THE ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2429, 7 April 1915, Page 6

THE ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES

WHAT IT MEANS . /WE CANNOT AFFORD TO FAIL" . ' When the present operations by tbo ; Allies to force the passage of ;tho Dar- ' danelles wero begun tlio "Times's".. military and naval' correspondents— both • writers of acknowledged author- ' ity—discussed the salient aspects of the enterprise in the columns of that journal. Their comments al'6. a most interesting mid lucid presentation of the problem wkioh confronts' the . Allies. , ' . "It is scarcely necessary to point out 'the great political and military consequences which will follow if tie attack is successful," says the "Times's" military correspondents "The whole situation in the Balkans will be immediately altered to our profit; Constantinople must cither surrender or be re-, duced to ashes; the trade with the 'Black" Sea will be reopened ; and while the enemy, will he struck at a very censitivo spot, the/decisions of wavering neutrals will bo immediately affected. The reasons in favour of this operation are overwhelming, provided that. . the risks and necessary preparations have been'-coolly calculated in- advance, ■ and that such naval and'military force as may be allotted to the objcot'_ ;in view can :be spared from the decisive '. theatre of war. New. Defences Probable. The defences of the Dardanelles are formidable,' and nothing is gained by denying the fact. The Straits are narrow, the channels are winding and they nre mined. A considerable current rims down the Straits, and the ground, on both sides offers excellent sites forlb'atiteries both' high and; low, and for guns giving high-angle' fire' for, the-'attsck-on ships' decks.. It is useless'to give the names of the • forts and batteries,, or to suggest thoii; present armament, because we have given ' Turkey- sis Itionthr.in which to improve the defences, and within this period, thanks to General Liman von Sanders and the large number of German officers and men with-,him, it is probable that both works and armament have been trans■formed. Our War Staff will probably Imow these facts well enough, but it Vonld only be misleading to give data' \vhioH were true before the war but • fciay no longer be true to-day. It was certainly true before the war that there . were not many reallv modern heavy ■ Rons in position, and that a part of the armament was out of date, but if we Jiope that this_ General situation has )iot been materially altered we cannot count -upon it until the 'Admiralty speak. « . The Best Way to' Attack. The best way to attack the Dardanelles is by means of a conjoint naval and-military expedition, .and a purely fchval attack can only be justified if ■the necessary and very large military ■ ifcrce cannot be spared, or if 'our "information is so good, and the ohances have been so carefully -.weighed that the success of, a naval attacK Is reasonably: probable. There' yrero certainly 200.000 Turks ,in the Constantinople 'district at the outbreak of war, and though part of these may have been sent to; the Caucasus front: it is probable that others have taken the places of those who have, left,' It—would therefore not imply a slicht military effort but-OT-VeiT:considerab]e:.one-were, we to dispatch troqns to-opeii; "the way fo v our_ ships, and .if the ships can. suc- - ceed_ without the aid of a very large ■ landing force it is all to our advantage. "Though we must view with'a certain anxiety the' risking ofsea-going ships against such a formidable position as the Dardanelles before the main bodies of the belligerent navies have met, there are several reasons . why ships may be better able now than merly to compete with coast batteries with, success. The heavy armament of most coast defences has not kept pace fl'ith ' the- increased power of modern guns mounted on capital ships,-and if . this is true, for "ue it is also true of . the Turks. It is, therefore open,to us to hope that our ships, if adequate observation can be obtained, can destroy the .enemy's exterior -batteries at the mouth of the Straits, while remaining •themselves immune, and this appears to, have been the result of the first ; Say's bombardment of the Sedil,-.Bahr, ,ind Kum Kaleh forts at the 'mouth of ,-he Dardanelles.' Observation of Fire, • "Observation' can- be' obtained by a spotting ship giving « control station, ' say 60ft. above the water line, at • a' ■range of 15,000 yards, but'.better still .will be' the. result if the seaplanes with the Allies , are fitted • with. / wireless •' plant, and ; can ■ immediately convey' to the guns the exact result of each round. . (We must suppose, that the;.'.:Navyi is fully alive to the experience of, ;the 'Army in France in this mattei-and' will profit by it.. . The; marvellous efficiency "of our ships .in recent actions, makes us hope and expect that the Turkish forts . at the.entrance to the Dardanelles will t -bo destroyed, by the cold, concentrated ■ fury of.:scientific.--gunnery, .directed by,, one;or..other* of these systems of .control. This will be the. first operation. It may take a little time, for the targets are small, the Tange long, and shooting-must be slow if no rounds are to bo thrown away. The range at-which a bombardment can take place by some of the guns with the Allied squadrons is about 18,000 yards, and without independent observation, and the spotting of every'shot, the shooting may easily be erratic. While the end-on target may I •he only some 50 square feet, that of the emplacement may bo only some 170 square feet, and it is an operation of no small difficulty to hit such ■ small marks fit such a range. "The chances are that many of the ■works further up' the Straits can - bo attacked from points npon which tlio defenders' guns do not bear. ' ],Tho best guiis arc of little use ; if- -badly ' sited, and it is part of tho duty.,of intelligence officers to discover the arc of firo of every coast battery which may have to bo attacked. The best guns are also of little avail unless rangefinding, observation, and communica- . tions are thoroughly modern, and the whole personnel of coast batteries trained to their work. These are aptitudes which are not common to Turkish troops who will probably be outclassed in scientific gunnery and in all its branches. As for the guns and mortars for high-angle firo which the Turks aro believed to possess, these are onlj of use in the middle and upper reaches of the Straits, and when the target is either stationary or moving very slowly. "Many things, such as tho wind, atmospheric conditions, the long time of flight, and variations of corrections due to different weights of charges, tend to make this fire ineffective, especially in unskilled hands, and it will probably only bo from batteries of -.this land, manned by Germans, that wo shall have much trouble. The Real Difficulties. "The destruction of tho forts at the mouth of tlio Dardanelles is only a preliminary operation on tho success of which ive can safely count. The real difficulties commence when the ships begin to thread tho ' narrow winding channel, and no longer possess the liberty of manoeuvre of the open sea. They will then be attacked from some batteries which cannot easily be mastered until they are closely approached; from concealed guns giving high angle fire, and by heavy field artillery. They will also have to deal with mines;. both*, those that are stationary 'and others.'

It is in every respect a serious operation that iis iu progress, whether, the attack, is delivered by ships, or troops, or both, and the arrangements made for prosecuting it will be watched with solicitude, since wo cannot afford to fail when wo touch upon the East." Counter-Stroke to the Blockade. "The Times's" naval correspondent observes that the bombardment of the forts at the Dardanelles is an immediate counter-stroke to the futile blockade of the British Islands and to the alloged successes of the Germans in East Prussia. The opening of • the Dardanelles and the occupation of the Chersonese means the beginning of a new phase ill,.the war which does not end with tlio arrival of the Allied Fleets off Constantinople. "Between St. Vincent and Fisher," lie says, "there have been not many sea commanders of the first class, but among them everybody would class the late Admiral of the Fleet Sir GeolfreyHornby. Those wlio havo read liis correspondence, and had his personal confidence, will know that Sir Geoffrey recognised the great strategic value of the Gallipoli Peninsula. At the time that Russia was pressing upon Constantinople in 1878, he strongly urged the authorities to- send a British force to the isthmus of Bulair. It is the:forts on the European side which dominate the straits. When those are in friendly hands, the_ passage is free, and all" obstructions in the shape of mines, etc., can be cleared away."