SUPREME COURT.

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2010, 18 March 1914, Page 5

SUPREME COURT.

SUSPENSION OF A COUNCILLOR. OHAKUNE CASE. ' I HE GAINS HIS POINT IN COURT.

The interesting case concerning the power ot a borough council to suspend ono of its members and prevent him from talcing part in the council meetings for a certain period was decided by the Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout) in the Supremo Court yesterday. The case arose out of trouble in the Ohakuuo Borough Council, and His Honour's decision is agaiust tlie council. Briefly, the facts were that, in consequence of a remark which ho made to tho Mayor, at a meeting of the council on February 17, Councillor Wilkie was (on March 4) suspended by tho council lor fourteen days. Ho wished particularly to attend a meeting of the council on March 17, and aslred the Court to issue an injunction preventing tho council from debarring him from doing so. At the outset of his judgment, His Honour stated tho case in these terms: "This is an application by a town councillor of Ohakune for an injunction agaiust the Mayor and other town councillors for , depriving him of his right to be present at meetings of the council. Two important questions are raised, first, (1) whether this is a case for the interference of the Court by injunction, and (2) whether the right to suspend a town councillor can be exercised by the Ma3 - or or Borough Council." Court's Power to Intervene. His Honour first dealt with the law on the point as to whether tho Court had power to grant an injunction. Ho considered that, as tfho rights of property wore involved, and were to be dealt with at last night's meeting _of the council, the Court had jurisdiction to interfere by injunction if the circumstances warranted that course. In arriving at the conclusion that tho rights of property were involved, ho observed that, as a town councillor, Councillor "Wilkie was a representative of a focal body that .had dealing with property as one of its functions. Suspension Illegal.

His Honour then dealt with the question of the council's power of suspension. "Clearly," ho said,- "there must be an inherent power in every meeting to maintain order, otherwise business could not proceed, and, if a person persists in being disorderly, be may be removed froin the meeting. This, I think, exists as a right independent of the liability of a person who interrupts a meeting to be punished under the Police Olfoncos Act, and tinder the by-laws of the borough." But (continued His Honour) was tliero.power to suspend a member? Such poive-r was. not granted by the Municipal Corporations Act, and, as the corporation was purely a creation of the- statute, it could not be said to have any powers that a corporation'created by charter, and not by statute, may have- had at common k»y. It would have been .ultra vires liad'tho corporation made a law of suspension. Moreover, this particular resolution of suspension was illegal, because it was passed at a special meeting at which the suspension was not one of the tpecial questions. Further, it was also clear that if tho standing orders of the House of Representatives of i\ow' ; Zealand were apphcablo to tho Obakune Borough Council, J-he suspension passed by the council was iu excess of the powers conferred by the Standing Orders of the House, for in Parliament tho suspension could only be for ono week unless there was a second oifence, and in the Ohakune case there did not appear to b? a second offence. Therefore, from any point of viow, the suspension was illegal. The only question remaining, then, was whether an injunction should be issued. There was power to grant the injunction, and as an action for trespass or assault would not bo an efficient' remedy, seeing that a meeting was to be held at onco, dealing with matters of property, he ordered that tho injunction should issue, to prevent the Mayor and borough councillors from stopping tho plaintiff sitting at and taking part in the meetings of the council.

On tbo question of costs, His Honour said that he had no doubt that the trouble had been caused by .Councillor Wilkio, ;aud that tho council had actod bona fido, Believing that they had power to suspend, and that their action was dictated by the belief that it was necessary to maintain order and uphold the dignity of tho council. Ho would, therefore, -allow only small costs—five guineas. \ GIFT OR LOAN? FATHER'S ACCOUNT WITH SONS. Matters concerning accounts and a will were briefly dealt with by His Hon-ouiv-the Chiof Justice. John Latham and James Alexander M'Gillivray, of Timaru, were tho plaintiffs. The actions which they took were against William and Hugh Taylor, sons of the late Kobert Taylor, of Timaru. The plaintiffs, who were the executors of the will of the late Mr. ( Taylor, claimed,.a sum of £700 from defendants. ' This sum they said had been lent to the sons by tho father. The defence filed to this claim was that the money was a gift, not a loan to Hugh, and that William had never received any of the money. "£I4OO As Wages." A further action was taken against William Taylor by plaintiffs, claiming an account for moneys received as manager of his Into father's farm," in the Southland district. . William Taylor's answer was a counter-claim, in which he said that he managed the farm without receiving . wages, on the understiUidiiiK that when his father died he was to get the farm. Ho alleged, also, that ho had advanced his father £500. As the farm had not been bequeathed to him, he claimed £1400 as wages, at the rate of £100 per yea; , . Mr. D. L. I'oppelwell, of Gore, appeared for tho plaintiffs; and there was uo appearance of the defendants. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs on both actions, and tho counter-claim mentioned was .dismissed. Tho accounts are to be taken before the Registrar, and leave is , reserved to the plaintiffs to move for judgment. Interest on the £700 claimed was allowed at.the rate of 7 per cent, from June 6, 1912, to March 17/1914.