WAR & WEALTH

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2375, 3 February 1915, Page 7

WAR & WEALTH

A " KOUND TABLE " ARTICLE GERMAN RESOURCES VICTORY MUST BE WON IN. THE FIELD. Much has been said and written at one time snd another about economic resources and the factor _of economic exhaustion, in their bearing on the war, but these subjects have seldom been so lucidly and comprehensively dealt with as in an article on "War and Financial Exhaustion," published in the current issue of the "Round Table." The initial position taken is that it is a matter of great importance that the British people should not sit down under the comforting idea that their opponents are likely to be forced very quickly to make peace by. financial exhaustion. ■ Experience is against such a view since countries have often been able to carry on prolonged war when their financial resources were in a wretched condition. Britain and her Allies command much greater resources of wealth than Germany and Austria and so long as command of the sea remains with the Entente, its members should easily maintain and improve the superior position which they enjoy in this respect, and also should be in much better condition ,at the end of the war to face the task of building up and developing the resources which it has depleted. As time goes on, too, the Germanic nations are bound to suffer more from economio exhaustion than their principal enemies,' but it 'is not at all likely that they will be brought to the point of defeat from this cause. They must be beaten by force of arms. This is the position taken up by the author of the "Round Table" article to which we have referred, and the case as he sets it forth is supported by a convincing array of facts and the best obtainable statistics relative to the wealth of Britain, Germany, and the other nations concerned. We quote the concluding section of the article in extenso: — It is too early to discuss what will ba the financial and economic results of the war. They must be great, and if it lasts long, they will be terrible. A year's war expenditure will not be far short of £4,000,000,000, snd so huge a destruction of wealth, so large a draft .on the world's capital cannot but react profoundly on its development during the years following. It is possible that immediately after the war there may be a short period of seeming prosperity, a small boom for I a year or two while the absolute necessities of civilisation are being replaced,, but the lack of capital on the one hand and the greatly reduced purchasing power of the world's population on the other must soon tell, and there must inevitably be then a more or less prolonged period of stagnation and depression,, while each country is build' ing up its reserves of capital. The world after the war will- be just like an engine, whose fires have been allowed to_ die down. It will be necessary to build 'hem up' and heat the boilers again, before there will be enough steam to enable the world to move again at the pace it has been doing in the last decadei On the other hand, figures of the annual production of wealth show at what a pace wealth can now be created with the help of modern machinery and modern means of transport. The country which will Tecover the quickest'after the war, will be that one whose population devote themselves with the greatest energy to replacing .what has been lost. But what is more important at this stage is not what will happen after the war, but what will happen during it. If the war is a prolonged one, financial and still more economic considerations will exert greater and greater influence. But for some months to come their influence will not be decisive ot even serious. The Allies, it is true, have in the aggregate much greater resources in wealth and population than have Germany. Austro-Hungary, and Turkey. Germany,, on the other hand, has the great advantage of concentration and absolute preparedness. Her whole aim is and must be to deal her foes rapid blows so violent and shattering in character that they will be forced to make peace, before any process of economio exhaustion has begun. In this it does not appear that she will succeed. But it may well be that the issue of the struggle will be decided in the next three or six months, and, if it is, it will have been decided not by any economic or financial considerations, but by the force of arms on sea arid land. Therefore, though our task must be to weaken Germany economically and financially in every possible way, it would be folly on our part to look to such influences to decide the war in our favour. Our business is to beat Germany in the field. If economio influences tell on our side, so much the better. But by themselves they will never enable us to impose a satis-, factory peace on our enemies. Moreover, they will tell on our side npon one conditiqai and one condition oidy. The people of the British Empire have learnt much during the last three months and will learn more still, before the war is over, as to the true source of their strength. Command of sea, now _as always, stands between the Empire and destruction. Command of sea is all that separates victory from disaster. So. long as the British Navy commands the sea, the British Empire cannot be defeated. If it loses command of the sea, the Empire cannot win. All discussion of financial, economic or other war problems must finally come down to that Bimple elementary truth, and it would be well, were it burnt into the mind of every subject of the King throughout the world. This country has won her great struggles mainly by defeating her enemies' fleets and partly bv the incidental method of destroying their oommerce. After more than one hundred years her supremacy at sea is again challenged, and, altered in many respects as the ■ problem is, its grand outlines are still the same. England has, it is true, in times of peace wisely or unwisely abandoned some weapons of sea power which she formerly wielded with effect. She cannot now, since the Declaration of Paris, touch noncontraband goods consigned to the country of her enemies, when carried in a neutral ship, nor can she do anything' to interfere with enemy exports carried in neutral ships. "Moderation in war" as Lord Fisher says, "is an imbecility," and we may deplore now this diminution of our powers, since, so far as trade is concerned, it renders the power of our Navy more defensive than offensive. Yet it does _ not affect our sea supremacy. Nothing will affect that but the defeat of the Fleet itself. If such defeat were ever to come, then Great Britain and all her Dominions would lose everything: empire, possessions, shipping and commerce. Their colonies would bo taken, _ their ooaling stations seized, their ships sunk and their commerce destroyed:- All that would be an easy task for a victorious fleet. Neither conventions nor Declarations, neither Hague Tribunals nor Laws of Nations would prevent our foes from employing every weapon to their hand for our destruction. Fortunately we have good faith that the British Fleet is more than equal to the task before it, and for this let us be thankful that wp did not listen to those misguided doctrinaires, who with .their incapacity to look facts in the face, to distinguish the real from the unreal, urpod us iti poaeon stsd out pf season to weaiea our u&afci

fatally to reduce even that small margin of insurance on which not _ a fow paltry millions, but our whole life and nationhood depend. Let us also throughout the Empire mark and learn the lessons which this war will teach Uii. While every part of the Empire is equally and vitally concerned in the command of the sea, yet the very breath of the Empire's Fleet is unity. If the Grand Fleet itself is defeated, small, weak, and distant squadrons must either uselessly keep their harbours or be sent to tho bottom. The shores and commerce of all the Dominions as well as of the British Islands will then be open to the attack of the victorious enemy. The whole Empiro is therefore equally concerned in the Navy's strength and it is vital to every part that in this and in every war there shall be present on the day of decision and at the decisive point an irresistible and united Fleet.