THE GERMAN ARMY

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2334, 16 December 1914, Page 3

THE GERMAN ARMY

STUDIOUS WAR PREPARATION LACK OF INITIATIVE REVIEW AFTER TEN WEEKS OF WAR. A general impression of German war tactics after some ten weeks' observation m the field, according to the special correspondent of the "Morning Post" mS! these , two P° int ' s outstanding: (I) the wonderful thoroughness of preparation on the part of the German nation for this war; and (2) the failure or tne Uerman nation to assert a superiority over.or even an equality with, its British, French,- and Belgian antagonists in unforeseen contingencies calling for individual initiative, fh S l '*/* could be provided for by ■thought beforehand, in nlLthe book-work and routine of war, in the matters of discipline and of equipment, the German force was generally ahove criticism, in those other, things which tell of the character of 'a race, of its native wit. and its -natural courage the German lias taken second placa to the Belgian the Frenchman, the British man. Constantly, therefore, in considering the «erman at war—apart from the strategy or his campaign, which is outside t?io scope of this article—one is moved to astonishing alternations of applause and censure. Spoiling the Citizen.

But perhaps there is an explanation which will do away with the astonishment. It was impossible that an intelligent and methodical people should tfevote their whole energies to the per'»£u O V of a - pla!1 of aggressive war without secunng great results; but impossible also that, this devotion to a single and. inhuman end • should not nave de-humanised the people somewhat lowered their general intelligence, injured their spirit of initiative. To tram for the defence of one's own coun■V s '* • f.^P 058 ' an ilm necessary part of intelligent life. But to submit to a military,, despotism for the sake of organising a war of conquest over one's neighbours must spoil the citizen somewhat in drilling the eoldier. Germany has profited in the field by the scientific exactness of her war equipment and the blind obedience.of her slavishly-drilled people , She has lost-in the field by the failure of these people under circumstances when equipment failed and common-sense shift" was called for, when obedience was not sufficient andan individual elan and judgment waa called for. ■ . ■>

Perfect Equipment,

In regard to equipment, the first days oi the campaign disclosed how perfected was.the German war machine in this regard. The first German dead gave up maay secrete. The German soldier was clothed in cloth of a colour which on the average of European days gives .ri.¥— t f?[. de of visibility than Khaki. This cloth was excellently woven to withstand weather and strain. Each soldier carried in his, pocket-knife a little equipment for mending his clothes (as also a little first-aid Eed' Cross bandage of adhesive plaster). His boots wore of wonderfully strong and supple leather, such boots as only civilians ingood circumstances can buy. His valise or cowhide tanned, with the hair on, was, most/ingeniously furnished witli straps and removable bolts of white metal for ease of carrying and ease of packing and unpacking. Its contents, disposed, in various little 'cupbc-Urds, gave the- maximum of food reserves and clothing comforts for the space and weight. .-Quite regardless of the value or the soldier's, life at the critical moment of an action, the German plan at least equipped him perfectly at the" outset, even with materials to facilitate the work of pillage'and , incendiariem which lmd neen mapped out for him.' Ihe order-books of' officers and noncommissioned officers showed the same' meticulous devotion to detail. During ail the years of preparation the German mind evidently,devoted itself with'passionate,industry to providing for every lU of the , soldier's life in the field. '

* Inferior Cavalry As the equipment was the zenith the cavalry tactic was the Nadir of the German Army. Whether against the' Belgian, French, or British cavalry the Herman cavalry was- always inferior. Ihe inuch-advertised Uhlans might pear, f'rom'somo episodes to have' done good, daring work; But in real fact they were .simply shot out from headquarters like stones from a catapult recklessly, non-intalligently,- to raid somewhere, anywhere. With so many of them out,they Had to blunder oil some successes. In the aggregate their record! was one of failure. Repeatedly they were trapped and almost exterminated by far inferior forces'(l recall one

instance of many near Osmael'when six Belgian cyclists ambushed twenty-five Uhlans and killed thirteen of them without suffering any loss). ' On the march they had no idea of scouting. In the first phase of the war tne.Uerman idea of cavalry on tie march m hostile country was for a squadron of twenty-five to precede by 500: yards the regiment; without flank scouts or advance scouts. Taught by heavy losses they modified that a little. But neyer did- they seem to learn the scouting side of cavalry work. Nor did their, cavalry seem to know how to follow up a retreat. 1 I have been .in several retreats and rioter were they harassed by the German cavalry. To give another proof from personal experi-

ence, when the Germans after a victory were about to enter a town.Jin three occasions I went forward on a cycle to get in touch with their advance cavalry and make sure of the direction they were taking. Never-was .there any real ground for; nneasinoss in doing 'this, though some Press gentlemen once reported me as killed because they sair me cycling out, apparently into the arms of the Uhlans, at Louvain, after the battle of TirlemontV The German cavalry, in short, had no eyes; its courage -was of the blind sort and 1 rapidly evaporated on a hot challenge. Whether the cavalry was able, to shine in any charges such as used to bo rehearsed so carefully at Potsdam I do not know, not having seen.any .charges or encountered an officer who has.

The Methodical Artillery. Competent observers tell mo that both the British and -the French artillery nave outclassed the* German' in tno heroic combats of Northern France It is a very high record for them,, since' the German artillery, from the heaviest to the lightest, is without a doiibt extraordinarily good in tactics. The way in which it co-operates with its infantry seems to me specially good. Step by step it follows the infantry advance with patient care, and' I have never noticed it either smash up its own men or leave them at a pinch without tho moral support of the guns In return the infantry sticks well to its guns, and I have never noticed nor have heard recorded an instance where the infantry cleared out regardless of the fate of the guns. In artillery ranging the 1 Germans evidently relied upon: (1) An excellent system ot maps. The area of operations was very minutely sot out in numbered squares; and on one battery finding its fire effective on a certain square the number of that square was sent on to as many othnr batteries as was necessary ,nii'd their fire thus could bo instantaneously directed on to the required spot. This system of ranging witli tho aid of squared maps is not peculiar to tho Gorman, artillery but it seems to have

reached with them a high degree of perfection. (2) By aeroplanes and captive balloons. The captive balloons usually operated in couples on two flanks; and, 1 conclude, took cross-observations from two angles of view. (3) Ly tho use of spies within the u,, tlieir antagonist. This was, probably, their most effective incans of ranging. Spies, passing for peasants and wandenngo about the field of i.pcrations, would give signals as to the position of batteries, trenches, and staff omcei's. , .1 he absence was noticeable of ranging by brackets" (i.e., Ending a distance ioin ' ? rmg first afc '° sa s'> 200; J un(l 2300 yards, then at 2100/2200, pud finding tho range at 2050). This system of ranging seems almost obsolete with Uennan batteries.

Moral Effect of Artillery. ~T h e moral effect of = artillery , fire is thoroughly understood and exploited by the Germans. Against infantry in trenches after finding that shrapnel does not cause a quittance they try high explosive—less-likely to be deadly, but more terrifying. On a wide battieneld a proportion of their guns will nre—seemingly without known aim— at points all over the place. This is evidently not only with the hope of finding a chance mark, but of breeding terrors over the whole field, making troops in reserve feel that they, too, are under fire. It is an expensive way of causing fright, but against unseaS °tT roops cai * be useful- ■ Ihe German big guns were laid perfectly It was always possible to see what they were aimed at, and to recogmse that the aim was good. In tlifl bombardment of Antwerp in narticular I noticed this. The guns clearu> had exactly the right elevation- and" exactly the right deflection. Whether it was intended or not—l think it was—the last stage of that b'lnbardment showed perfection in big-gun Pointing. Six shells, in quick succession came within a few yards of the Hotel de.Ville. " I imagined ihafc the idea was to hurry up the. burgomaster V° m V Ut BUrre nder. \Ho had eit on that mission at 8.30, just before this bouquet of shells arrived.) Ihere was no notable horse aitili'ery work on the part of the Germans, so tar as I could see or hear. The artillery worked.perfectly '|by the book," without dash or any spirit of adventure. Certainly it was never pushed forward to punish a retreat

The Infantry's Mass Attacks,

~ The German infantry has to be credited with a very stubborn courage, mJ T™rd so , far as can be i ud ecd, chiefly "officers' courage." Left to themselves the German infantrymen were prone to surrender though the same men under their officers would sutter the most severe punishment without flinching. The virtues and defects aiik.o or the German military system concentrated in the infantry?' Educated, partly by godly precept, partly b>: brutality, into believing that the military officer is a being apart, worthy of worship, the German rank and filo follow their..officers, or are driven forward by their officers, in positions which seem almost desperate. On the other hand, the German rank and file,-depriV oa of their ; officers, are nwe helpless than French' or Brit ish soldiers in the same circumstances. In entrenching himself the German soldier is as good as the best (book work and methodical practicel). In taking advantage of natural cover he is far interior to the British (absence of initiative!). Ihe virtues, and defects alike or his training send him to the cliaree m.close platoons. Thus he is easier to Kill but more terrible if he arrives. His marksmanship is inferior to that of the British soldior, but his voliey-firing-helped by the ilat trajectory of his rifle bovory effective. .He is not or the bayonet as a weapon. at all sparing of the infantry ■when the order to advance is given, the Uerman tactics is nevertheless careful of its fnfantry in that it practises a very thorough, artillery preparation, and, I have noted beiore, the artil/lery follows the infantry step by step

Cerman Air Work, In regard to minor • points, tho German air work was far letter than was expected in the absence 01 any special advertisement of her airmen,before the war. Her aeroplane proved a vorv good very. serviceable model, and the aeronauts were, it seemed, standardised A laube could always be relied upon for about the same speed and daring. The, German commissariat and transport had

astonishingly hard .work to do and ■seemed on the whole to do it very well Occasionally the men lacked food; but I donot think they e\er lacked ammunition. Food problems were in part solved by the system of pillage, but the demands, of the wasteful guns had to be supplied from headquarters, and, apparently, always were.' In the , villages and towns the individual German soldier showed a tendency to become human and to attempt to fraternise with', the inhabitants. Perhaps, it was partly because of a fear of the results of this that some of the outrages were organised. Fraternising with civilians would have deteriorated the discipline, so slavish in its methods, and would have probably led to many desertions'. Summed up, the German Army in the field had all the virtues which a thorough hook preparation and a slavish discipline could giva. But it was not the ideal army; and, in my judgment,' inferior in effectiveness to the French and the British Armies. Comparing it particularly with the British Army, it showed no. point of superiority, and several points of inferiority. '