The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 1914.. THE NORTH SEA BLOCKADE

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2229, 15 August 1914, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 1914.. THE NORTH SEA BLOCKADE

The. operations of the British North Sea Fleet are still slrrouded in mystery: : but the occasional glimpses of light that have momentarily pierced the obscurity have afforded good-grounds for the belief that our warships are more than holding their own. The sinking of the Qerman submarine and the sending of wounded Germans to British hospitals show , that some fighting has takon place, and the assurance of the Admiralty regarding the safety of the ocean trade routes indicates lhat the enemy's fleet is effectually bottled up. This means that the German North Sea ports are blockaded, (It will be. remembered that the Briti3h >, §!Jeet sailed some time before war was declared, and it may be taken for granted that wlien hostilities actually commenced the Navy was in full command, of the North Sea. Tho principal aim of a fleet in time of war -. is to destroy the enemy's sea power, i But this cannot always be done immediately, even by a superior force. In the meantime the. object of naval strategy _ is to control the. lines of communication and ocean trade routes, so as / to annihilate the enemy's overseas trade and to make it impossible for the warships on the other side to'be-nioved from place to place without having to try conclusions with a more powerful force; A belligerent., whose sea power is weaker than that of bjs adversary naturally desftcs to a.vbid a. decisive battle in the opon, aud,-if possible,

ho keeps his fleet in port until the . time is considered opportune for I striking a blow. _ In such circura- ! stances the superior force must re- ( main in the neighbourhood, in order i to prevent the enemy's ships from i doing any harm. In this way the I weaker fleet can be rendered useless, i oven though it cannot bo destroyed. : The ultimate aim is not to keep the : adversary's ships bottled up, but to ' ensure that they will be defeated if - they como out. Nelson, for in- : 6tancc, denied that ho blockaded ' Toulon in the sense of sealing up tho port. '"The port of Toulon has ! never been blockaded by me," ho i said; "quite the reverse —every opportunity has been offered to tho enemy to put to sea, for it is there that wo hope to realise the hopes and expectations of our country, and I trust that they will not be disappointed." The aim of Admikai, Sie John Jellicoe, who is in command of the North Sea Fleet at tho present moment, is no doubt the same as that of Nelson. The probabilities are that ho has no desire to keep' the German warships permanently blocked up in their own ports. He would be only too glad to see them como out into the open sea and do battle with the British Elect. A naval blockade at the present day is a much more difficult and dangerous operation than it was in the old days of sailing ships, when a line of smaller vessels closely guarded the to the port while the larger warships cruised in the vicinity ready to act at any, moment. The advent of steam propulsion, Dreadnoughts, < submarines, aeroplanes, and wireless telegraphy has made these simple methods no longer possible. It would bo madness to place battleships at fixed stations where they would be within reach of the enemy's torpedo craft. Referring to modern methods of blockade, a naval authority states that .. " in the conditions established by the advent of the torpedo and.its characteristic craft, there would seeiri to be only two alternatives open to a'fleet of battleships engaged in blockade operations. Either it must bo stationed in some sheltered anchorage outside the radius of action of the enemy's surface torpedo craft, and if within that radius adequately defended against torpedo' attack; or it must cruise in tho open outside the same limits, keeping in tonch with its advanced cruisers and flotillas by means of wireless; telegraphy, and thereby dispensing with" anything like a fixed rendezvous. The Fleet need i riot always stay outside the prescribed radius, for it is* a very difficult thing for torpedo craft to damage battleships winch are continually moving ■ at high speed, especially when they are themselves liable to attack from tho cruisers and torpedo craft of the blockading squadron. The the German naval authorities at the present time seems to be to keep theli fleets under shelter until they have weakened and worn down Britain's superior force by torpedo attacks, by the severe strain of unceasing vigilance, by genera} wear and tear, and by the periodical, need of' repairing and refitting; and if the British fighting strength could be' sufficiently reduced by -these, means tho German fleet would then sail out and risk a battle. But after making full allowance for the wearing down process the fact remains that the superior force must always possess an enormous advantage. Tho blockaders can also wear down ;arid destroy, as the -Japanese did at Port.Arthur, and tno weaker force has the same anxieties and need for continual alertness .as its adversary. The advantage of--superior strength is .ovorwholming, -in the opinion of the authority already quoted, "if it is associated with energy, dcterminationj initiative, and skill of disposition no more than equal to that of tho assailant." .The blockade/thedestruction of tho enemy's shipping, and the cu'tting. off of his food supplies are, of course, factors of the utmost importan'ceTin naval warfaio. but tho supreme and ultimate object ' must always be to destroy'the armed forces of the-adyersary. The main purpose of.Nelson and other great British seamen'was not merely to cripple the enemy, or tb get the best of an encounter, or to bottle up his warships; but to destroy hostile fleets wherever they.found them, and to annihilate the sea' power of Britain's, foes. ■:'-..