IS IT PRACTICABLE?

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2375, 3 February 1915, Page 7

IS IT PRACTICABLE?

GERMAN INVASION SCARE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES It may .be. freely conceded that a mere raid, a more lively version of the transient appearance of the German cruiser squadron off Yarmouth, \fi!l remain a possibility so- long as the Germans come to sea at all, writes David in. the "Manchester Guardian." The East Coast, which is difficult to approach because of the mines, and wnere the danger of interruption by the. British Fleet is greatest, is the lea6t' likely to be attacked.. But ono cannot affirm that the escape of a German squadron from the North Sea and into the Atlantic is a physical impossibility. The feat may bo achieved and may be followed by a raid of tho same class—on the west coast of Great Britain or Ireland. The French privateer Turot (or Thurot) /landed at Carrickfergus months after Hawke had beaten the main. French fleet 5 at Quiberon in November, 1759. But even tho people at the place did not care much. , No- ; body else paid any serious attention, and the dashing Frenchman was over- : taken and killed on his way back. ; Much more than this sort of thing will be required to constitute an "invasion." If we wish to learn how far the greater form of attack is, or is not, probable, the best course to follow is not to begin by assuming that the Germans have, left port and have reached our shores, and then asking more or less nervously what we should do. To approach the subject in this ,way. is to begin by assuming what ought first to be proved—namely, that it is in the power of the Germans to get there at all. • And this we can do only bv putting ourselves in their place and asking how we would set about the work if we were acting in thei* conditions.

The Conditions of Invasion. First of all, let us clearly understand what tile conditions aie. The invasion is to -be carried out before the Britisl Navy has been broken by a great defeai or succession of defeats. The' German Navy is 60 much out-classed in nnmbei and weight that it • cannot venture tc attempt to clear the road b.y seeking battle and gaining victory. Therefore, the invasion must come suddenly and undetected, else it will be intercepted and ruined. How is this to be done? Let us assume lhat the necessary transports and their armed guard have been (by the help of the Kiel Canal) concentrated in tlie Elbe and the Jahde behind the barrier of mines which protects the German North Sea coast. That is easily enough to be done. What ia to be the 6ize of the army those transports are to bring ? We cannot with sanity suppose that if we were to make the invasion we would send a force which would certainly be overwhelmed within a few days at the outside, and before it had time to march inland. Since we are about invading England from the German North Sea coast, we must allow ourselves 100,000 men, in view of the raising of the New Army in England. Suppose we collect all the best Reamers we can get, and pack our men tighter than the emigrants who go out yearly'to take the harvests of South America are packed—that is to say, about as close as human bodies can be placed and still retain the power to more. There are horees to be provided for, and guns with their carriages, and ammunition for a series of actions, and food for, say, ten days. You cannot expect to find provisions for such an army oil the beach or just near it. The majority of our best steamers —let us still continue to put ourselves in the place of the Cfennans—are either laid up in foreign porte, or taken, or cruising (if they still survive) as armed or unarmed auxiliaries to our commercedestroyers abroad. The enemy's vessels we have embargoed at the beginning of the war—seventy-four in aii 1 average some sixteen or seventeen hundred tons. n We cannot carry our 100,000 men, nor even' 75,000, if we risk the venture with that number, together with the horses and endless impedimenta of a properly equipped army, in less than 100 steamers. Remember that very large ships which could carry eight or ten thousand men tightly' packed are, tn begin with, few in number, and that they draw a great deal of water, and cannot safely approach a shallow coast and sands. . Big or not so big, when they are under way they cannot go touching one another. Thoro must bo a space of four times their length between them if thev are to avoid constant collisions. Howover you arrange them, they must cover a- space miles long and broad.

The Passage and the Landing. When they are loaded they have to come out through the passages left in jour miiio bnriior for your own use. When they are thro'.ich they have to rioss a sea on which mine-fields have boon laid by both sides. You dare not KO full speed ahead and run ri.qht, into a mine-field. If you do, your invasion «n!l bn c»'c-r hefors it begins-, You jausfc either be sure of a dear p&wWx

ov you' must dredge the mines "up as' you go. The operation, of-- bringing your Hock out through the openings in the mine-barrier cannot be a Quick one. It has to .be performed in the face of the enemy's submarines -and • other scouts. If you send your warships out to drive them away first, then that sortie will almost certainly be deteoted and reported by wireless. It will be little short of -a miracle if you are not ■seen in'time to allow the enemy's fleets j which by uhe very nature of the-case is. so strong that you cannot give it' battle with any rational .hope of success, to'intercept you. If all these difficulties are overcome,' if the convoy is brought'out and does cross the sea, the invader's work is just beginning. Infrorit of /him is the coast on which he is to land. He cannot land at all points. He cannot expect; to find a port open to him with wharves at his disposal, buoys in their places, and fairways unimpeded. He must land on the coast, and no secreet is revealed when it is pointed out that a landing cannot be made at all points of the coast. Let us assume that the passage' has been made, and that the invader has approache'd some point on the coast where there is an open beach and' sufficient depth of water to allow large ships to come fairly close. Now he has to land men, horses, guns, ammunition, and food. The actual , speed at which lie could do this would, of course, depend on the state of the weather, to begin with, and then the number of steam launches he had at command,' tho amount of practice which his men,, naval and military, had had in carrying out an operation .which cannot be performed merely by the light of nature. Men. however skilful, cannot work for ever, and when overwrought work badly. Let tho invader, do his best and he will not be able in the, most favourable circumstances to land all his men and implements in one period of twentyfour hours. What would the enemy ))e doing during that time ? It is obvious that he would be concentrating by land anH sea on the invader. Again, it would be no less than- a miracle if the assailant were not destroyed in tho vry act of attempting to land. j