on the fact that, effective occupation- of the Gallipoli Peninsula is practically equivalent to the mastery of the Dardanelles. On this account it was assumed in the first instance that the land attack would probably be confined to an invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The landing of the French at Kum Kale seemed to upset this view', but it now transpires thafc the landing of the French was merely a feint which served its purpose in engaging a section of the Turkish forces which otherwise would havo been available in resisting the British landing at Sedd-el-Bahr, and that of tke New Zealanders and Australians on the. outer coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula.. The departure of the French from Kum' Kalo is not as yet officially confirmed, but there is no reason to doubt that it has occurred. A campaign on the Asiatic shore presents obvious disadvantages. Working along the strait an invading, force, being exposed at all times to a flank attack, would bo very greatly hampered in attempting t-o reduce the forts on the Asiatic side. These forts in any case oan be more conveniently destroyed by artillery bombardment once the Gallipoli Peninsula has been mastered, becaitso it offers many positions commanding-the low-lying Asiatic shore.

* # * * In its broad topographical features the Gallipoli Peninsula is-not unlike the hill country about Wellington. As in this neighbourhood the higher hills reach an altitude of about a thousand feet, and the peninsula as a whole presents an almost continuous succession of hills and valleys. One of the widest valleys, running aoross the peninsula, debouches on the outer coast immediately south of tho point at which the Australians and New Zea-landers landed. The other/end of the valley reaches the strait apposite Nagura, at the head of the Narrows. The Colonial Forces are apparently working their way inland from the coast, up the slopes of a long rise on-the northern side of the valley. Their aim will, of oourse, be to gain positions which will at once enable them to command the valley anct ward off attacks by Turkish forces advancing through the hills from the north and ea-st. When 'this'has been accomplished and the colonials have effected a junction with the British ' troops advancing from the south, possession -of the valley across the peninsula should greatly simplify tho problem of transporting the heavier artillery which will bu utilised in the operations against the_ forts along the Narrows, including Nagura and others on the Asiatic side.

A striking contribution to the war news to-day is a Greek message stating that a desperate bitttle has been fought at the Dardanelles in the vicinity'of Maidos, in which a Turkish battalion was captured. _ If this is reliable, as several unofficial messages regarding tjie Dardanelles campaign have proved_ to be of late, it means that the Allies have made extremely rapid progress. Maidos is on the European .side of the strait, almost directly opposite the point at which the New Zealanders and Australians landed on the coast. A battle near Maidos would seem to implv that the Colonial Forces, aided by the covering bombardment of the fleet, had already advanced a considerable distance across the peninsula to the inner coast. In this locality, ' however, the_ Gallipoli Peninsula is only five miles wide.

The shelling of Dunkirk turns out, as was suggested yesterday, to have been merely an exhibition of longrange gunnery without material effect or bearing upon the campaign in Flanders, (something has yet to be . learned about the weapon, or weapons, that the Germans employed, but there is an air of probability about a story that a big naval gun has been mounted in the German lines behind .Dixmude, in Northern Flanders, and that it bombarded Dunkirk from a distance of some 20 odd miles. A more futile proceeding could not well be imagined, for a gun of this character must in the nature of things be practically useless in field fighting, 4 where highangle fire at comparatively moderate ranges is chiefly demanded of the more powerful artillery. Apart from the loss of lives it is probable that the damage done at Dunkirk cost a great deal more to, inflict than it will cost to repair. It has been stated that each charge of the 16-inch howitzer, used- by the Germans against Belgian and French forts in the early days of the- war, cost £105O! The more powerful charge of a gun capable of hurling a shell 23 miles would cost considerably more. Making a reasonable allowance for the cost of manufacturing the gun and transporting and placing it in position, "the. outlay incidental to the brief and comparatively ineffective bombardment of Dunkirk must have been enormous.

Another, disadvantage which attends bringing naval or fortress artillery into the field appears in the reports that ' Allied airmen have alreadv bombarded the German gun or guns (it is not yet certain that only one of the mammoth weapons was employed). Half the art of effective artillery bombardment in this war has been shown to consist in tiie concealment 'of the guns, and in a continual changc'of position to which handiness and mobility are essential. In these qualities a gun like that which bombarded Dunkirk is, of course, totally lacking. It is intended to be placed in 6ne position and to remain there, and its removal must necessarily be & slow and cumbrous process, easily observed and interfered with by airc,tn.it, On the const. of Flandersi ivhei'« tte. liave converted ports and

bathing resorts into sea fortresses, the Germans no doubt have ample use for the heaviest artillery, to cope with the naval bombardment to which these positions are periodically subjected, but the use of mammoth guns on the inland field linos is. simply an extravagant and costly folly.

* if II * There is a disappointing abscncc of news concerning the German foray into the Russian Baltic Provinces, and for the time being no addition is made to the Petrogmd-statement that it is void of strategic importance. This is probably perfectly correct. The general aim of German strategy throughout the war has been to obtain a respite on one front in order to strike a- crushing blow on t-iie other. The broad position at the moment is that Germany is called upon to meet heavy pressure upon an increasing length, of her existing fighting fronts. That sho would voluntarily seek to increase the area of pressure is most unlikely.

A late official message from Petrograd mentions without coir.mcnt tho fact that the Germans occupy the Shavli district (60 miles north from East Prussia on the Libau-Dvinsk railway), that German patrols have appeared near Libau and that German torpedoei's have visited the Gulf of Riga. This more or less confirms German claims that they have advanced north from East' Prussia • on ail extended front. Whether they have done so in strong force and with intent to press a serious invasion is another matter.

Inaotion is apparently still the rule on tho Yscr front in Flanders, where such severe Conflict was recently ' waged, and to-day's reports go- li.ttle beyond the statement that 'German attacks were beaten off northward of Ypres. Satisfactory but unsiflsatiortal reports are given concerning other sections of the' Western line. Mention of a French bombardment'of tho'southern' front of tho outer defences of Metz is at first glance arresting, but it probably only means that some fairly long-range firing has been done with' guns of much more modest calibre than the monster weapon used by the Germans in shelling Dunkirk. In their position on the Lorraine border, north of Pont-a-Mousson, the French are about twelve- miles dist-ant from the oute;' circlo forts of' Metz, but probably, as in the case of Verdun and other- fortresses, the Metz defences have o'f late been extended considerably beyond their original perimeter.

Rumours concerning the intentions of Italy have so often proved baseless that the latest crop will probably be rcccived with <ome doubt. A llussian message to-day, however, uncovers a feature of the situation which deserves attention. Dismissing rumours of an agreement between Italy and the Entente as undoubtedly premature, it states that Italy has been reminded that if she waits to enter the war until Russia has descended into the Hungarian Plain her support will be deprived of its value. Whether or not such a warning has been issued in diplomatic form the facts 6f thc i position must, undoubtedly suggest it, and it is a justifiable deduction that unless Russia- encounters an unforeseen set-back in her main Eastern campaign Italy will be bound to come to a decision for or against war before many weeks have passed. Entering the war now or 'in the near future she would create a valuable diversion in Russia's favour. In addition she would probably encour--ago an agreement amongst the .Balkan nations, which would make further additions to the Allies of the Entente, and facilitate a speedy reckoning with Turkey. On the other hand every step taken by the Russians towards the invasion of Hungary, and by the Allies at the Dardanelles towards the subjection of Turkey) diminishes the v.ilun of Italian intervention.

Stories that the Entente Powers jure chaffering with Italy, and making her more attractive. offers than Gettiiany and Austria uro perhaps baaed only ,on imagination, hut it' is undoubtedly true that Italy, assisting to bear the buvdehs of the ■Entente,- will be in a much better position thail if she waits until the battle has been fought and won to claim a share of the benefits. As things stand Italy is leaving it to pther nations to fight her traditional enemy and late ally—Austria—and if this state of affairs_ continued to the end it would be strictly natural that Italy should be ignored in the final settlement, even where her wellgrounded claim to the Trentino is concerned. Aa regards the northern and north-eastern Adriatic there are Slav as well as Italian claims to be considered—Servia has established a claim to benefit at Austria's expense—and in this case there would, bo positive as well as negative reasons for declining to gratify Italian aspirations when the time for settlement arrives, always supposing' that Italy persists in her present policy of safe neutrality. It is not to be supposed that the Entente will bring any pressure to bear upon Italy, but oiroumstanoos in themselves, aa is pointedly indicated in the Bussian message quoted above, apply pressure of the very strongest kind. It must, therefore, still he_ regarded as likely that Italy will intervene on the side of the Entente,. for the simple and sufficient reason that her own interests dictate such a course.

The sinking of the destroyer Recruit by a German ■ submarine is one of the most disappointing of the minor .naval episodes that the war has witnessed. Though not of the newest type, the Recruit had a speed of'thirty knots an hour, ajid was armed with a twelve-pounder, quick-firer, and' a number of smaller guns. She belonged to the class of naval craft which have repeatedly and with entire success protected bigger_ ships from submarine attack, defeating and foiling 'the underwater craft by superior speed and handiness.' That a ;boat Ibf this type should succumb 'to submarine attack seems to call for explanation.

A notable prospective addition to the French Navy is announced in the launching of the super-Dreadnought Languedoc at Bordeaux. She is a heavily armoured ship, carrying twelve 13.4-inch guns in her- main batteries and a strong secondary armament of twenty-four 5.5-inch guns. Originally she was to have been completed in 1917, and her construction must have been considerably expedited. It will bo some time yet, of course, before she is ready for' sea.