THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2255, 15 September 1914, Page 6

THE RUSSIAN ARMY

ITS NEW POWER WHAT GERMANY OVERLOOKED "The Russian Army in Future War" is the subject of an interesting article ill the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, transited by Lieut. B. M. B. Bateman, 11.A,, from the "Revue des Francais." "Pay. by day," states the article, "ovents, by bringing the diplomacy or -the Triplo Alliance faoo to , .face with that of tho Triplo Entente, and by inciting tfie majority of the Powers to improve their war machines, the clearest support of their policies, give a peculiar importance to the power of Russia. Since the. Russian Army is. capable of intervening more rapidly than formerly in case of conflict, Germany has found herself obliged to. modify her arrangements. . If, for tile future, the Russian Army is the principal support of Slav, aspirations in opposition to German claims, it means, actually, for us French, an ally whose effective support will become more and more important as timo goes on. "However, with us very little is yet known of this army; polemics have been raised about it, inspired either by. an unreasoning enthusiasm or hy a feeling of mistrust aroused in due course by certain modifications whicli our ally had thought fit to make. So, at a time when the European groupings are engaged in counting their forces, it appears to us an opportune moment to show what is really the strength of tho Russian Army, particulars of its organisation, and the eventual character of its co-operation iu a European conflict. . ,-.'•■.■'. New Distribution of the Army. "When, in October, 1910,' the St. Petersburg' General Staff adopted a new distribution of army corps over the Empire's territory, this proceeding had a considerable effect in the Press of France as well as abroad. Forgetting the increase of power which resulted,from it, some, uneasy at tho reduction of the troops* in Poland, cried out in alarm, almost accusing Russia of forgetting her obligations as an ally. On the other hand, Pan-German journals exulted. "Tho fact that Russia has with-, drawn- her troope from her "western frontier to the great annoyance of the French," said tho "National Zeitung," of February 18, 1911, "proves that she wishes to display a greater energy on her eastern frontier; Russian diplomacy now abandons the policy which it adopted in error." "As a mere member of the Triple Entente," added the "Voss Gazette," on its part, after the review at Potsdam between the Tsar and Kaiser. "Russia is deplorably "weak, while she knowß how to act when she becomes moTe friendly with Germany." It was-a case of forming a top biased and hasty conclusion; in fact, it was a caso on the part of both of looking at only one side of tho question, not taking sufficient account of the extraordinary development which had occurred in the railways' of the Empire during the last fifteen years; everyone knows the importance of railways in a modern war; mobilisation, concentration, and oven active operations depend especially on them. To put to the test "this simple optical offect" to : which General Soukhoralinoff, Minister of War,. lately leferred, to be able to come to a conclusion based on a knowledge of all tho facts,' it is- necessary to make a comparative .study of the former and now organisations of the Russianforces, to determine the roll destined for our ally in.case.of a European, conflict, and j finally ■.t-o ) ' ; |'gee,.iff,.,th'e,! ) meap i ures . adopted allow this role to "be successfully, performed." ' ~' ' ■

Methods of Mobilisation. - In the eariy days of the Alliance'the lack of , means of communication obliged 'Russia to mass her active -European troops in proximity to their eventful theatre of operations, in order to expedite their taking the field, their mission consisting essentially ■ of taking the offensive against Germany at the earliest possible opportunity.- So i.tho army corps at this period were disposed to tho west of the line, St. PetersburgMoscow, Simjerpool; to the east of this line there were only skeleton cadres. However, the forward march of tho Russian troops could:'only be begun once the mobilisation and concentration were complete; the following are the means by which these operations were brought about. The units along the western frontier, those of the Warsaw district and. some of the Wilna and Kiev districts, already with largo 'peace strengths, drew their reservists , from the same, part of the country; they could, therefore, be ready to take the field about the eighth day after declaration of war. The other , regiments of the interior received their balance of reservists from all other provinces of Russia in Europe. Hampered by the scarcity'of railways, the mechanism of mobilisation was as follows: the reservists, on being warned: by means of notices, repaired to a prescribed /rendezvous ; gradually as they arrived, they were sent off in batches ,by the commanding officers of the recruiting districts, and according to the numbers re? quired to complete regiments: these detachments were at once dispatehed by rail to their respective garrisons. 'The units then, proceeded with their mobilisation, completing their equipment and supplies; at this "stage they • were forwarded, to their concentration zones, ..where they, only arrived complete betweon the 35th and 40th day: Apart' from its'complication, this system had the • inconvenience of distributing amongst the active companies, and that at the last moment, reservists of all ages of uneven physical resistance, and in the majority of cases unknown to officers; the cohesion of units must have been ' especially affected by it. Once the active corps had been mobilised, there remained a notable surplus of reservists to use. Consequently there existed in time of peace special units called reserve cadres, from which second line formations were expanded; as a rule, eight battalion cadres mobilised 32 reserve battalions, ■ according to the same.rules as those described above. . , "To sum up, formerly tho Russian system of. mobilisation was analogous in its form to that employed in Franco in 1870, when our northern reservists went to mobilise in the centre or the south, to be at onco nioved into Lorraine; as is well known, delays, disorders, mistakes, and unwelcome dissillusions resulted from this method. If it is added that in addition to this start'obtained in the German and Austrian mobilisation exposed the Russian advancedguard army in Poland to be crushed before being supported by the armies of ''the interior, it is clear that an improvement was indicated ae necessary. And so it was inevitable that, as soon as tho feasibility of it was evident, Russia thought of remodelling a system sn defective. Increase in Railways. . "During the last twenty years, the agricultural, commercial, aiid industrial progress of the Russian Empire lias necessitated the development of rail communication; moreover, the loans raised in France were to a large extont devoted to this purpose; and so as soon as in 1910 the Russian railway system admitted, the military re-organisa-tion on moro rational linos became moro possiblo, and was successfully realised. At present, tho increase in railways allows the reservists to rejoin their garrisons and makes mobilisation much less difficult than before. Besides tho lines of communication leading from the centre and the Eaet of the Empire to the western frontier are more numerous and capablo of a more dense traffic. Where not lone ago there were only six concentration lines, of .which throe, are.

• double, there are now available eigW lines, of whidi six are double lines ( without even counting certain bran,cli linos, : of which six are double lines, which would accelerate the concentration. Russia, who fifteen years ago, was less well provided than Austria, is now , better off, since her neighbour, for the concentration of her arniy in Galicia, would have only at her disposal seven linos, of which only two are double. For the former system, which grouped the Russian active troops in the western provinces, and left the greater part of the reserves in the eastern districts, it has been possible to substitute in 1910 ii new analagous fo that at present adopted by all the' greater military .Powers by distributing corps in conscriptions where thev recruit the majority of their young soldiers, and the whole of their reservists. Tho regiments,- scattered over the whole of tW area, so as to exploit the immense resources in men more judiciously, each . possessed their own recruiting division. On mobilisation, the reservists proceed direct to their unit; thus precious time is saved, which was formerly taken up iu forming batches at the recruiting 'collecting points, and by their dispatch to their garrisons. Further, the reservists, as in France, will return as a rule to the company in which they did their colour service;-they will be more reliable, bettor known to their officers, and the value of units will be enhanced. In addition to which, the proportion -, of. reservists in tie mobilised companies is practically the same as in Francs' and Germany, i.e., 34 per. cent, in-the covering regiments, and 52 per cent, in those, of the interior;' the squadrons are entirely formed of men serving with'the colours. These- new arrangements "will probably enable mobilisation to be com> pleted on. the sixth day, and the con« centration. to -be-begun on the seventh,. This was in fact, tho timo taken at the time of the Russo-Japanese War by some eastern frontier unite, who tilled up with reservists on the spot: som'o managed even to mobilise in thro* days. .'.... Advantages Caincd. • "This reorganisation,, not only produces a distinct acceleration in mobilisation and. an improvement in the value of the first line troops, destined tc bear the first shock,' but it presents fctill more valuable advantages. In the first placo, it leads to a fairer distribution of the military burdens over the provinces. . Thus it satisfied the . ■wishes of-the Duma, who, on account . of the increase of the population in the centre of the Empire, had,firmly demanded larger, garrisons in the Jlosi cow and Kazan districts. The establishment of a staff for; recruiting, which' , bad not existed before, ' insured ' its : proper administration. Further, three . years' service,- substituted, for five i years in 1906, helps to keep the reserves ! rather younger and improves the en- .' ergy of tho mobilised army by reducing exemptions considerably, and, Tby forc- | ing young men of. education into the ranks, ensures the. recruiting of. reserve .officers, .who,, up till then, left much to be desired'on the score of;quantity as well as quality. ';'. . , ■ ' ' ' "The result of the change is. that, in ' Europe alone, without .counting the Caucasus,' Russia has ' .increased her ' army-by three strategical .units .(27 I corps instead of 24), and the importance' 1 is obyioue of numerous large -units from ■ the point of view of tactics." ' ' t

:■,;. ORIGIN OF THE WAR . . WHERE THE-BLAME BELONGS. "An American Professor" writes as follows to the editor of tie New York ''Evening Post":—. : ■: "It is right that the German side should be presented as in the letters which you are publishing. The writers, however, should remember that; Germany has .given two greaii; affronts' to the peace of the world,' the taking of Alsace and Lorraine, the fatality of which was sorrowfully predicted by Crown. Prince Friedrioh. at the time of the declaration of war in 1870, and the building of a' great war navy, whose object could only nave been predatory, for Germany hae no colonies of value. Except for these two mistakes, Kaiser Wilhelni II would to-day be the most honoured of ; all guests in Paris and London. "Wβ in New York are proud of Columbia University and b the Rockefeller Institute, but few of ..us realise that such establishments exist in tenfold magnitude in Berlin. Americans who know the triumphs of orderly domestic government there, can only turn'with horror from the spectacle of a.poweVM man whoso word 'this shall not be thrown in the balance would have accomplished peace. ..- . - - ■ : "The blowing up of the Maine brought in its wake the wanton destruction of our reputation as a great nation which could get on'without war. The killing of an Austrian prince has 'reduced Europe to barbarism. ' Americans. to whom the glory of England, France, and Germany each in itself makes its own special appeal must not be criticised for placing the blame-squarely when it belongs." . .;. , ■'.•. ■.'■ '■ '

The potato-planting scheme at Lower Hutt was commenced in/real earnest on Saturday afternoon. Through;the week about an acre and a half of land Had been ploughed, disced, and harrowed at the Recreation Grounds, and abou., eighteen volunteers sacrificed their afternoon in order that the work of planting might be started. The Mayor (Mr* H. Baldwin) and Mr. Allen supervised the work, and after- all-the preparco ground had been planted, the workers ■were entertained at afternoon tea by Mr. Baldwin and Mrs. Ayson. At the Eastern' Hutt. School grounds about an acre and a half of land has been plough-. Ed, and is ready for the discs, ere planting operations are begun. The attention of horse-owners and others is directed to a preliminary notico of a huge patriotic sale of produce to be held shortly by the-N.Z. Farmers' Co-op. Distribution Co., Ltd., at No. "3 Shed, King's Wliarf, the proceeds of which will go .to the Dominion War Fund. -, ..".; . ... : New York newspapers have been thanking Britain for keeping the seaway open, and the thanks are well deserved. There is no doubt, remarks an Australian exchange, that American commerce has been saved a good deal of delay and annoyanco by the fact that British ships have cleared the seas. It is not, of course,',a question of attack, since America is a neutral State. But neutral vessels aro always open;to. the exercise of the woll-recognisd right of "visit and search" by any belligerent warship. And a liability to continual stoppages at the bidding of strange cruisers, which may send off boats and inquisitive officers to insist upon the hauling up through the batches for examination of quite a large proportion , of a,vessel's cargo, is not likely to help commerco much. It is beginning to be realised that a commanding navy such as Britain's is very much ,morß than a costly but needed protection to the island that pays for it, and that in war-time, as in peace-time, it could ill bo spared by the commerce of _ tho world. Indeed, there is not a business man ouside Austria and Germany that it does not benefit indirectly at all times. In peace it charts and polices tho remotest seas, cheerfully . making the profession of pirate unprofitable even in its final resorts, the Persian Gulf and Chinese waters-, and causing the last of the slave traders to be very, sorry for themselves. And in war time it does the samo policing'on a. larger scale, putting more heart into the fearful trader, as ho sees cargoes arrive to time and the barometer of war risks gradually falling. ■ Dr. W. B. Bruce, the well-known Scottish scientist and explorer,' headed an oxpedition which left Edinburgh recently to cary out hydrographic and geological research in the least known of the sea lakes flf Suitzbomen, ■